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ABSTRACT
One of the most unexpected changes of the 1990s is that firms in a number of emerging
economies not previously known for their high-technology industries have leapfrogged to
the forefront in new Information Technologies (IT). Surprisingly, from the perspective of
comparative political economy theories, the IT industries of these countries use different
business models and have carved out different positions in the global IT production
networks. Of these emerging economies, the Taiwanese, Israeli, and Irish have successfully
nurtured the growth of their IT industries. This dissertation sets out to establish that
emerging economies have more than one option for developing their high technology
industries. Moreover, it advances a theoretical framework for analyzing how different
choices lead to long-term consequences and to the development of successful and radically
different industrial systems. Hence, this dissertation strives to give politics - the art and
profession of creating alternatives and the social struggles of choosing between, and acting
on, them - the importance that it seems to have lost in the social sciences. The research
focuses on the role of the state in shaping the structure of the IT industry in Israel, Ireland,
and Taiwan. It argues that the developmental path of the IT industry is influenced by four
critical decisions by the state. First, decisions about how to acquire the necessary R&D
skills influence which organizations - public or private - play a leading role in innovation.
Second, state decisions about financing significantly affect both the R&D resources
available to the industry and the scope of R&D activity. Third, state efforts to develop local
leading companies have long-term consequences for the industry's opportunity structure.
Fourth, state decisions regarding foreign firms and investors within and outside national
borders affect the resources and the information that the industry receives from its
customers, as well as the diffusion and development of specific innovative capabilities. Of
particular importance are state decisions that develop specific links between local and
foreign companies, investors, and financial markets. Overall, the dissertation utilizes this
framework to explain the divergent development of the IT industry in Taiwan, Israel, and
Ireland.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzanne Berger
Title: Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One - Plurality, Choice, and the Politics of Industrial Innovation
"Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter,
corresponds to the human condition ofplurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the
World. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is
specifically the condition - not only the conditio sine que none, but the conditio per quam - of all political
life"
Hannah Arendt - The Human Condition (Arendt 1958 p. 7).
Explaining Rapid-Innovation-Based Development
One of the most unexpected developments of the 1990s is that firms in a number
of emerging states not known for their high-technology industries in the past, moved to
the forefront in new Information Technologies (IT). Even more surprising from the point
of view of comparative political economy theories, the IT industries of these countries
seem to embody different business models and to carve out different positions in the
global production network of the US dominated IT industry. Of these emerging
economies, the Taiwanese, Israeli, and Irish indigenous IT industries, riding what seems
to be one of the greatest waves of industrial innovation ever, have become hotbeds of
New Technology Based Firms (NTBF). Some of these firms have become global players
over the last ten years.
That very different IT industries working in the same sectors and markets have
grown in emerging economies challenges two central ideas in the comparative political
economy literature. First, it suggests that there is a way for less developed countries to
become successful players in rapid innovation-based (RIB) industries, something that
was not considered plausible in the past. Second, it suggests that there are multiple
choices for industrial development. The cases of Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan demonstrate
that states and societies, even under conditions of intense globalization in one of the most
globalized industries, can pursue different strategies of economic growth.
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Contemporary political economy literature cannot satisfactorily explain many of
the changes in industrial systems in the last few decades. This is especially true in the
case of RIB industries in emerging economies. First, contemporary political economy has
a dismal view of the prospects for RIB industrial leapfrogging by backward societies.
While each of the standard theories has a particular approach, they all unite in pessimism
about the possibility of using government policies to leapfrog in RIB industries, i.e., to
transform a relatively backward society to a front-rank competitor in technological
innovation in a time-span of one generation.' Second, none of the theories can
accommodate a situation in which a few different emerging countries, each employing
very different industrial policies, planned and implemented by very different
bureaucracies, as well as having very different labor market regulations, financial
institutions, and educational/training systems, achieve success at the same time in the
same R&D-intensive sectors.
Against these bleak predictions, the stories of Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan present
cases of successful RIB industrial growth in the time span of one generation in countries
with very different political and institutional systems. Thus, the stories of IT industrial
development in Taiwan, Ireland, and Israel, offer us multiple puzzles, the answers to
which are intimately linked to important debates in comparative political economy. First,
comparing the three stories provides us with insights into a highly contested issue of
For the purpose of this dissertation, success in RIB industrial growth is defined as the development of an
industry based around NTBFs, which contribute a significant amount of GDP growth, exports, and
employment, making the industry a critical sector of the national economy. I use the common definition of
NTBF from the literature: companies whose products are new technologies, are based on their own and
others' R&D effort to commercialize applications of new technology, or, companies whose main revenue
stream is based on R&D efforts to develop new technologies. I further elaborate on it by defining IT NTBF
as a company whose main product/s are either a new technology or a new application of new technology
that its main function is the gathering, transferring, possessing, or presenting of information, and where the
company is conducting the R&D that leads to the product itself, either with or without cooperation with
other organizations.
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economic growth - the role of the state in the development of high-technology industries
in less developed economies. Second, comparing the three very different paths of science
and technology industrial policy regimes and development, bears upon the question of
whether states and societies have choices in their economic development strategies.
Finally, comparing the three different positions and relationships of the local IT industry
with the global IT production networks offers us an understanding of how globalization,
and especially the radical transformation of production, influences development
opportunities of peripheral economies.
Politics are about crafting and picking alternatives. Politics matters, therefore,
only if choices can be made and if making them has real consequences. In the last three
decades, students of politics have done their best to convince us that choosing between
alternatives, even if choices exist, no longer truly matters. Nowhere is this more evident
than in comparative political economy, particularly in the study of industrial
development. Both the neo-classical economists in their belief that the only choice is to
let the market rule, and the developmental statists, arguing that only specific structures of
states bring forth industrial success, have marginalized the importance of picking
between true alternatives.
The aim of this dissertation is to show that choices still exist, that states and
societies, through the political process of crafting and picking alternative modes of
action, can fellow diverse paths and still achieve industrial success. Furthermore, this
dissertation aims to prove that the outcome of each path is a different socio-industrial
system with different strengths, different weaknesses, and a different distribution of the
fruits of success. I argue that choices have real consequences. This dissertation sets out to
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confirm that emerging economies have different options in regard to their industrial
development. Moreover, it advances a framework of thinking about how different choices
lead to long-term consequences and the development of successful and radically different
industrial systems. Hence, this dissertation strives to give politics - the art and profession
of creating alternatives and the social struggles of choosing between, and acting on, them
- the importance that they seem to have lost in social science.
The goals of this dissertation are twofold: first, to expand our understanding of the
role of the state in the development of the rapid-innovation-based industries. The
dissertation aims to clarify not only what options less developed states have or do not
have to spur the creation of, and sustain, IT industrial growth, but also to analyze and
map the limits of state actions and the dynamics of state-industry interactions. To do so,
the analysis focuses on the ways in which the three states influenced the skills and
capabilities acquired and developed by the private IT industry.
The second goal of the dissertation is to explain how the different approaches of
the three states shaped the IT industries, and influenced the particular development path
of, and the particular capabilities developed by, each industry. I seek to move beyond the
question of whether or not the state has a role in industrial development. I propose a
theory concerning the influence of particular policies on the development of RIB
industries in emerging economies. Much of the literature in comparative political
economy takes the existence of different industrial and capitalistic systems as given and
explains their influence on the behavior of firms and economies under the same global
conditions. This dissertation seeks to understand how different industrial systems are
created in the first place. It argues that state actions give rise to different high technology
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industries. These industries not only utilize different business models, position
themselves differently in the global production network, and acquire different skills and
capabilities, but also have very different strengths and weaknesses and distribute the
fruits of their success very differently within their host societies. In short, this dissertation
argues that choices are made, actions are taken, and these choices and actions have
consequences.
A Brief Historical Description of the Three Cases
Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan were poor, peripheral, and technologically backward
societies in 1950. They all had mixed histories of success in more traditional industries.
At the end of the 1960s, state-led initiatives to develop indigenous high-tech industries
appeared in all three societies. At that point, all three were very similar along most of the
important economic dimensions, including size and population. All three had low skill
intensity in their labor force (defined as the number and percentage of scientists and
engineers in the population), a relatively low percentage of high school graduates, poor
communication and physical infrastructures, and a high dependence upon agriculture.
All three states followed similar infrastructure policies. Each improved its
education system, leading to high rates of skill formation between 1960 and the 1980s.
All three improved their physical infrastructures, and, after failed attempts at direct
bureaucratic control, created public telecommunication companies that vastly improved
their line subscription penetration rates. Deregulation and privatization of the
telecommunication market followed, leading to high rates of wireless and Internet
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penetration. Finally, unlike Japan and South Korea, all three based their growth on small
and medium size enterprises rather than on big corporations.2
Despite the similarities of their macro level and infrastructure policies, however,
their micro, i.e., industry and firm level, policies were distinctly different. For most of the
period since the late 1960s, Ireland has focused mainly on inward investment policies.
Israel has focused on inducing industrial R&D activities through government grants, with
project ideas originating solely from private industry. In Taiwan, the ruling party, the
KMT, mistrusted big private industry and feared the rise of competing powers. Hence, it
prevented the creation of overarching conglomerates, controlled the inflows and outflows
of investment, and relied on public research agencies such as ITRI and III to lead R&D
efforts and diffuse the results throughout private industry.
Moreover, the structure of the state in all three countries varies significantly.
Ireland is a model of an English-style Weberian bureaucracy with its separation between
engineering and management, i.e., between industrial domain knowledge and high-level
bureaucrats and politicians. Taiwan is a model example of a technocratic Weberian
bureaucracy. All high and mid-level bureaucrats, as well as their Ministers, have graduate
education in engineering, and thus, are quite versed in their industrial domain knowledge.
Israel has a much more chaotically structured bureaucracy. The key principle behind its
establishment was to balance bureaucratic professionalism and the ability of politicians to
implement their will. The result is similar to the American bureaucracy: elected
politicians bring in many of the top executives, including all the director generals of state
ministries, from outside the state structure. These differences significantly influence the
2 On Japan's and South Korea's conglomerate-based industrial development, see, for example Amsden
1989; Anchordoguy 1989; Calder 1993; Evans 1995; Fields 1997; Johnson 1982; Okimoto 1987.
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politics of industrial development in each country. Moreover, their existence severely
weakens arguments that focus all their explanatory power on specific state structure.
It is important to underscore the critical role of the state in all three cases. For
many years, the private market did not possess the necessary skills and capabilities to
successfully create and manage R&D-based IT companies. Private actors, in particular
investors, shied away from even attempting to do so. Moreover, even after more than a
few successes, such as the spin-off of UMC from ITRI in Taiwan, or the several IPOs of
Israeli firms on the New York stock exchanges by 1989, private financial institutions
were unwilling to invest in the IT industry. Thus, the state was the only actor able and
willing to start the process of skills and capabilities development in an attempt to spur the
growth of the industry.
Today, the IT industries of all three countries are undoubtedly successful.3 But the
three IT industries are markedly different in the way they work, the business models they
use, and the way they relate to the global IT production network.
3 In Israel annual overall sales in the high-tech electronic industry, excluding software, more than
quadrupled from 1986 to 2000 from $2.003 billion to $12.5 billion. Exports rose even faster from $1.135
billion to $11 billion. Software sales had the highest growth rates, rising from overall sales of $380 million
in 1989 to over $3.7 billion in 2000. Software exports grew from $5 million in 1984 to over $2.6 billion in
1998. Ireland, a country that lost 1.1% of its total population in 1989 due to economic immigration, has
seen its IT industry achieve remarkable growth. Software was the main sector where indigenous
companies, and not only Irish subsidiaries of MNCs, achieved worldwide success. The number of
indigenous software companies in Ireland rose from 291 in 1991 to 630 in 1998, while the total number of
firms rose from 365 to 760. Revenues reached a total of $6.6 billion, out of which exports were around $6
billion. The total sales of Irish-owned companies were $950 million, a marked improvement from 1991
when total revenues were $2.7 billion, out of which only $234 million came from the Irish-owned sector. In
1998, the IT exports of Taiwan, a country in which the first IC chip was fabricated in a demonstration
fabrication facility of a public research institution only in 1977, reached more than $40 billion, out of which
over 80% were hardware, with a large and growing percentage of the world's chips being fabricated by
Taiwanese companies. Sources: Israel, CBS 2001; IAEI 2002; IASH 2003; MOTI 1998. As the SEC filing
of the leading Israeli software firms were higher than the reported sale figures of the Israeli Association of
Software Houses, there is a reason to believe that the figures above are underestimated; Ireland, IDA 2000;
NID 2003; Taiwan, ITRI 2003; MoEA various years.
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Israeli firms have succeeded in both the software and the hardware subsectors.
The industry's role in the global IT production networks is one of a supplier of high-end
new technologies (or of new products based on new technologies). Thus, Israel's success
is almost solely based on intensive R&D. In Taiwan, the software industry development
has stagnated, and the IT hardware industry is embedded within the global IT production
network in a very different way than Israel's. Taiwan's industry bases its success on
innovation in product design and manufacturing, and focuses on second-generation
innovation R&D. In Ireland, even after more than forty years of industrial policies that
brought MNCs to open manufacturing facilities in Ireland, the indigenous IT hardware
sector growth has not been significant, and it is the local software industry that rose to
prominence.
Politics play a very important role in these stories. In a similar way to Japan in the
late 19th century and Germany before it, these three young societies faced a harsh reality,
in which the result of a failure to build successful national industries would have meant
destruction of their societies as independent social units. Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan were
all societies that had only recently gained their right to independent existence after long,
bitter, and bloody struggles. The leaders who directed the three societies to their current
success - politicians, civil servants, and businessmen and entrepreneurs - were all of a
generation keenly aware of the price of failure.
Thus, the ways in which Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan have been building their
national IT industries, and shaping the relations of these with the global markets, can only
be understood as part of national efforts. These have been endeavors in which Ireland,
Israel, and Taiwan strived not only to stay independent, but also to continuously win
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legitimacy as a coherent national unit, both internally and externally. Economic and
industrial growth has been an important part of the national and international process
with which these societies have been defining and redefining themselves. Analyzing the
roles of the state in the growth of the IT industry, therefore, gives us another mirror in
which to see how national socio-political identity is shaped both inwardly and outwardly
in a globalizing world - a continuation of the constant socio-political struggle to define
what it is to be Irish, Israeli, and Taiwanese.
The bulk of the dissertation aims to show that politics - creating, picking
between, and acting on, different alternatives - have consequences. Accordingly, it
analyzes how different policies are structured and shape different national industrial
systems in turn. However, throughout this dissertation I will also analyze how specific
critical decisions were shaped, in part, as an element in this nation-building political
process. I will briefly explore how Ireland's economic policy was shaped within the
context of its long dependency on Britain and its struggle to shape itself anew; how
science and technology policies were formed by both the Israeli-Arab conflict and the
ongoing quest for a national Jewish identity; and how the Taiwanese IT industry has been
shaped by its formal international political isolation and the need to craft and present a
new and better model of"a China."
The dissertation utilizes the comparative case-study method in an inductive-
iterative theory building effort (Eisenhardt 1989; King et al. 1994; Lin 1987; Ragin 1987;
Ragin 1994; Van Evera 1997; Yin 1994). Hence, the theoretical and research traditions
that this dissertation arises from, firmly believe that only intimate connection with
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empirical reality allows the researcher to develop a relevant and valid theory (Glaser and
Strauss 1967).
The data analyzed in this dissertation comes from a database of 482 interviews
conducted between December 1999 and December 2003, as well as from official and
industrial statistical sources.4 The interviews were conducted with founders and
executives of IT companies, top civil servants in all the developmental and science and
technology industrial agencies, academics, and venture capitalists. All developmental
agencies were visited at least once and their top officials interviewed. In addition,
interviews with the specific labs and departments within each agency were conducted.
For both the hardware and software sectors, a list of companies was compiled from
public and official records. All the major Irish, Israeli, and Taiwanese companies in the
two sectors were interviewed, together with a large sample of smaller companies chosen
from companies that were not doing only bespoke development or consultancy.5 Lastly, a
snowball technique was used to tease out companies that were not included in the original
lists but were deemed innovative by their peers. Thus, our sample was intentionally
biased toward the more successful and R&D-based companies, giving us, if anything, an
overly optimistic view. In all company visits we tried to interview the top management,
preferably the CEO/President and/or the firm's founders.6
4 Of the 482 interviews (not counting repeats), 137 were conducted in Ireland or with Irish companies and
officials in the US, 110 were conducted in Israel or with Israeli companies and official in the US, and 235
were conducted in Taiwan or with Taiwanese companies and officials in the US. Unless otherwise stated
data on company profiles and information was gathered through interviews, SEC filings, Hoover on-line
database, and companies' websites.
5 Because many interviewees from private companies have not only asked to stay anonymous but asked
that no mention be made that their firm was interviewed, unless I needed to refer directly to an interview, a
decision was made that when possible not to specify which of the companies described, were interviewed.
This was done in order to better mask the identity of the interviewees who wished to stay anonymous.
6 While the interviews were open-ended, an interview theme consisting of forty questions organized around
eight sub-themes, was adhered to, with all questions touched upon during the 1-2 hour long interview. The
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The State of the Literature
No single strand of political economy literature offers a comprehensive answer to
the puzzles that motivate this dissertation. The first puzzle is to understand the role of the
state in the development of high-technology industries in less developed economies,
under the conditions of intensified globalization and fragmented production. The second
puzzle is to understand how such different development paths of the high technology
industry appeared, and whether they suggest that multiple developmental choices are
available to emerging economies.
It is therefore necessary to develop a theoretical approach using the arguments of
several theories. For each question our puzzles present we will need to borrow insights
from a different body of literature. The developmental state and late development
theories give us an understanding of the role of the state in economic growth in emerging
economies. Globalization theories, specifically global production network and industrial
fragmentation, offer us a way to understand development in the radical new conditions
caused by the rise of global production networks. Finally, systems of innovation theories,
which seek to explain how different institutional systems affect the innovative capacity of
industrial systems, offer some explanations of how different decisions about resources,
industrial R&D, and industrial relations affect the dynamic creation of firms' capabilities.
Systems of innovation theories also present a theory of how the co-evolution of state-
industry interactions influences different development paths. The following section
explores these theories and the answers they provide to the two puzzles of R&D-based
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interviews' transcripts were then uploaded onto a server running custom-made software that allows access
to the extended database through a web portal with enhanced research engine capabilities.
industrial development of emerging economies. I then use elements of these theories in
my approach, which is presented in the concluding part of this chapter.
Late Development and Developmental State Theories
One prominent school of thought that aims to explain the role of the state in
emerging countries' economic growth is late development. This paradigm originates in
the work of Alexander Gerschenkron on the industrialization of the "late developing"
European countries, e.g., France, Germany, and Italy (Gerschenkron 1962). In Economic
Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Gerschenkron presents an institution-based view
of how a backward state's leadership can use the advantages of relative backwardness to
attain rapid economic growth. He argues that the more economically backward a nation,
the more state intervention is needed if it is to grow. An economic historian of Europe,
Gerschenkron acknowledges that the task of economic growth should be positioned
within the process of modem nation-state building. Late developing states needed a more
rapid industrialization than the pioneering nations, as economic backwardness equals
political and military weakness.
One of Gerschenkron's main arguments is that states have different paths of
industrial development, built around different institutions, depending on the timing of
industrialization. Gerschenkron points to the appearance of a new model of industrial
banks in France and Germany and the transfer of this model to Italy and Russia as they
reached their rapid industrializing phase.
Advancing a linear theory of economic development that sees it as a process with
specific stages, Gerschenkron contends that among the advantages of backward countries
is the fact that product markets are already developed and defined by the pioneering
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countries, which have already invested in the R&D to develop the manufacturing
technologies.7 A backward country, unlike a pioneering country, has the double
advantages of knowing the market, and accordingly being able to predict needs fairly
accurately, as well as of having a clean slate in regards to manufacturing infrastructure so
that its industry can invest in the latest technologies. This allows backward countries to
reach a scale and scope that the pioneering countries cannot match, as they have already
invested in an array of smaller and older manufacturing facilities.
To use these advantages, backward economies need two institutional capabilities:
planning capability (i.e., a professional and capable bureaucracy) and access to large
amounts of patient investment capital, i.e., financiers willing to invest large sums for long
periods of time. If it manages to put these two together, a relatively backward economy
can invest in large-scale factories with the latest manufacturing technology. It can
achieve economies of scale and outdo the leader in manufacturing capacity and global
market share. Gerschenkron stipulates the development of specific and new institutional
systems, different from the institutional system of early developing countries.
The idea that backward economies have a specific path of development that
depends on the timing of their industrialization, is still very prominent in the literature.
For example, Alice Amsden argues that
"If industrialization first occurred in England on the basis of invention, and if it
occurred in Germany and the United States on the basis of innovation, then it
occurs now among 'backward' countries on the basis of learning. The
paradigm of late industrialization through learning generalizes to a diverse
7 Together with Rostow, Gerschenkron gave a paradigmatic all-powerful stature in economic development
studies to the notion that economic development should be seen almost as an organic process that must pass
through certain specific stages before achieving full blossom, and with it the ability to innovate on the
scientific edge (Rostow 1960). A more recent proponent of the linear model in regards to innovation and
the IT industry in Asia was Linsu Kim with his influential model of innovational catch-up progression
(Kim 1997). For an argument that changes in the 1990s made this linear model of sequential innovational
progression less compelling in Asia, see Ernst 2004b.
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assortment of countries... but in all cases industrialization has come about as a
process of learning rather than of generation of inventions or innovations.
Learning moreover, has been based on a similar set of institutions" (Amsden
1989. P. 4. Italics added.)
Even the most recent proponents of the developmental state theories bow to the notion
that common timing necessarily means a common model of development.8
Gerschenkron's model provides the basis for a more recent version of the late
development theories, the developmental state theory. Most writers in this tradition focus
on the rapid growth of Japan after WWII and on the rise of the Asian Newly
Industrialized Countries (NIC), also known as the Tigers or the Dragons. The latter group
of states has been described as late-late-developers. One of the pioneers of this approach
was Chalmers Johnson (Johnson 1982). Johnson situated the industrial and economic
growth of Japan as a part its national-political struggle and development process.9 In
MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Johnson uses Gerschenkronian logic to argue that what
enabled Japan to attain such rapid growth after its devastation in the Second World War
was a unique developmental agency called the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). MITI, argues Johnson, acted as a pilot agency. It not only strategically
planned the development of Japan, relying on the fact that both the technologies and the
major markets for its final products were already well developed, but also used control
over foreign exchange to encourage the entrance and growth of a few large
conglomerates to compete in each of the strategic industries chosen.
Hence, Johnson argues, the fact that the Japanese state had internal cohesiveness,
a capable bureaucracy, and a specific structure with a pilot developmental agency,
8 See, for example, O'Riain 2004. Pp. 6-8, or Amsden proposing the same theoretical argument in her
recent works (Amsden 2001. P 2.)
9 Woo-Cumings elaborates to great lengths on the intimate connection between the developmental state
and its growth as part of the socio-political efforts of nationalism and state building (Woo-Cumings 1999).
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allowed Japan to become a plan-rational-economy, enabling it to generate an export-
oriented catch-up industrialization that has been the basis for its "economic miracle" after
World War II.10° Some writers have applied Johnson's arguments to South Korea. Others
claim that Taiwan also used a similar strategy even if in a less state-controlled way
(Amsden 1989; Amsden 2001; Amsden and Chu 2003; Cheng 1990; Cheng 1993; Fields
1997; Kohli 1994; Park 2000; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1991).
In sum, the developmental state theories have built on Gerschenkron's theory of
relative backwardness to present a model of development that emphasizes the role of the
state in a national effort of creating an export-based industrial system and facilitating
industries that excel in technology transfer-based catching-up. Thus, they advance an
argument about the need for specific state structure that enables emerging economies to
utilize a particular strategy of development. This is a strategy of state-led development
based on long-term industrial planning, and the nurturing of a few big industrial
conglomerates operating across a broad array of industries with some managed
competition. This creates a system that tends toward large investment in the latest
manufacturing technologies to reach scope and scale. Its underlying assumption is that
industrial development is achieved by the growth of a few big vertically integrated firms
that manufacture complete products and are not only competing among themselves, but
are also able to directly compete with foreign companies in the world markets." 
The industrial systems that are built as a result of these policies are systems that
foster industrial research that focuses on: (1) improvement in process and manufacturing
'0 For a recent article that also argues that the development agency needs to be a "pilot" agency, contending
that in order for developmental policy to succeed there is a need for a "nodal" development agency with
power over other agencies, see Chibber 2002.
" Parts of this version of this economic growth theory have been sanctified by the World Bank (WB 1993).
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technologies; and (2) incremental changes to products and technologies originally
innovated and designed elsewhere. Moreover, this model of development is based on the
assumption that advanced economies are willing to grant the emerging economies access
to their market and to their technologies, even when their trade balances with the same
emerging economies are deteriorating. In addition, a key element in all these theories is a
particular model of professional elite bureaucracy, as was idealized by Weber (Weber
1952; Weber 1958; Weber 1999).12
None of the assumptions of this model hold in the case of R&D intensive and RIB
industries. First, looking at the industrial landscape, the market is not already well
developed. Therefore, strategic planning by the state, based on the fact that both the
products and their markets are defined, is not as useful. Second, the rate of technological
innovation is so fast that industrial systems based on incremental innovations on
technologies and products developed elsewhere find it difficult to compete and develop
comparable products quickly enough. Third, products are no longer being manufactured
by vertically integrated firms. Many of the leading MNCs in all industries, American as
well as European, are shedding most of their manufacturing capacities and moving to
manage a global production network where products are manufactured by stages in
geographically distant locations. Finally, when the industry itself becomes the creation
and rapid application of new technologies, a strategy that is based on catching-up and
12 Among Japanese specialists a disagreement with Johnson's assessment of the state's extreme power and
importance evolved. For examples of studies that strongly disagree with Johnson, see Calder 1993;
Freeman 1987; Samuels 1994; Samuels 1988; for examples of studies that only slightly disagree, or even
agree with Johnson ,see Anchordoguy 1989; Chinworth 1992. Nonetheless, all these studies agree with the
basic Gerschenkronian model of industrial growth and all agree that the state was highly important in the
development of the industry in Japan.
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massive long-term investment in large-scale manufacturing facilities does not grant such
a big advantage. Chalmers Johnson noted this in MITI and the Japanese Miracle:
"When there is confusion or conflict over the overarching goal in a plan-
rational economy <developmental state>, it will appear quite adrift, incapable
of coming to grips with basic problems and unable to place responsibility for
failures... Generally speaking the great strength of the plan-rational system lies
in its effectiveness in dealing with routine problems" (Ibid. pp. 22).
The relative economic stagnation of many of the Asian NICs and Japan toward
the end of the 1990s, their difficulties to succeed in more innovative industries, and even
more importantly the realization that under the new international conditions and the rise
of China it would be difficult for other nations to emulate their growth strategies, brought
a new version of the development state theories to the fore. Proponents of the neo-
developmental state theories, building on earlier research by critics of the strong
developmental state theory like Richard Samuels, or on the revised theories offered by
some of the developmental statists themselves like Peter Evans, proposed a restructured
theory of state-industry interaction in industrial development (Amsden and Chu 2003;
Ansell 2000; Calder 1993; Chibber 2002; Chibber 2003; Evans 1995; O'Riain 2004;
Samuels 1994; Samuels 1988). The adjectives describing this newly found category of
developmental state proliferated. However, be it "the flexible developmental state," "the
neo-developmental state," "the developmental networked state," or "the embedded
autonomy industrial bureaucracy," the same broad model is advanced.
This model suggests that for a state to initiate successful industrial development,
especially in a technologically intensive industry, it must cultivate interaction and a
dynamic division of labor with the local industry. The state needs to: (a) have and retain
ability to make and implement decisions in the national interest; (b) be informed about
the needs, abilities, and difficulties of the industry so it can tailor its policies accordingly
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and refrain from policy initiatives that limit the ability of the industry to develop
capabilities on which it can base long-term growth; and (c) change its policies in tandem
with the changing needs of the industry. Rather than long-term planning, the state needs a
flexible structure that enables it to quickly change and implement different policies as
quickly as possible when industrial conditions change.' 3 In addition, the neo-development
argument implicitly calls for the state to manage a process in which its let the industry
gain more and more power to decide its own future as it finds its feet and grows. Hence,
the state needs to be able to change its role from that of initiator and leader to that of a
supporting actor.' 4
However, neo-developmental arguments are all structural, contending that if a
state manages to have the specific necessary state structure economic development will
follow. The main difference between the various neo-developmental statists lies in the
specification of the necessary structure, not in the theoretical argument or causal
mechanisms.
The neo-developmental statists argue that in order to succeed in the
developmental efforts in high technology industries, the bureaucracy needs, first, to have
13 There are some differences among the neo-developmental state theorists, in particular between those who
argue that the state should continue to advance national champions, and those who argue for a strategy
based around SMEs. It is unclear whether these differences arise because of the different context of
location, timing, and industries that the different writers researched. However, in the critical part of
theorizing about the optimal role and behavior of the state in its attempt to spur the growth of high-
technology industries and in their treatment of the state for all practical purposes as a unitary actor, the
authors are similar enough to be treated as advancing one model.
14 The reason why I argue that this point is implicit and not explicit in the neo-developmental state theories
is that while some writers, for example Peter Evans, present a typology of the different roles of the state,
none of the neo-development statists pay enough attention to the political process of the state initiating the
creation of the industry and then managing its own retreat from a commanding and planning position to a
more supporting and less controlling role. Nonetheless, these exact political processes determine both
whether sustained success is achieved, and how different models of industrial systems are shaped.
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multiple ties with, and embeddedness within, industry and finance.' 5 Indeed, recent
writers in this line argue that the main attribute of a successful developmental-state in the
1990s was its network structure. They argue that the ability of the state to successfully
motivate industrial development stems from a structure where different agencies are
embedded into different social-industrial-capital networks (Ansell 2000; O'Riain 2004).
Second, the bureaucracy needs skills that enable it to understand the complex and
changing needs of a highly technological industry. These two requirements means that
we can no longer view the developmental bureaucracy as an ideal-type Weberian
bureaucracy with long stable career patterns and skills and capabilities that are taught
solely within the organization. In addition, if the arguments are that: (a) the
developmental agencies need to be able act independently from other state agencies; and
(b) that the developmental agencies need to be flexible and dynamic, constantly changing
their policies in step with the needs of the specific and different industries each agency
aims to nurture, we must also change our view of the state.
No longer can we view the state as a unitary actor. The neo-developmental
theories lead us to focus on specific parts within the organization of the state and analyze
each one in line with the specific policy domains and industrial sectors we study. If we
are to follow the neo-development arguments to their ultimate conclusion, the state itself
is to be viewed as multiple groups of development bureaucracies each with unique
capabilities, structures, powers, and embeddedness within society. Indeed, even a cursory
"5 As such the neo-developmental state theorists are different from the earlier critics of the strong
developmental state argument, such as Samuels' model of the politics of reciprocal consent. These earlier
critics' main aim was to re-inquire into the exact roles of the state and the nature of state-business relations
in the development of industries that are not based on rapid innovation, at a period before the advent of
globalized fragmented production, not to propose a new model of the developmental state suitable for RIB
industries (Samuels 1988).
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look at Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan reveals three very different bureaucratic structure and
cultures, therefore, very different politics of industrial development.' 6
Nonetheless, the new developmental state theorists, in much the same way as the
old development statists, still portray the state as a unitary and under-defined variable: the
state is portrayed either as a success, and therefore a flexible/networked/embedded
developmental state, or as a failure, and hence not a neo-developmental state. An
example is Sean O'Riain's recent study of the Irish software industry, where he defines a
flexible development state:
"The flexible developmental state (FDS) is defined by its ability to nurture
post-Fordist networks of production and innovation, to attract international
investment, and to link these local and global technology and business
networks together in ways that promote development." (O'Riain 2000, my
italics)
The tendency toward a success or failure definition of states is the result of two
common traits of recent studies. The first is the use of either a macro level of analysis of
industrial development, or the use of partial sectoral analysis looking at one specific
industry or region and generalizing to the national level. The second trait is the tendency
to focus on either successes or failures without an attempt to analyze these at the micro
level. This tendency can be attributed to the under-defined nature of the neo-
developmental state concept and the need to classify the cases studied using the
16 Just using the simple Evans-Ruach measurement of "Weberianism" in the structure of the bureaucracy in
regards to meritocratic recruitment and career patterns reveals some surprises. While Taiwan and Ireland
score very high (12 and 12.5 respectively on a 14 point scale), Israel's score is relatively low 7 (Evans and
Rauch 1999; O'Riain 2004. Pp. 145-146.) Israel's score equals that of Morocco and Turkey, and is below
that of Mexico, Brazil, Sri-Lanka, and Egypt (Ireland's score was evaluated by a different study using the
Evans-Ruach measurement, an evaluation which is strengthened by our own analysis, see Chapter Four of
this dissertation). This result suggests that the strong coherent Weberian bureaucracy hypothesis does not
hold a lot of generalizable explanatory power over the three cases. This is before we even noted the fact
that the three bureaucracies are very different in their tradition and social role, as well as the social origin,
educational background, and the influence on the political decision making process that their members
possess.
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dependent variable. This is true even in studies that urge us to look at the different
bureaucratic constellations of agencies and power.
Thus, for example, Vivek Chibber, comparing the development efforts of India
and South Korea, argues that the Korean state was successful and that the Indian state
was a failure. He does so even when arguing that the Korean development efforts were
successful because the Korean state had a "nodal" development agency with power not
only over the industry but also over other agencies. Thus, even with an argument locating
the reason for success at the level of industrial agencies and constellation of power within
the state, Chibber still treats the state as a unitary actor and industrial success as a binary
success or failure variable (Chibber 2002).
This is surprising because the neo-developmental statist arguments strongly
suggest that the same state, having a structure where different agencies are embedded into
different social-industrial-capital networks during their attempts to nurture different
industries, can both succeed and fail in different sectors. It is quite possible that it is no
longer the "state" that is neo-developmental or not, but different parts of it. If indeed
there are many ways to organize the ties between the state and the industry, many ways in
which to organize R&D efforts, and no way in which to fully and strategically plan the
industrialization process, then industrial systems that grow out of these diverse efforts
will be different. The neo-developmental statists, however, still propose one "best" model
of development and focus their explanations around specific state structures. Therefore,
their argument marginalizes the importance of politics. They do so even when their own
arguments, suggesting the possibility of many different ways of organizing and managing
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the industrial development effort, undermine the one best practice argument in the case of
R&D intensive industrialization.' 7
Another way in which the neo-developmental statists diminish the role of politics
in their theories is by not accounting for the dynamic process of co-evolution within
which the state builds its "networked structure" and embeddedness. Even if the argument
is that there is only "one" best way to be embedded, then it is important to explain how
this embeddedness is taking place. It becomes crucial to explain this once the assumption
is that there is more than one way to be "networked" and that the different ways in which
the state get embedded with industry have long-term consequences. Ignoring the politics
of state-industry co-evolution is a significant oversight in the case of emerging
economies. Since private industry lacks the skills, the capital, and sometimes the will to
enter new high-technology industries, many times the first and foremost role of the state
is to directly intervene and create the industry. Hence, it is imperative for sustained
industrial growth that the state manages the dynamic political process of moving from a
position of hierarchical power into a position where it acts more as the supporting actor.
These processes are critical in molding the final shape of each particular industrial
system, and as such they need to be accounted for.
Since the old and neo-developmental state theories are not focused on explaining
the various outcomes of diverse industrial policy regimes, they do not supply tools to
understand and predict these differences and to gauge their influence and importance.
Instead, their main efforts are devoted to showing the importance of the state in industrial
17 For example, Sean O'Riain, a neo-developmental statist who specifically looks at the growth of SMEs in
the software industry of Ireland, still argues for one specific model of development and state behavior that
he terms either as Flexible Developmental State or as Developmental Networked State, which is different
than the old developmental state model that he terms Bureaucratic Developmental State (O'Riain 2000;
O'Riain 2004).
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development and to distinguishing their model of state-industry interactions from that of
the old development state theories. Indeed, "The State" might have been brought back
"in," but only at the price of throwing politics "out" (Evans et al. 1985).
Finally, the neo-developmental state argument proceeds without attention to the
radical ways in which industrial production has changed since WWII, although these
writers claim to explain growth in post-Fordist industries. Recall that the old
developmental school was built around the coherent Gerschenkronian institutional theory
of industrial development in relatively backward societies, and was built on an
understanding of industrial technology and production management. Thus, the old
developmental-state school not only explained but also predicted a whole set of
complementary institutions seen in many successful NICs, such as high saving rates and
the strategy of industrial conglomerates-based growth. In contrast, the neo-developmental
statists do not propose or integrate a theory of economic and industrial development. This
explains why writers in the developmental state tradition can not account for a particular
set of institutions arising in a specific society or industry, nor for how certain institutions
influence economic growth trajectories and behavior in global markets.'8
This is a major lapse in the neo-developmental state arguments as it also denies
them one of the mainstays of the developmental state theories - the intricate explanation
of the specific ways in which developmental states' control over finance allowed them to
influence industrial development (Zysman 1983). Many developmental state writers have
gone as far as to call control over finance the "nerves" of the developmental state; others
have argued that answers to questions about financial resources and policies provide the
18 For example, high saving ratios, industrial banks, conglomerates-based industrial development, and
employment regimes.
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best indicators for states' ability to realize industrial goals (Evans et al. 1985; Woo-
Cumings 1991; Woo-Cumings 1999). It is a glaring omission that the neo-developmental
school does not have a coherent theory of how states' different financial initiatives shape
the growth of different high technology industries.
As a tradition of research that grows from an institutional theory of national
industrial and economic growth, the neo-developmental-state theorists lack a systematic
understanding of how recent and radical changes in industrial production change
industrial growth. Without such a theory, it is not possible to explain how policies
interact with the markets and with private industry to produce specific institutional
systems that foster the growth of technological industries with specific capabilities.
Globalization as Fragmentation - Global Production Network Theory
The intensified movement of capital, trade, services, and, to some degree, people
across national borders, starting in the 1970s, gave rise to a multitude of studies. Of these,
a specific line of research that tries to understand the international reconfiguration of
industrial activities is of particular interest. Pioneered by economic geographers, these
studies highlight two interlinked novel features of the latest globalization: the growth of
worldwide production networks, and the growing fragmentation or 'deverticalization' of
the production process. Interestingly, this process is accompanied by a new pattern of
geographical industrial clustering, that of similar activities of the production process
(Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001a; Feenstra 1998; Gereffi 1994; Gereffi 1996; Sturgeon
2000; Sturgeon 2002).
Today we see rising spatial specialization in particular stages of the product
manufacturing chain and a rising international inter-firm (not just intra-firm) trade in
37
components (not only in final products). Within the electronics industry, for example,
there has been a major transformation in the way final products are manufactured and
sold. In the US, new leading companies such as Dell, Sun, Cisco, or Microsoft's Xbox
division do not even have their own manufacturing facilities but concentrate on R&D,
high-level product design, sales, marketing, and, at most, final assembly. Old companies
such as HP (and Compaq before their merger), 3Com, and IBM have been shedding a
large percentage of manufacturing capabilities and opting for manufacturing outsourcing.
Even components such as hard-drives are now manufactured in discrete stages in
different locations globally (Gourevitch 2000; Kenney and Florida 2004; McKendrick et
al. 2000; Sturgeon 2000; Sturgeon 2003). In addition, a whole new class of high-
technology companies - the fabless IC design houses - rose to prominence without ever
having a manufacturing facility for their own chips.
Many writers use the term product chain to describe this growing 'de-
verticalizaiton'. However, product chain may imply linear manufacturing processes of
specific products from basic inputs to final assembly. The reality, however, is of
manufacturing processes built from multiple relationships between suppliers, each with
different power structures between actors involved in the production of numerous
products. These products may be the final products and/or components for other products.
For these reasons I prefer to use the term production networks which implies many
suppliers with different relationships producing multiple products. Especially in the case
of the IT industry, the term global production networks describes reality much better than
product(s) chain with its linear implications.' 9
19 For papers outlining the different terminology used in the literature, see Henderson et al. 2002; Sturgeon
2001.
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There are many causes of the growing fragmentation of production: lower
transportation costs, lower telecommunication and information costs that in turn decrease
the cost of off-site coordination and control, technological advances that enable the
codification of component manufacturing and allow off-site manufacturing, and the
de- and re-regulation of trade. This fragmentation process has also been the cause, and in
turn is further expanded by, the de-linking of the innovation, design, and marketing and
sales processes from the production process. The de-linking of production stages is now
evident in almost every industry in the world, from textile to auto manufacturing, and
from tool making to electronics (Fuller et al. 2003; Gereffi 1999; Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz 1994; Herrigel and Wittke 2004; Sturgeon 2000; Sturgeon 2003; Sturgeon
and Lester 2004; Yeats 2001).
The growth of the global production network raises questions about its effects on
developmental strategies of nations and regions (Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001 b; Bathlet
et al. 2002; Gereffi 1999; Gereffi et al. 2004; Henderson et al. 2002; Ruane and Gorg
2001; Sturgeon and Lester 2004). It is becoming more and more apparent that what is
moving from country to country are specific phases of production, rather than the
production of complete products, but of. Thus, product-cycle theories, which predict that
as products and industries become old and commoditized they will move from the more
advanced economies to the less developed, are becoming less relevant (Akamatsu 1962;
Cumings 1984; Vernon 1966).
This fragmentation not only occurs in production, but also in R&D (Dunning
1994; Gassmann and von Zedtwitz 1999; Gerybadze and Reger 1999; Pearce 1999;
Reddy 2000). A study by the MIT Industrial Performance Center analyzing the results of
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two surveys conducted in 1991 and 1999 on all the companies in Western Europe, Japan,
and the US, with R&D expenditures topping $100 Million in 1991 current dollars
(totaling 244), found a remarkable growth in the tendency of big companies to rely on
external sources of R&D. While in 1991 less than 10% of American firms, 20% of
European, and 40% of Japanese reported a high reliance on external sources for R&D, by
1999 the figure was above 80% for all surveyed firms. Moreover, the geographical range
and distance of firms' sources of R&D had also grown tremendously. If the average of
the percentage of total R&D activity outside the home region was 26.8% for European
companies, 24.3% for American, and 4.6% for Japanese, in 1999 European and American
companies reported estimates of over 33% of total R&D done outside the home region
and Japanese companies reported over 10% (Roberts 1999).
There has been no study that systematically examines how product fragmentation
shapes the development of emerging industrial countries. Such an account would need to
explain why some activities occur in specific locations, as well as to clarify whether
particular development strategies resonate better with specific stages in the global
product chain. There are many calls for research on the effects of global production
networks on economic development. Nevertheless, what the literature offers are only
suggestions for research frameworks on the governance and power relations in different
types of product chains, or case studies about particular industries in specific locations.
A promising point of departure is to look at the two dynamic processes that
reinforce fragmentation: production stage specialization and capability building, and
production stage economies of scope and scale. These are the main reasons for the rapid
diffusion of fragmentation and the growth of global production networks. If we can
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analyze them to gain understanding of how different emerging countries' industrial
policies give these countries advantage in specific stages of production, we will have the
beginning of an answer.
"Production stage economies of scale and scope" is the term I use to describe the
process by which, once a specific production chain fragments into discrete stages,
suppliers in each stage, by pooling the demand of many customers, create economies of
scope and scale that in-house manufacturing divisions cannot. These economies of scope
and scale enable suppliers to become more efficient and allow them to operate on levels
of profit margins that are significantly lower than those achieved by in-house
manufacturing divisions.20 This in turn allows them to further lower their prices while
offering the same or even higher quality, further speeding the trend toward outsourcing of
this stage's manufacturing activities (Sturgeon 2000; Sturgeon 2002).
"Production stage specialization" is the term I use to describe the process by
which product fragmentation leads companies to develop superior capabilities in
particular stages or components of the product network. A recent example of this in the
IT industry are the pureplay foundries. Pureplay foundries, such as the Taiwanese TSMC
and UMC, are semiconductor companies that specialize solely in chip fabrication, and
whose revenues come from fabricating chips according to the designs of their customers.
Such specialization enables companies to become better and more efficient in this narrow
set of activities.21 It also helps them to acquire specialized capabilities and knowledge
20 One should differentiate between higher overall profits and profits margins. As these specialized
suppliers sell vastly large quantities, they can lower the margin of their profits per item sold, while still
having overall profits that are higher in-house manufacturing divisions. The best scenario from the point of
view of the specialized supplier is becoming so efficient that they can continuously lower their prices per
item and still have a profit margin that is as high, or higher, in-house manufacturing divisions.
21 In effect this process takes Adam Smith's argument about the division of labor, specialization, efficiency,
and the size of the market one step further (Smith 1937, in particular book I chapters 1 and 3).
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that more vertically integrated firms could not. These capabilities, once acquired, enable
these firms to excel in innovation around the particular production stages and set of
components they focus on, using their superior skills and unique knowledge. Over time
these two related advantages, in skills and innovation capabilities, grant these companies
even more advantages vis-A-vis in-house division of vertically integrated companies. We
observe this process both in high-technology areas, for example in the manufacturing of
specialized cards or chips for the PC, such as graphic cards or memory chips, and in more
traditional industries such as the bicycle where the product chain fragmentation allowed
one company, Shimano, to become the innovator and market leader in drive-train
components (Galvin and Morkel 2001).
The fragmentation of production and the growth of global product chains suggest
that there are multiple entry points and ways to succeed, even in the same industry and
even during the same time period. Global production networks allow emerging
economies as many different innovation-based entry points to the global IT industry as
there are stages in the global IT industry production network. The decisive factors that
influence the entry point of each national industry are: (a) the relationship of the industry
with global markets, specifically with the MNCs that build, manage, and to a large degree
control these product chains; and, (b) the development of capabilities that enable the
industry to excel in specific activities that are more or less suitable to specific stages of
production. Thus, focusing on the development and growth of global production
networks, theories of product fragmentation enable us to formulate arguments as to how
different states' science and technology policies build national industries that do better in
different production stages. However, we still need to account for how state-business
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interaction and the implementation of specific policy regimes translate into institutional
systems that, through time, facilitate the development of particular capabilities and skills
by private firms and motivate them to employ specific business models. We need to
understand how different industrial innovational capabilities are created, maintained, and
employed.
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Systems of Innovation Theories
From the point of view of the comparative political economy literature, the
systems of innovation theories are seen as part of the varieties of capitalism theories.
Those theories assume many different models of national economies, each with distinct
institutional systems. These systems confer different economic and industrial advantages
and disadvantages on companies operating within them. As a result, these companies, in
turn, behave differently even when operating in the same product markets and under the
same international conditions.
Systems of innovation (SI) theories aim to explain how systematic differences in
industrial as well as science and technology institutional systems give rise to industries
with specific industrial technological innovation capabilities. SI theories were first
developed in the 1980s by evolutionary economists (Carlsson et al. 2002; Edquist 1997;
Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). The writers in this tradition build on
Schumpeterian economics and on institutional economic theories. They argue that not
only is innovation the main source of long term economic growth, but also that there is a
major role for policy in R&D and science. Government has such a major role, they argue,
for two reasons: first, the innovation process itself is iterative and cooperative in nature;
hence, there is a significant role for public actors (Braczyk et al. 1998; Cooke and
Morgan 1998; Lester and Piore 2004; Morgan 1997; Piore et al. 1994; Piore and Sabel
1984; Teubal 1996; Teubal 2002). Second, scientific research, especially industrial R&D,
represents a clear case of market failure. The indivisibility, inappropriability, and high
uncertainties of R&D lead private investors to allocate sub-optimal amounts of finance to
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research under conditions of perfect free competitive market - a clear case of market
failure (Arrow 1962; Schumpeter 1961 (1934)).22
Starting from the national system and later moving to the sectoral, regional, and
industrial systems, researchers in this tradition have argued that the different relationships
between government, firms, research institutions, suppliers, and customers influence the
ways in which new technologies are created and/or diffused throughout the industrial
system. The relationships also affect the rates at which new generations of products using
the latest technology are produced (Braczyk et al. 1998; Breschi and Malerba 1997;
Lundvall et al. 2002).
The main mechanisms by which these constellations influence firm behaviors are,
first, by shaping firm capabilities, especially their dynamic economic capabilities and
innovation production/absorption capacities, i.e. capabilities to produce new products and
technologies or to infuse new technologies into their existing products and manufacturing
systems (Carlsson and Eliason 1994; Carlsson et al. 2002; Cohen and Levinthal 1989;
Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Second, institutional structures influence firm behavior by
offering different opportunity structures and different resources which influence the
profitability of certain activities (Carlsson 1995; Carlsson and Eliason 1994; Giuliani
2002; Morgan 1997; Teubal 2002; Teubal et al. 1991). Thirdly, institutional structures
influence firms' R&D behavior by infusing the system with specific research paradigms
and business models that move certain R&D activities and procedures to the forefront
and others to the background (Dosi 1982; Samuels 1994).
22 Market failure is defined as a case where due to lack of information or the specific characteristics of the
industry/activity, we should expect the private market to allocate a sub-optimal amount of resources.
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There are two main strands of SI theories. The American strand of SI focuses
more on the influences emanating from the different ways in which R&D is organized
and financed (Nelson 1993). The European school, originated at Aalborg, has been more
focused on explanations based on backward links between producers, and on the flows of
information from users (or user sectors) to producers, and has a stronger emphasis on the
role of the quality of demand on the development of capabilities (Lundvall 1992;
Lundvall et al. 2002).23
SI theories argue that three main variables explain the amount and sophistication
level of industrial R&D of each system, all intimately connected to the fact that industrial
R&D is a semi-public good. The first variable is the location of industrial R&D activities
within the industrial system. The levels of industrial R&D sophistication and capabilities
are different if most of the industrial R&D is conducted by the firms themselves, or by
public and semi-public organizations like research institutions and universities. SI
theories contend that there are major differences between systems depending on the
location (public or private) and the identity of the agents that typically conduct most of
the R&D. While most SI writers do not deal with these issues in detail, SI theories
suggest that the more R&D is conducted by private firms, the more private industry
develops sophisticated R&D capabilities.
The second variable is financing. Different financing modes affect not only the
location of R&D activities, but also the focus (time horizons and product versus process
innovation) and amount of industrial R&D. SI theories, again, do not fully elaborate their
arguments on the subject but suggest that differences between public and private
23 For an excellent example of a theoretical model for the importance of the creation of a users-innovators
community to the successful implementation and continuous improvement of new technology, see Teubal
et al. 1991.
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financing, the financial gains that investors are looking for, and the origin of the
financiers directly influence the R&D capabilities and business models employed in each
industrial system. The more resources for innovative product R&D are available, the
argument goes, the more R&D is conducted and the more sophisticated capabilities are
developed. Similarly, the more there are sectoral limits on R&D activities, which inhibit
the development of broader or multidisciplinary capabilities and knowledge, the more the
scope of R&D capabilities will be limited. Finally, the more financing is linked with
global capital and exchange markets, the more investors will seek financial exits that
allow them to channel the profits back home. Accordingly, foreign, or foreign-financed
VCs will push firms into business models that aim at either going public on the leading
stock exchanges or being bought by an MNC. As these tend to utilize a business model
emphasizing new product innovation, SI theories imply that the more the local industry is
dependent on global VC financing, the more the industry will focus on product
innovation and follow a business strategy aimed at foreign IPOs or merger and
acquisition deals. 24
The third explanatory variable highlighted by SI theories is the industrial
opportunity structure. By industrial opportunity structure I mean the composition of the
local industry, including the links between producers, between producers and customers,
and the links of the local industry with the global production networks, in particular with
the MNCs that control them. Different opportunity structures affect the capabilities and
business models employed by firms by giving different industrial systems access to
24 SI theories usually do not pertain to the important national difference between the regulation of venture
capital and stock exchanges. Thus, while they argue for a more general observation, claiming that VC
financing leads to the rapid diffusion and use of American-like start-up businesses models, I prefer to refine
their argument. Thus, I claim that only VC funds whose source of finance is the global capital markets and
are linked to the leading global stock exchanges.
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different information and skills, as well as by giving each local industry different sets of
customer focus, business prospects, and market niche openings. A critical factor in this
configuration is the local leading companies. In addition, as the main market for IT has
always been the US, and as American MNCs (with some exceptions) also control the
global markets, a key to understanding the different opportunity structure is to look at the
different relationship that the local IT industry has with these MNCs, both inside and
outside national borders. This has become especially true with the growing fragmentation
of production.
MNCs (and leading local firms) are critical for the overall skills and capabilities
composition of each national IT industry for a few reasons. First, MNCs and local leading
companies are the main customers of new local IT companies. Secondly, MNCs are
important for the local IT industry as key actors in the transfer and development of two
critical spheres of skills and capabilities. First, the R&D labs of MNCs develop products
and components on the technological cutting edge. Consequently, they are a major source
of cutting edge technological information and knowledge, and, even more importantly,
world-level R&D-conducting capabilities into the industrial system in which they
operate. Second, MNCs are the best organizations in the world in designing and
developing new products. Therefore, their R&D divisions diffuse into the industrial
systems within which they are located the skills and capabilities needed to design new
products as well as better knowledge of the customers in the final market.
For these reasons, major differences in industrial development patterns are to be
to be found in IT industries that have different leading companies and different
relationships and links with the leading MNCs. If the MNCs' subsidiaries and leading
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companies within a specific country are conducting manufacturing activities and focus on
process and manufacturing innovation, then their outputs into and inputs from the
industrial systems are significantly different than if most of the MNCs' subsidiaries and
leading local companies conduct critical R&D activities. Thus, the outputs MNCs and
leading local companies seek from local firms, the inputs they put into the local industrial
systems, as well as the ability of local firms to sell their own products and services to
these MNCs globally, are different depending on the activities MNCs perform locally.
In the case of MNCs' manufacturing, subsidiaries, local firms might find it easier
to sell manufacturing services or become components suppliers to MNCs, than to become
suppliers of new technologies and innovations. In addition, the inputs of the leading
domestic companies and MNCs into the local industrial system would be focused around
manufacturing and process information and skills, including critical innovational
capabilities around these activities. For the same reasons, local firms will find it harder to
sell the same MNCs new technologies and the MNCs will diffuse less R&D and fewer
product design skills and capabilities into the local industrial system.
In short, the global production network and the system of innovation theories
give us a better understanding of the institutional underpinning of industrial development
and innovation in a world of geographically fragmented industrial production. Using
these insights, together with the lessons we have learned from late development and
development-state theories, we can now develop a more comprehensive argument about
the role of the state in the development of RIB industries in emerging economies.
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Building the Theory
This dissertation develops an approach to understanding the role of the state in
industrial development in a world of globalized fragmented production. It does so by
presenting arguments about the roles and structure of the state in the development of high
technology industries in emerging economies. Hence, we first need to explain how states
can organize and interact with private industry to promote the growth of innovative high-
technology industry, and to explain the political process of this interaction. Second, we
need to explain how specific policies and state-business interactions produce different
national industrial systems within the same industrial sector.
A New Model of RIB Industrialization Politics
Analyzing late development and developmental state theories, we noted that, in
the development of high technology industries, the state should act as the flexible
facilitating agent, and not as an overall commander. The state should no longer
methodically plan the development of strategic industries by choosing specific products
and product niches, forcing private companies to enter them and supplying some of the
necessary finance and technologies. Instead, the state should concentrate on creating
more broadly defined technological capabilities, and focus on motivating private agents
to work in these areas and collaborate with each other and with the state. The state role is
no longer seen as one where it makes the decisions and compels private companies to
follow them, but rather motivates private companies to make long-term commitments to
operate in RIB industries and activities. This argument is an opposite one to the strong
developmental-state argument that gave the state the job of long-term planning and
control over the industry. The neo-developmental statists argue that, in the case of RIB
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industrialization, the state needs not only to spur the creation of the industry, but also to
quickly grant the industry control if not full jurisdiction as it develops. At the same time,
the state still needs to retain enough knowledge and skills to devise and implement
policies that help the industry to grow and maintain its competitiveness in the world of
constant technological change.
The state is pictured as the national management consultant and central arbitrator
and promoter of the industry, with the distinction between public and private roles and
power becoming more ambiguous. State-industry relations are described as a division of
labor of the tasks each side takes to reach the same national goal of economic growth. In
this way the state is seen as embedded, i.e., as an important agent, but not the overall
leader, in a network of private and public agents that together makes the industrial
system.
However, the neo-developmental arguments are still: i) structural in claiming that
one specific structure of the state (differently named by different authors) has all the
explanatory power; and, ii) aggregate in treating the whole state as either developmental
or not. However, often success in one sector does not implies success in others, a point
that the neo-developmental statists tend to neglect. Moreover, they still hold to the old
timing logic of the Gerschenkronian argument - that the timing of the beginning of the
rapid industrialization efforts inherently imposes only one successful model. For
example, Alice Amsden argues for one specific mode in which "the rest" can
industrialize, and Sean O'Riain sees Israel, India, Ireland, and Taiwan as representatives
of the same model of a developmental state (Amsden 2001; O'Riain 2004).
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In so doing the developmental statists marginalize politics in several ways. First,
by maintaining that the explanation lies in a particular state structure, the neo-
developmental statists repudiate the importance of specific policies, as it is no longer the
policies that make the difference but the overall bureaucratic structure. At the same time,
structural explanations also negate the importance of selecting between alternatives, as
the only choice left is of either selecting the "correct" alternative or dooming oneself to
economic backwardness.
Thirdly, the neo-developmental arguments disregard the importance of sectoral
politics. By looking at the aggregate level and describing whole states as either successful
or not, the neo-developmental state theorists cannot explain how embeddedness develops
in the first place. Consequently, neo-developmental statists disregard the importance of
politics in determining the success or failure of the sectoral state-industry co-evolutionary
process. Moreover, looking at the aggregate level and advancing one form of state-
structure, the neo-development statists evade confronting the realization that their own
arguments suggest that there are multiple forms of embeddedness, each leading to a
different industrial system. Accordingly, failing to notice that what determines both
sectoral success and failure and the mode of success, are the politics of state-industry co-
evolution that leads to each form of embeddedness. For example, there is nothing in the
neo-developmental argument that would help explain why the Taiwanese hardware
industry flourished while the software industry languished, although the two sectors had
the exact same formal bureaucratic structures of state-industry embeddedness and rules of
conduct.
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Fourthly, the neo-developmental statists suggest that there are many differences
between the developmental bureaucracies of different states, their polices, and the ways
these policies are implemented. Nevertheless, they do not explain these different modes
of state-industry embeddedness and bureaucratic structures and cultures bring about
different trajectories of industrial development. This dissertation aims to propose
explanations of this phenomenon.
Lastly, although these writers claim to explain growth in post-Fordist industries,
the neo-developmental state argument proceeds without attention to the radical ways in
which industrial production has changed since WWII. The neo-developmental statists
cannot account for a particular set of institutions developing in a specific society or
industry, nor for how certain institutions shape economic growth trajectories and
behavior in global markets. Our framework aims at rectifying this gap by utilizing
insights from the systems of innovation and globalproduction networks theories.
Therefore, there is a need for a new model that delineates the role of the state in
the politics of industrialization. This theoretical framework should build on the neo-
developmental state arguments, taking into account the multiple ways in which successful
development can simultaneously take place within the same industries; accordingly there
are alternatives, with different consequences, to create and from which to choose.
The idea of network development can serve as our basis. My framework proposes
that, in successful cases of RIB industrial development, state agencies will first aim at
creating a set of firms and industrial actors, and then seek to develop a thoroughly
multiplexed network among these actors, and between these actors and the international
financial and production markets and networks (Ansell 2000; Locke 1995; O'Riain 2004;
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Teubal et al. 1991). What I expect to find in successful cases of RIB industrial
development are, different political processes, in which the state's first role is as a key
actor in the creation of a network. First, a more hierarchical network, and then in the
course of co-evolution, I expect to find the network becoming denser and more
heterarchial/policentric and international, with the state moving from a position of
controlling the network to a position of centrality, i.e., an important node within a bigger
and much more multiplexed, larger, and diffused network. Consequently, the state's main
role becomes more that of a facilitator-organizer, rather than of an overall commander.
Further, I predict that the different ways local and sectoral politics shape the development
of these networks will vastly influence the industrial structure and capabilities.
In cases of RIB industrial development failure, I expect to identify two different
kinds of failure. The first occurs because of the inability or unwillingness of the state to
facilitate and participate in the growth of this industrial sector. An example of that kind of
failure would be the state ignoring the industry, largely refusing to participate in its
growth, or to channel the resources necessary to that effect.
A second kind of failure is anticipated when the state actively participates in the
creation of the network, but then resists the relinquishing of its own power, trying instead
to retain its position of control, aiming to maintain hierarchical relationships with private
industry.
To successfully manage the dual staged process above, the state needs to acquire
two assets: (1) sufficient technological and scientific skills, knowledge, and information
to make informed decisions in the case of ever more complex industrial technologies
development; (2) multiple relationships with the industry that enable the development
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agencies to be constantly informed about the shape and needs of the industry, as well as
to implement its decision without resorting to coercion. Moreover, the state needs to have
and preserve its ability to make decisions independently. As I noted earlier, acquiring
these two assets, managing these transitions, and developing the needed industry-state co-
evolution processes suggest a model of the state that is incompatible with the Weberian
ideal-type bureaucracy. In addition, as there are many ways to acquire the needed skills
and create embeddedness within the industry, as well as many ways to manage the
relationship with the industry, even within the same state, it follows that there are many
different models of the new development state.
We can now propose a new model of successful state efforts for RIB
industrialization. The new model suggests a bureaucracy that is less Weberian and
isolated, but much more fragmented. However, it is also more technologically and
scientifically knowledgeable and skillful, and closer to industry. The state's structure
should allow the developmental agencies to react quickly to the needs of the industry,
allowing the state to be the facilitator, but not overall commander, of industrial
development. Thus, while the old model conceptualized the state as a unitary actor with
personnel recruited, trained, and indoctrinated within the bureaucracy, the new views the
state less as a monolith and shifts attention to its different agencies. It follows that
differences in the ways the bureaucracy is constructed, the social origin and educational
background of its personnel, and its ability to shape the decision making process must be
analyzed.
There are many ways in which the developmental bureaucracy can acquire the
needed skills and embeddedness within industry. One approach is for the state to be
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involved as deeply as possible with the industrial R&D process, bringing the technology
creating agents into its own structure. Of the three cases, Taiwan's strategy of utilizing
two state-controlled public research institutions - the Industrial Technology Research
Institution (ITRI), and the Institute for Information Industry (III) - as the main impetus
for IT industrial growth, is an example of such a strategy. A second approach is to create
a development bureaucracy with porous borders and employ a "revolving door"
recruitment and training strategy, enabling scientists and industry leaders to move back
and forth from state to private industry. Of our cases, the way in which Israel's main
developmental agency - the Office of the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of Trade and
Industry (OCS) - has been structured, is an example of such a strategy.25 The third
approach is a variant of the second, in which the state attempts to preserve the
cohesiveness and Weberian principles guiding the developmental agency by creating
specific subunits, usually with a more limited or advisory role, in which regular
recruitment and training procedures do not apply and into which industry insiders are
recruited on a temporary basis. Of our cases, Ireland's utilization of such subunits, of
which the National Software Directorate has been the most influential, within larger
development agencies that embodies Weberian ideals, such as the Industrial
Development Agency (IDA) and Enterprise Ireland (EI), is an example for the use of that
strategy.
The new framework differs from the old in the ways in which the developmental
agencies create, conduct, and maintain their relationships with industry. In the old model,
the development-state was portrayed as having strong relations with the leading big
25 Since 2003, the Ministry is called the Ministry of Trade Industry and Employment.
26 Since 2003, the National Software Directorate has been renamed the National Informatics Directorate.
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firms. While dialogue was maintained, the state had the authority and responsibility of
guiding and controlling the industry's development. In the new model, the state aim is to
become embedded within the industry, industry-state dialogues are to be between equals,
and the state's role is more of a facilitator than of a planner and overall leader. However,
unlike the old theories, which described a fairly straightforward relationship and power
structure, there are many ways in which the state can accomplish its roles and create the
relationships that the new framework emphasizes. The shaping of these choices is done
through a constant political process.
The choices available to the state can be conceptualized along two related
continua. On one end of the first continuum, measuring control, are attempts by the state
to get maximum control over development and direct industrial R&D efforts almost from
basic research all the way to specific products. On the other end of this continuum we
have a state formulating high technology industry-specific policies only after a few
companies have already proved the growth potential of specific sub-sectors, with the state
direct assistance limited to more mature firms. State decisions as to the degree of
targeting sectors and technologies, can be conceptualized on a second continuum. On one
end are states that formulate policies down to the level of defining specific generic
products and technologies. On the other are states that see their role mainly as assisting in
the realization of decisions made by private firms, employing horizontal technological
policies that are neutral in regard to technologies and sectors (Teubal 1997). In between
there are states that target specific sectors, for example software, but do not attempt to
target specific technologies or define future products.
57
In our cases we have an example of the three main positions on these two
continua, both extremes and the middle. On the one hand we have Taiwan, where the
state has been targeting specific technologies and products, authorizing and financing its
public research institutions to develop them to the stage of working product prototypes
and then either deliver the result to the industry or spin off the research teams as
companies to commercialize the results. On the other hand we have Israel, with a
development agency that defined its role as fixing the market failures associated with
industrial R&D and maximizing product R&D activities. The Israeli state followed
almost ideal-type neutral horizontal technological policies (Teubal 1983). It implemented
a policy of giving R&D grants for product ideas developed by private companies and
entrepreneurs in every industrial branch, helping companies in all stages of development.
In the middle is Ireland, which did not have a specific industrial policy for RIB industries
until after the indigenous software industry achieved some success globally. Ireland then
restructured its development agencies and policies to focus on specific industries and
tailored its financial instruments to companies that, while still young, have already moved
beyond the seed stage.27
The last dimension along which the new model of the state is significantly
different than the old model is in its role in relation to the global industry and financial
markets. In the old model the state had three main roles. The first was to organize and
facilitate technology transfer deals from the leading MNCs to local industry. The second
was to use its control over foreign currency to shape industrial development, granting it
27 That is not to say that the state was not important in the early development of the industry in Ireland.
Indeed the then mainly FDI focused industrial agency - IDA - was critical in the industry's development in
the 1980s through its Enterprise Development Plan. However, as the name suggests, the aim of that policy
initiative was to develop business in all sectors of the economy, without regard to R&D, and with its main
goal still that of job creation.
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to chosen firms that were successfully exporting, and denying it to others. The third role
of the state was to prevent MNCs from gaining control of too large a percentage of the
domestic market, crowding out local infant industries.
In our framework, the state's roles are much more complex. In a world of
fragmented industrial production, vertical integration is no longer the sole option, and not
necessarily the best one. Instead, there are many ways in which the local industry can
become a part of the global production networks. In each of these, the local industry
needs to develop specific relationships with the MNCs and with the global financial
markets, and for each kind of relationship different technological and managerial skills
are necessary. In addition, as the local industry is based more and more on indigenous
R&D activities, the role of the state in strategically managing technology transfer, while
it might still prove important in the early stages, is diminishing. These decisions relate to
the heart of national politics: questions about national ownership, identity, foreign
relations, as well as financial security and independence.
Again it is useful to think about state choices in enhancing the local industry's
specific linkage with, and embeddedness within, the global industry and financial
markets as two continua. The first continuum looks at the state's behavior toward foreign
technology-based firms, in particular the MNCs that develop and control the global
production networks. On one extreme, we have states that look at foreign firms as the
main mode for industrial upgrading and focus on convincing foreign firms and MNCs to
locate manufacturing facilities within their borders. The hope is that these firms'
subsidiaries, once established, will become embedded within the domestic industry. On
the other extreme we have states that focus most of their efforts on convincing MNCs to
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locate their R&D labs within their borders, and pay close attention to the development of
specific relationships of local companies with their foreign partners.
On the first extreme we have Ireland, which until the early 1990s focused its
industrial policy almost solely on bringing MNCs to open manufacturing facilities in
Ireland, without paying much attention to creating strong relationships between them and
the local industry, either within or outside Ireland. On the other extreme lies Israel. By
generating collaborative projects between Israeli IT firms and American companies, the
Israeli state has established relationships in which Israeli firms focus on product R&D
and their American partners focus on sales and marketing. Israel's developmental
agencies have also been attempting to lure foreign firms to open R&D centers in Israel.
Taiwan has chosen a middle course, first urging MNCs to open manufacturing facilities
in Taiwan, but then goading them into buying a growing percent of their components
from, and outsource their manufacturing activities to, Taiwanese companies.28 At the
same time, Taiwanese developmental agencies have tried to help local companies
produce more components and improve their manufacturing and design services
capabilities.
Relationships with global financial markets are better conceptualized along a
second continuum. On one extreme we have states that try to link their local industry with
global financial markets. They court foreign investors not only to back local firms but
also be the financiers of the local VC industry, and encourage local companies to get
28 In 2001, the Taiwanese Department of Industrial Technology (DOIT) embarked on an initiative to
specifically lure MNCs to open R&D centers in Taiwan. This initiative has been quite successful with
thirteen MNCs opening facilities in Taiwan within two years, and ten more MNCs on the waiting list.
Indeed, if this new trend is sustained, and these MNCs consistently conduct high-level R&D activities in
Taiwan, a very interesting future research project would be to gauge their influence on the Taiwanese IT
industry after a decade or so of operations.
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publicly listed on foreign stock exchanges. On the other extreme we have states that try to
limit, as much as possible, the financing of their high technology industry to local
investors, and try to limit, if not outright prevent, the public listing of local companies on
foreign stock exchanges. In between, we have states that are either less active or aim to
strike a balance between the two.
Of our three cases, Israel has done the most to lure foreign VC investors and urge
public listing on foreign exchanges. State efforts have been a main cause behind the
current situation: the vast majority of Israeli NTBFs' financing, either directly or through
local VC funds, is foreign. In addition, Israeli companies all aim to be listed on foreign
exchanges, making Israel, with only six million people, the state with the largest number
of companies listed on NASDAQ other than the US and Canada. On the other extreme is
Taiwan, focusing all its technology financing initiatives on the local investment
community, and strongly advancing the Taiwanese Stock Exchange. Ireland has chosen
the middle road: channeling EU money to the local VC industry, but creating the new
funds mostly through local financial institutions.
Different Choices - the Varied Paths of Industrial Growth
Conceptualizing the new model of state-industry relationships helps us to analyze
the different ways in which emerging states can structure themselves and their
relationship with the local industry in order to nurture and support the growth of high
technology industry. We can now consider how the different choices made by states
influence their high technology industrial development path by utilizing our analysis of
the systems of innovation and product fragmentation theories. We will then use these
insights to explain how in the cases of Taiwan, Ireland, and Israel, specific state policies
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and behavior has helped to spur the development of different IT industries, as well as the
relative success and failure of each subsector within each of the three cases.
Our reading of production network theories highlighted the spatial clustering of
similar production activities and the underlying linked dynamics of production stage
specialization and production stage economies of scale and scope. These point us to
several domains of interest. First, specific industrial R&D, dynamic economic
capabilities, and business models are more suitable for certain stages of the production
process. Second, the analysis of the dynamics of production stage specialization and
economies of scale and scope indicates that industrial systems that specialize in specific
stages of production tend if successful, with time and effort, to become ever more
competitive and innovative in these specific stages. Consequently, if we want to
understand the different evolutionary processes of high technology industrial growth we
need to understand: (a) how industrial R&D and dynamic economic capabilities are
created, improved, and maintained in each of our cases; (b) the growing utilization of
certain business models in each of our cases; and (c) the development of specific
relationships that the local industry has with the global industrial and financial markets.
In the words of SI theories we need to analyze the development of industrial R&D
capabilities, capacities, and opportunity structures in each of our cases. In order to
understand the growth of industrial R&D capabilities SI theories urge us to compare the
different location of the R&D conducting agents, the R&D resources available and the
way in which firms are financed, the scope and limits of R&D, and the industries'
customers and relationships.
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As to opportunity structures, with infrastructural variables being more or less
equal, two main variables, the industry's customers and markets and the ways in which
the industry is financed, strongly affect the business models and strategies firms and
entrepreneurs employ. This leads industrial agents to focus on the building of specific
innovative and manufacturing capabilities. In a world in which most of the trade in IT is
done through global production networks, the relationships that local IT firms have with
local leading firms and with foreign companies, especially leading MNCs, are one key
factor in determining their opportunity structure. The second factor is the sources and
forms of finance. For example, in a system in which the main source of financing
available to technology entrepreneurs is product-development R&D grants, entrepreneurs
and firms would devote much more attention to developing R&D capabilities, than in a
system in which the main source of financing is not focused on the R&D stage. In
addition, we argue that the more financing is linked with the global capital and exchange
markets, the more investors will seek foreign financial exits. Consequently, foreign-
financed VCs will push firms into business models that aim at either going public on the
leading stock exchanges or being bought by an MNC.
We can now analyze how different behavior and structure of the state influences
the development of the IT industry's R&D capabilities in each of our cases. First,
decisions by the state on how to acquire the necessary R&D skills are influencing the
identity of the agents conducting industrial R&D. The more the state bureaucracy
encompasses the R&D conducting agents within its structure, the less industrial R&D
activities private firms are encouraged to perform. Second, decisions by the state over the
level it attempts to control the technological development path of the industry, including
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decisions of how, and who, to finance bear on both the R&D resources available to the
industry and the scope of R&D activities conducted. Thirdly, state efforts developing the
first local leading companies have long-term consequences for the industry's opportunity
structure. Similarly decisions that the state is making concerning the involvement of
foreign firms and investors within its national borders, as well as decisions made whether
to enhance specific relationships between local and foreign companies outside the state's
national borders, affect the resources, the particular feedback and information the
industry gets from its main customers, and the diffusion and development of specific
innovative capabilities.
We expect that private firms in the high technology industry of emerging
economies will have more limited R&D capabilities where the state has tried to control
the industrial R&D development path, encompassed the R&D conducting agents within
its structure, supplied only limited resources, refrained from urging foreign companies to
conduct R&D activities within its borders, and limited the involvement of foreigners as
financiers.
However, neither Taiwan, nor Ireland or Israel followed these idealized paths. In
each case a particular mix of policies and initiatives across these different dimensions has
been played out. Therefore, to have the full answer we will have to go into a more refined
level of comparison, fully elaborated in Chapters Three to Five. Nonetheless, even a brief
analysis along the lines described in our arguments can demonstrate our case.
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Israel. Ireland, and Taiwan - the Argument in Brief
Taiwan is the case where the state attempted to firmly direct and control the
technological development path of the IT industry. In Taiwan the bureaucracy
recruitment is styled on the Japanese model where exams screen the candidates into
different management and career patterns (Kim et al. 1995). However, unlike both Israel
and Ireland, almost all of the top persons of the development agencies and ministries
have PhDs in various engineering disciplines. In addition, all the Ministers responsible
for industrial development, telecommunications, and Science and Technology policies,
have had doctoral degrees in engineering, before and after democratization. The state,
already relatively well equipped with scientific experts in its decision-making apparatus,
opted to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge for IT industrial development by
encompassing the industrial technology creating agents within its bureaucratic structure.
It did so by establishing two public research institutes, ITRI and III. Nevertheless,
Taiwan has also supplied funds for industrial R&D and the state encouraged R&D
activities on a wide spectrum of technologies, even if they were conducted within its
structure, and not by private companies. However, where throughout the development of
the hardware industry ITRI saw as its ultimate goal the creation of a thriving private
industry and has successfully managed its own diminishing role as the industry grew, the
situation in software has been different. From its inception, III tried to maximize its
control and financial resources, directly competing with private industry. In contrast to
ITRI, III has been reluctant to see its power diminish and has continuously competed
with the industry. In addition, III focused its strategies and policy initiatives around its
own, and not around private industry's, growth. Thus, the case of the Taiwanese software
industry is a case of stage II failure - inability of the state to relinquish its own power
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over the sectoral industrial system and move from a hierarchical to a networked mode of
governance.
On the local-global relationship front, Taiwan has aimed to help the local industry
to excel in supplying components, and manufacturing and design services, to the IT
industry's global production networks. Until recently Taiwan steered a middle course in
regard to the activities it encouraged foreign companies to conduct in Taiwan. Unlike
South Korea, Taiwan encouraged foreign companies to establish manufacturing facilities
within its borders. But unlike Ireland, Taiwan then pushed these companies to acquire
more and more components locally and to transfer the necessary skills and know-how to
local suppliers. In addition, Taiwan has been encouraging local companies to be publicly
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and not on foreign stock exchanges. It has been
targeting the local financial community as the main source for the IT industry's venture
capital.
This partial analysis already helps us to understand why Taiwan's IT industry
developed in the way it did. Taiwan has an enormously successful hardware industry in
which the first leading firms have been focusing on supplying components and OEM
manufacturing services to foreign companies. This gave rise to an industrial system,
which focuses on 2nd generation, process, and manufacturing innovation, with a division
of labor between the state and private firms. The state conducts most of the early
technology screening and R&D, and the private companies focus more on final product
development. It is an industrial system in which most of the firms are supplying
components and design and manufacturing services to the IT industry's global production
networks.
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Israel has also been very active in the development of its local high technology
industry, but with an almost opposite strategy. The state defined as its main goal the
development of an industry with sophisticated, new product-oriented export-focused
industrial R&D capabilities. The Israeli state devised and implemented its policies around
this notion. The state supplied financial backing to R&D projects developed and executed
by private firms and entrepreneurs across the industrial range, without any attempt to
direct the industry's technological development path. Israel's bureaucracy never strictly
followed the Weberian model. Throughout the years there have been attempts to both
professionalize the bureaucracy and follow the American model of"government of
strangers" allowing politicians to have more control over their Ministries by bringing
with them many of their own people (Bowsher 1991; Deri 1993; Heclo 1977; Pfiffner
1992). The result has been a mixed structured civil service with relatively low status and
workforce continuity. The OCS is also the best example, within the three national cases,
of a development agency following the strategy of porous borders and revolving door
structure to acquire skills and knowledge. Thus, the chief scientists (the heads of the
OCS) have been traditionally recruited outside the agency, with a particularly large
number of executives and employees either brought as consultants or recruited directly
from other organizations outside the bureaucracy.
On the local-global front, the Israeli state pushed Israeli and foreign, especially
American, companies to form partnerships in which the Israeli firms focused on R&D
and the foreign firms on marketing and sales. Israel focused on trying to convince MNCs
to open R&D centers within its borders, not manufacturing facilities, until recently a
unique strategy among emerging economies. The state was also actively linking both its
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companies and its VC industry to the foreign financial markets. We can now begin to
understand why in Israel both the hardware industry and the software following its
footsteps in a second stage of growth became equally successful with almost all firms
following a similar strategy - industrial R&D leading to either the development of new
technologies or new products based on cutting edge technology. Israeli companies
position themselves as suppliers of new R&D inputs to the IT industry's global
production networks. Israel has become one of the prominent locations in which foreign
companies and MNCs open large-scale R&D centers.
Ireland concentrated for many years on job creation. The state has also been
following a much less active strategy in regards to the indigenous IT industry. While
vastly improving the educational, physical, and communication infrastructures, Ireland's
industrial policy focused mainly on bringing foreign companies to open manufacturing
facilities within its borders. Some thought was given to the ultimate goal of embedding
these firms within the Irish industrial system, but there has not been, until very recently,
coherent attempts to do so. As a result, many of these companies eventually left Ireland.
For many years the Irish development agencies followed the ideal-type Weberian
structure with internal recruiting, training, and career development procedures. However,
they did so with an English flavor, including a strong distinction between the social-
science-humanity-law "general-educated" employees who are being groomed to
management, and the technical-engineering "expert-educated" personnel whose career
does not lead them to high management positions (Rose 1981; Rose 1986). Since the
1960s there has been only one Secretary General of a Ministry who joined the civil
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service technical personnel career track with an engineering background. 29 Accordingly,
Ireland opted to follow the third strategy of acquiring technology and industry specific
skills - creating domain specific subunits stuffed with industry insiders - when these
skills were deemed necessary.
There were very limited resources devoted to R&D in Ireland. Even when the
IDA established a program to promote local industry in the 1980s, its focus was on job
creation and not R&D. This especially hurt the hardware sector, which needs more
financing than software to successfully conduct R&D or commence operations. Local
Irish hardware companies also had fewer opportunities to profitably employ service or
consultancy business models. In addition, during the 1980s the hardware industry had to
compete fiercely for the limited number of skilled engineers against MNCs who were
recruiting for both their Irish and global facilities. With meager financial resources and
unable to offer secure long-term employment the Irish hardware industry was at a severe
disadvantage. This failure of the state to engage with the specific needs of the Irish
hardware industry and to embed itself within it, even with the first successes of the
indigenous industry - Mentec and Lake Electronic - both being hardware companies is a
case of stage I failure. The Irish state, focused as much as it was on FDI strategy, was
unable to allocate enough resources and attention to devise specific policy initiatives and
embed itself within the industry to spur its growth. It was only a decade later, after a few
software companies achieved some commercial success in foreign markets, with the
software industry using all its political muscle, and with the IDA already changing its
focus of attention, that Ireland developed a coherent IT industry focused industrial policy.
29 Similarly to Taiwan, and unlike Israel, the top civil servants in each ministry (including the Secretary
General, or the General-Manager) are chosen from within the ranks of the civil service.
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Even then, the industrial policy was geared toward the indigenous software and not
hardware sector. Moreover, the policy was focused mostly on companies that passed their
early development phases, again putting at a disadvantage hardware firms that need
larger amounts of pre-revenue R&D financing and find it more difficult to use
consultancy or service business models.
Only in the late 1990s did Ireland start to pay close attention to the assistance its
local companies might need abroad, and even then the state limited its role to that of a
promoter of companies in various foreign markets and did not attempt to structure
specific relationships between local and foreign firms. With regard to foreign financial
markets, the state, while happy that some IT firms have publicly listed on foreign stock
exchanges, has encouraged them to also list locally. In addition, while employing and
channeling EU grants, the state has focused on local financial institutions as the main loci
for its various initiatives to create a local venture capital industry.
Again we see that even a cursory analysis of Ireland along the dimensions
suggested above helps us to understand why the Irish IT industry developed the way it
did. Even with the IDA's long history of bringing foreign hardware firms to open large
manufacturing facilities in Ireland, it is the indigenous software industry that has become
the more successful sector, while the hardware sector has struggled. The Irish IT industry
focuses on developing products of mid-level sophistication, most of which are innovative
mainly in applying existing IT technologies to new domains. The more successful
companies prefer to either double list on both a local (now also EU) stock exchange and a
foreign one. The level of acquisition of Irish firms, while still higher than Taiwan's, is
considerably lower than in Israel, both in total numbers and in the average size of the
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financial transaction. The IT industry is still dominated by foreign firms concentrating on
activities of relatively low sophistication, and the overall level of innovation in Ireland is
the lowest of our three cases.
In sum, even with a brief analysis built on comparison of the behavior and
structure of the state, in our three cases we can distinguish strong national patterns. These
patterns greatly help us to understand the different development path of each industry, as
well as the relative success of the software and hardware sector in each case. This
empirical analysis lends strength to our theoretical arguments. The full analysis laid out
in Chapter Three to Five looks at each of these cases in detail, giving us a much more
refined understanding, and supplying us with lessons that can then be generalized
Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation has three targets. The first is to expand our understanding of the
roles and the limits of the state in the development of RIB industries in less developed
economies. The second is to explain how the different approaches taken by Israel,
Ireland, and Taiwan has shaped the IT industries, influenced the particular development
path of, and capabilities developed by, each industry, and moved each industry into a
different position in the IT industry's global production network. Lastly, by showing that
emerging countries have real alternatives in regard to RIB industrial growth, the
dissertation argues that politics and the political struggles of crafting and choosing
between these alternatives, as well as the politics of state-industry co-evolution, are
important not only to explain the difference between success and failure, but also to
explain the reasons behind the specific choices made. Hence, by moving away our
explanations from solely timing and structure reasoning, this dissertation aims to show
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that both "state" and "politics" need to be explained if we want to understand both policy
formulation and its outcomes.
The chapters are divided as follows. This chapter is followed by the empirical part
of the dissertation - three chapters, each describing one national case. Each of these
chapters presents the politics and evolution of the IT industry in Ireland, Israel, and
Taiwan. All the chapters utilize our framework in the analysis of the history of state
actions and interactions with the two subsectors of the IT industry, the national and
subsectoral innovation systems, business models used, and the industry's position in and
interaction with the IT industry's global production network. Chapter Six returns to the
theoretical approach in a comparative way, reflecting on what can be generalized from
this study to the more general question of RIB industrial growth in other emerging
Economies.
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Chapter Two - The Development of the IT Industry in Israel -
Maximization of R&D as an Industrial Policy
"Like old Soldiers, old R&D Projects never die.
There is always the sequel"
Brigadier General (Ret.) Professor Itzhak Yaakov - Israel's Chief Scientist 1974-78
Introduction
Israel's IT industry is an impressive success story. In less than twenty years, the
country has emerged as a key player in global IT technology, with Israeli companies
pioneering many hardware and software market niches such as Voice over IP (VoIP),
encrypting, Printed Circuit Board inspection, antiviral protection, digital printing, and
firewalls. This small country of only six million has, after the US and Canada, the highest
number of IT companies listed on NASDAQ. In 2000, Israeli IT industrial exports
reached over $13 billion and accounted for more than 71% of all industrial exports, and
the IT industry alone accounted for 70% of GDP growth (CBS 2000b; CBS 2001; IAEI
2002).
Looking at Israel today, with its strong science and research infrastructure, one
can easily claim that its success in the IT industry was predictable. However, nothing
could be further from the truth. Israel's industrial policy in its first two decades of
existence resembled the model prescribed by the "old" developmental state theorists. The
state employed long-term planning and directly intervened in the creation of specific
sectors and industries, especially textiles and defense, without any thought given to the
creation of high technology industries (Levi-Faur 1998; Levi-Faur 2001). In 1968,
Israel's science and technology (S&T) industrial policies were public research institution-
based. R&D activities in the private civilian industries were almost unheard of. Standing
at less than one percent in 1965, Israel's total R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP
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were lower than any of the OECD countries except Italy. The number of scientists and
engineers - ten per 10,000 employees - was not low, but it was still less than half of the
US, at twenty five, and Sweden, at twenty two (Katchalski 1968. Pp C/7.) The absolute
number of R&D personnel in the industry was minuscule, and most R&D activities and
personnel were concentrated in the defense and academic research sector.30
What accounts for this enormous transformation and the success of Israel's IT
industry? Throughout this chapter I make the following arguments: first, Israel's main
competitive advantage has been its R&D capabilities - its competitive edge originated in
an existing defense sector and academic research system. The state's almost exclusive
focus on the enhancement of technological cutting-edge R&D capabilities has enabled
firms to develop novel products based on the latest technologies, the new technologies
themselves, or new applications of these technologies, and has led Israel's IT industry
into its position as a supplier of new technologies to the global IT industry's production
network. This development path brought the IT industry to success first in hardware and
then in software; thus the software industry developed within an industrial system that
was already centered around advanced product R&D activities.
I further argue this system was shaped by S&T industrial policies that from the
beginning of the 1970s focused almost solely on developing capabilities to create new
R&D-based products. In addition, the state's R&D policies viewed private firms as the
main agents of R&D; the state saw its own role as the grantor of capital for R&D
activities. It encouraged the development of R&D capabilities in the private market,
diffused R&D know-how from the university and defense sectors to the civilian industrial
30 The total number of workers with academic education involved in R&D activities in all branches of the
civilian industry was 886; in addition there were 671 R&D workers with some technical education (Bar
1990. Pp. 41.)
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sectors, and coordinated and provided public space in which private and public R&D
agents could meet in order to enhance the flow of information and ideas (Breznitz 2004a;
Breznitz 2005a). Thus, in Israel, the state's actions nurtured an institutional environment
that stimulated private firms to develop advanced R&D capabilities, and gave them the
resources to do so.
Thirdly, I argue that in Israel the state has forcefully advanced a specific division
of labor between local firms and MNCs. The state advanced both a specific and
prominent model of organizational development in the IT industry, and a specific model
of embeddedness into the global IT Industry's production networks. This division of
labor allowed Israeli firms to specialize in product R&D and to utilize American (and
later European or Japanese) MNCs as marketing channels.
However, the state's almost exclusive focus on promoting R&D activities and
business models that are based on new innovations is also the source of the industry's
most severe weaknesses. With management and business development skills on the
backburner many Israeli companies have difficulties in sustaining their initial success for
the long-term. Many market niches that were pioneered and controlled by Israeli firms no
longer have any Israeli firms operating in them. More worrisome is the fact that this is
especially true in market niches that have grown in their importance and overall revenues.
Indeed, for an industry with over thirty years of history of global success, it is extremely
rare to see market niches in which the Israeli industry has had long-term leadership.31
Furthermore, the institutional setting of the industry, its strong imitation of the American
start-up model and VC financing, and with it the need to focus on securing financial
31 It might be telling that there is no direct translation in Hebrew to the verb "sustain" or to the adjective
"sustained."
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exits, exacerbates this problem. It also becomes increasingly apparent that Israelis no
longer control a growing percentage of the Israeli IT industry. Therefore, it is not at all
clear whether it is Israel and its society that fully enjoys the fruits of the industry's
success. In addition, the continuing decline of the rest of Israel's economy and its
industrial productivity suggests that the IT/R&D sector is now disconnected from the rest
of Israel's economy.3 2
In this chapter, I present a full view of the co-evolution of Israel's S&T industrial
policies, the particular growth pattern of the industry, and the state role in this growth. I
first give an overview of Israel's early economic history as a background. It is important
to show how the development of industry was profoundly influenced by the nature of the
Israeli bureaucracy, national security concerns, and an ideology that privileged scientific
research. The next section analyzes the decisions that led to the creation of the OCS and
its early years. Following this account, I examine the growth of Israel's IT industry, first
hardware and then software, by evaluating the intricate co-evolution process between
state policies and industry's development, the changing roles of the OCS, as well as the
particular division of labor that evolved between the local and the global industry, and
between public research institutions and private finns. The last sections investigate the
industry's development in the 1990s, the influence of a new set of OCS policies, the ways
in which these policies, in turn, were influenced by the industry's evolution, and the
industry's current strengths and weaknesses.
32 As the main positive effect attributed to IT is growing productivity, the fact that productivity in the
business sector was decreasing in the 1996-2000 period, the same years that the IT industry achieved its
greatest success, is especially worrisome (BOI 2004).
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Historical Background and the Beginning of the IT Industry
In the first two decades of Israel's existence, industrial R&D in general and in
private industry in particular, was almost unheard of. Nevertheless, a few factors that
proved crucial for Israel's IT industrial growth were already in place. The three most
important were the continuous growth of an educated workforce and a highly capable
university research sector, a small but expanding defense R&D sector, and a national
ideology that gave very high status to science and technology (with scientists having easy
access to political leaders). Furthermore, the flexible structure of the Israeli bureaucracy
made it possible for leaders within the civil service, who came to see the development of
IT industry as a national interest, to devise and implement policies with relative ease.
The transformation of Israel's industrial policies, especially the beginning and
evolution of S&T industrial policies, had little to do with the ability of the bureaucracy to
conduct long term planning and monitoring, or with its internal cohesiveness. It had more
to do with the specific constellation of political leaders in positions of power in the
development agencies and government, as well as their views on the proper goals for
S&T industrial policy. The structure of Israel's civil service, with its porous borders and
revolving doors between state, academia, and industry, eventually made Israel's IT
industrial and financial elites not only look as one, but act as one.
This structure reflects a conscious political decision to give political leaders
power in shaping and implementing policies-in effect, designing the Israeli bureaucracy
more in the American view of civil service than in light of Weberian ideals (Deri 1993;
Heclo 1977; Sharkansky 1989).33
33 This is not to say that this bureaucratic structure does not pose its own problems, such as governance and
the low status of the civil service.
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From independence to the 1967 crisis
From its 1948 independence to 1966, the Israeli state followed a protectionist
economic policy coupled with an interventionist industrial policy. There were three goals:
security and regional policy, industrial development, and the building of a private-
ownership-based economy. While waves of immigrants from less developed countries
lowered the average level of education, the institutional underpinning of Israel's
education system and its research-oriented third level education system was already well
established and enabled Israel to quickly upgrade its workforce. New immigrants were
channeled to new cities, located according to a security-based logic, not on a purely
economic basis. The state anchored these new cities around privately-owned,
government-subsidized, large-scale plants. (Textiles was the one industry to be the focus
of this state industrial planning, but parts of the defense industry complex and various
other industries were enlisted in these aims.) The result was a quasi-private, large-scale,
plant-based industrial sector, deeply dependent on, and actively lobbying for, government
subsidies and aid.
During this period the growing friendship and alliance between two leaders of
industrial and economic policy, Pinchas Sapir and Levi Eshkol, would have an important
long-term influence on Israel's industrial and economic development and the setting of
S&T industrial policy until the mid 1970s. Both served as ministers of the three main
economic ministries: the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
and the Ministry of Finance. Eshkol was also the Prime Minister at a critical period of
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Israel's development between 1963 until his death in 1969, with Sapir serving as his
Minister of Finance.3 5
This long-term alliance and friendship is critical for several reasons: first, the fact
that these two strong political leaders remained in positions of influence for such a long
period of time, gaining extensive and intimate knowledge of their domain,
institutionalized specific patterns of state-industry relationship, and gave the two an
unusually high level of influence over Israel's economic development, that was even
higher than the relatively high level of power that Israel's bureaucratic structure grants
political leaders. Second, this long-term stability and influence over the key industrial
development ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry, enabled Sapir and Eshkol to follow a plan of making them more professional,
populating them with handpicked personnel. Many of the graduates of the Hebrew
University Department of Economics (at the time the only one in the country) were
recruited straight to the bureaucracy, sometimes even before they finished their studies
(Levi-Faur 1998). Third, Eshkol and Sapir nurtured long-term personal relationships with
some of Israel's key scientists and early IT entrepreneurs. These relationships were
crucial for the start of Israel's S&T industrial policies. 36
Ideology has also played a significant role in Israel's development, with social-
democratic principles given cultural prominence, evident in the idealization of the
Kibbutz (Tsuk 2004). Nevertheless, the state, led by the socialist party until 1977, had
35 The Ministry of Trade and Industry changed its name a few times during this period, from Commerce
and Industry, to Trade and Industry, and in 2003 to the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Employment. The
Ministry of Development was dismantled.
36 According to the developmental state theories, stable long-term relationships between industry and state
are key for the creation of specific patterns of development and the ability of the state to influence
industrial development. For example, see Samuels 1988. P. 2.
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also (surprisingly to some) used its considerable power to ensure that private ownership
of the forces of production became the predominant form. The Labor Party's political
leaders firmly believed that the future of the Israeli economy crucially depended on a
strong capitalist industry led by private entrepreneurs. This tension came to a head in
1956 when the Federation-of-Labor-Unions' (Histadrut) industrial conglomerate - Solel
Boneh - was deemed too powerful for private industry to compete against, and the labor
party's national political leaders moved briskly to break it up and force the resignation of
its manager, Dan Hillel. The labor-led government did so at a time when the party was
controlling the Histadrut and with Hillel as a longtime party member. In a meeting of the
labor party's MPs during the Solel Boneh crisis, Minister of Finance Pinchas Sapir's
remark illuminates the economic belief behind these actions,
"When I spoke with Hillel Dan yesterday I realized that he has an interesting
ideology. I think it is utterly destructive for the national economy, and I told
him so. He says that there is no hope or future for private industry in Israel.
Myself, I think that if there will be no private industry in Israel there will be no
public industry in Israel... the conclusion of the things I just said is that Solel
Boneh is impeding the growth of Israel. I am utterly sorry for it, but it does not
prevent me from seeing the reality." (Protocol of the parliamentary labor party
meeting 12/11/1956 as it appears in Levi-Faur 2001, pp 179, my translation).
In 1965-7, Israel suffered its first recession, which ended with the 1967 war. The
war became a critical point in the development of Israel's science and technology
industrial policy thanks to the unexpected hero of the Israeli IT industry: French president
Charles de Gaulle. Today, after three decades of close alliance with the US, few
remember that in the first two decades of its independence, Israel's main ally was France.
Israel bought almost all of its military equipment, including critical systems such as
fighter jets and ships, from France, and Israeli engineers were working closely with
French teams on the modification and specific systems R&D for various weapon
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platforms. 37 In 1967, on the eve of the June war, with Israel under a severe security
threat, de Gaulle declared an immediate military embargo on Israel, due to France's
decision to ally itself with the Arab world. That decision resulted in Israel's inability to
buy critical weapon systems off the shelf anywhere in the world.3 8
The immediate reaction of the Israeli state was to put large amounts of resources
and R&D power to ensure the rapid growth of Israel's high technology defense industry.
A decision was reached that Israel should never again be completely dependent on a
foreign power for military platforms. Starting in 1967, Israel's military R&D targets
changed from developing niche weapon systems, the most sophisticated of which were
radar-guided rockets, to developing its own weapon platforms such as tanks, fighter jets,
and ships. At least as important as the skills and product R&D capabilities these projects
helped to develop in Israel was the rising demand for scientists and engineers. As will be
discussed later, this demand and the accompanying higher wages and status prospects for
scientists and engineers in Israel created strong incentives in the Israeli labor and
education markets to acquire these skills (Halperin and Berman 1990; Halperin and
Tsiddon 1992).
The Seeds of the IT industry
While the official history of computing in Israel began in 1947 at the Weizmann
Institute of Science (then known as the Sieff Research Institute), before the creation of
37 Not only was France the main source of Israel's advanced weapon systems, but the two states also had
many co-development research projects. France and Israel were also crucial for each others nuclear
program, with France licensing the technology developed at the Weizmann Institute for the production of
heavy water, helping Israel in return to build its nuclear reactors. Indeed one commentator from the defense
sector portrayed that co-development defense industry relationship as being closer and more satisfactory
then the one with the US (Amit 1988).
38 The alliance with the US did not commence until after the 1973, war and even today the US does not
allow Israel access to a number of crucial technologies (Vekstein 1999).
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the state of Israel, the 1948 War of Independence and the continuing security threats
propelled Israel's development of computing onto a different track. While academia,
mainly the Weizmann Institute, continued to develop three generations of scientific
computers called the "Golems," the defense apparatus and the state bureaucracy quickly
became the torchbearers of computerization development in Israel.39
Probably the first unit in the Israeli defense complex to develop and use
computers was RAFAEL (the Hebrew acronym of: armament development authority).40
RAFAEL, the first, and for many years almost the only, body in Israel to conduct high-
tech R&D, had already started to use computers in the 1950s. In 1956 RAFAEL built an
analog computer, one of the first analog computers ever made and designed in Israel. In
1959, RAFAEL created a more sophisticated analog computer, "Itzik," to enable larger-
scale simulation. Later, RAFAEL developed a few early digital computers.4 '
The way RAFAEL was organized is an example of the high esteem that science
had in Israel and the way it was used in building a national identity. RAFAEL was
organized until the early 1990s more as an applied academic institution than as a
company. Its researchers were considered academics and were granted all the educational
benefits of full-time academic staff including a sabbatical every seven years, which most
of them spent outside Israel at leading academic universities or IT companies. RAFAEL
39 It should be noted, however, that the Golems were highly advanced worldwide. The building of the first
electronic computer in the US was finished in 1952; the first Golem, which was built on a similar scale to
the first US computer was finished in 1954, see also, Ariav, G. and. Goodman S.E. (1994).
40 Some might find it Ironic that Raphael (spelled in Hebrew in the same way of Rafael) is the biblical
angel responsible for healing (Rapha is the verb for heal, while Al stands for god).
41 The story behind the formation of RAFAEL is also of interest as it illuminates the significant influence
and importance that prominent scientists had on public policy in the decades before and after Israel's
independence. The initiative to create a special "science corps" was presented by two professors, Aharon
Katchalski (the brother of Ephraim, head of the 1968 Katchalski committee) and Yuchanan Rutner to
David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the biggest Zionist organization in pre-independence Israel and its first
Prime-Minister, before the 1948 Independence War. In 1958, the science corps were separated from the
Israeli Defense Forces and another prominent biochemist from the Weizmann institute, Aharon Bergman,
stayed on as its first head (with Munya Mardor as its first MD).
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sponsored graduate academic education for its employees both in Israel and abroad,
amounting to more than a few thousand graduate degrees in Israel, and a few hundred in
top US engineering schools such as MIT and Stanford, to which these graduates returned
regularly as visiting scholars. Thus, from the point of view of a national contribution and
international scientific connections, RAFAEL acted as a small-scaled elite engineering
university. 4 2
RAFAEL played two other important roles, aside from being an important source
of information diffusion in the areas of science and technology and R&D management,
and generating spin-offs.43 First, some of the scientists who founded RAFAEL, such as
the Katchalski brothers Efraim and Aharon, formulated Israel's science-based industrial
policy at the end of the 1960s. Second, RAFAEL was used by the state as an incubation
center to "infect" other defense and civilian companies and organizations with IT R&D
capabilities. 44 The most important of these were: i) the creation of the Israeli military
computer unit (MAMRAM) in 1960 (Breznitz 2005a). ii) The first attempt in 1962 to
upgrade the Israeli Aircraft Industries (then known as Aircraft Maintenance Corporation)
into a high-technology company with the relocation from RAFAEL of the entire project
team that developed the Gabriel, the first Israeli sea-to-sea radar guided rocket. iii) The
creation in a joint venture with the Elron group, of a high-tech start-up called Elbit in
42 It is important to remember that the head of RAFAEL, even after it was separated from the IDF, was a
member of the chief of staff forum ("Forum MATCAL"), the leading discussion and decision body in the
Israeli security apparatus, a telling indication of the importance given to indigenous R&D throughout the
history of the Israeli state.
43 For example, RAFAEL pioneered the use of operations research and project management techniques
such as P.E.R.T in Israel.
44 Some of the data regarding these decisions is still classified; however, large parts of it have been
published. For more details see the memoirs of Munya Mardor RAFAEL's first CEO, (Mardor 1981) and
(Efrati 1999; Rehav 1998).
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1966, the R&D basis for which was created by the relocation of the entire digital
computer development team of RAFAEL to Elbit.45
A second major computerization and software programming effort was
conducted in the Ministry of Finance.46 In 1960, the Deputy Income Tax Commissioner
Emmanuel Sharon decided to computerize tax assessments. Due to the absence of
software programmers in Israel, a special course was arranged, very similar in
organization to the Military's MAMRAM's core programming course, on a onetime
basis. 47 Graduates of these two centers later became the early leaders of the Israeli
software industry.
While the state apparatus was generating future IT industry leaders, two
interesting parallel developments in the private sector occurred. Their importance is not
just in the fact that they culminated in the first globally successful Israeli IT companies,
but also that they clearly show the differences between the co-evolution of state-industry
relationships in Israel and that of Ireland's and Taiwan's. In Israel it were private
entrepreneurs who gave the impetus to critical policy decisions, including the idea of
financing industrial R&D ventures. This was possible because of the porous and flexible
structure of the bureaucracy and its early embeddedness within the industry. These early
45 Elbit's first product was a mini-computer that competed head to head with Digital's. Later Elbit moved
toward more defense-oriented markets and is now Israel's largest defense high-technology company. In
1971, the American multinational CDC bought the Ministry of Defense's 50% share. In 1983 Elbit first
listed on NASDAQ, and as of 2002, three of Elbit's companies -- Elbit Medical imaging, Elbit Ltd. and
Elbit Vision System - were listed.
46 Interesting and, in retrospect, highly amusing were the conclusions of the 1960 Ministry of Finance
committee for the assessment of computer uses in the Israeli national economy. Headed by Professor
Dostrovsky from the Weizmann institute, the committee concluded that two Philco computers should be
enough for the needs of the whole national economy in the years to come. These conclusions were
sponsored by the Ministry of Defense with the hope that someone would buy a second Philco to be used as
a backup to the one in MAMRAM. Fortunately enough, no one paid any attention to these conclusions, not
the least the committee's own secretary Emmanuel Sharon, who at the same time was organizing the
computerization of the Ministry of Finance.
47 See, Sharon and Naamen October, 1961.
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efforts of private industry were also critical for laying the foundation for the intimate
relationship between the Israeli IT industry and the US, fashioning not only their basis
but also the specific form that they would take in the future.
While most of the banks and investment companies in Israel, like their Irish and
Taiwanese counterparts, found investing in the IT industry too risky, there was one
critical exception: Discount Investment. At the time, the group was called the Israeli
Company for Investment and Finance and was headed by Dr. Augusto Levi. Italian born
and educated, Dr. Levi decided to follow the export-oriented industrial investment model
of Italian banks. At the beginning of the 1960s, Dan Tolkowsky, who left the military
after commanding the Israeli Air Force, joined Discount Investment. Tolkowsky became
instrumental in moving the discount group into high-technology investment. In 1961, he
first met Uzia Galil, the founder of the Elron group. Elron was the first, and for many
years the main, hub of IT NTBFs in Israel. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Elron
group and Discount became the two main sources of NTBFs in Israel. Elron, Elbit, and
Elscient, all of which later had IPOs on NASDAQ, were created by Galil with
Tolkowsky, as the manager of Discount Investment, becoming their chairperson.4 8
In 1965, without realizing it, Tolkowsky and Galil started the process that would
culminate in Israel's first S&T industrial policy and development agency. Concluding
that without state support there would be little hope for the industry's future, they came
up with the idea of organizing a small industrial R&D grants program and presented it to
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, arguing that the creation of "science-based" industry
48 It is at this critical point - the birth of the Israeli high-technology industry - that we see again the
importance of Israel's academic infrastructure, Galil started his forays into the private market from the
Technion, and recruited Suhami, Elscient's (the combination of Elron and Science) co-founder, while
Suhami was still a Ph.D. student. Indeed Elscient's first medical imaging products, on the basis of which
Elscient became the first Israeli company on NASDAQ, were related to Suhami's work in the Technion.
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was important for Israel's economic future. At the time Aharon Dovrat, then a protege of
Sapir, was the manager of the industry department in the Ministry.49 In another example
of the power Israel's bureaucratic structure confers on its politically backed mid-
managers, Dovrat accepted the idea and was able to create a part-time position for a chief
scientist to evaluate industry R&D-based new product proposals for support from a very
small fund. Thus, it was the efforts of entrepreneurs that secured the creation of the
forbearer of OCS.50
Tolkowsky was also crucial at another decisive juncture for the Israeli IT
industry, its relationship with the US industry, financial markets, and stock exchanges. In
1971, he flew to the US to interest the still young VC industry in investing in Israel.
Knowing that on merit alone he would have limited chances, he approached Arthur Rock,
who was not only one of Silicon Valley's most famous VCs (Rock was crucial in
securing the financing for Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, and later became involved
in Apple), but, even more importantly for Tolkowsky, was Jewish. Rock turned him
down, but introduced Tolkowsky to the other famous Jewish VC of the time, Fred Adler
of New York (Adler was involved in Applied Materials and Data Systems at the time).
Adler still remembers Rock's phone call:
"I got a phone call from Arthur about Dan Tolkowsky. He told me that Dan is
seeking someone to invest in Israel. He then told me about Dan and his
background: a fighter for the British RAF in WWII who became the
49 Aharon Dovrat, Argentinean born, later left the civil service to become the CEO of Clal, an investment
vehicle created by Sapir to channel and manage the investments to Israel of Jews from Latin America.
Under his management Clal became one of Israel's prominent holding companies, and Dovrat, who left
Clal in 1991, became one of Israel's prominent businessmen. In another example of Israel' porous borders
between public and private Dovrat was also the chair of a committee (known as the Dovrat Committee) on
the restructuring of Israel's K-12 education system, whose report has been accepted by the government as
the basis for a radical and controversial reform, which the government hope to implement in the 2005/6
school year.
50 To verify this account, interviews were conducted with Dan Tolkowsky 6/7/2000 and 8/10/2000, Uzia
Galil 8/9/2000, and Fred Adler, 9/28/2000, see also Levav, Ibid, and Autler, Ibid.
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commander of the Israeli Air Force. You must remember it was only three
years after the 1967 war and I must admit that it got me so interested in the
man himself that I wanted to meet him just because of that" (Interview with
Fred Adler 9/28/2000).
Tolkowsky had better luck with Adler who later visited Israel and became
involved with Elscient. Realizing that he could not raise VC for the company, Adler
decided to bypass the VC stage altogether and raise money through an IPO in the US on
NASDAQ. Adler assumed that after several IPOs had been successful, the Israeli industry
would look more inviting to American investors. In the end this strategy would work, but
it would take more than two decades and a critical state policy initiative.
Thus, by 1972 the Israeli IT industry already had its first global success and
foreign listed IT company with American VCs on its board. Implementing its "self-
reliance" ideology in the development of the high technology defense industry the state
was gearing the accumulation of resources and skills toward a specific path of new
product innovation. Furthermore, thanks to the high esteem science and scientists enjoyed
in Israel and the efforts of private industry, the backbones for what would become
Israel's critical high technology development agency had been established.
Restructuring S&T Industrial Policy on the Side - The Creation and Early Activities of
the OCS
In May 1966, in the midst of Israel's first recession, Prime Minster Levi Eshkol
convened a committee to look into the organization of government-backed research. The
economic crisis convinced him that Israel's industrial policy had to change and that one
of the only sources of growth for a resource-poor country, was science. The second
reason for convening the committee was that Eshkol faced a tough political challenge
when the legendary leader of the labor party and Israel's first Prime Minster, David Ben-
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Gurion, decided to organize a new party and run against him, with the utilization of
science in Israel at the top of his political agenda. Eshkol nominated his long time friend,
Professor Ephraim Katchalski-Katzir then head scientist of the Ministry of Defense (as
well as a university professor), as the head of the committee. Katchalski was a renowned
scientist and involved in the early development of defense R&D in Israel. 51
Contrary to the common myth that credit to the Katchalski committee for the
creation of the OCS in its present form, the committee's original aim had very little to do
with it. It is true that its recommendations started the process that led to the
institutionalization of S&T industrial policies in Israel. However, the reconstruction of
the OCS had to wait in what since has become a pattern until Israel's political leaders
nominated a powerful outsider to head and reconstruct the OCS. The mission of the
Katchalski committee was to review the fourteen civilian public research institutions and
offer recommendations for their restructuring and management. The committee was also
asked to review the working of the Israeli R&D authority (the Israeli equivalent to the
NSF).52 The committee met thirty times over the course of eighteen months and
conducted the most extensive research ever done in Israel on the role of science in the
modern state's economic life, the role of the state in the advancement of science for the
use of the economy, and the workings of the public research institutions in Israel.
In December 1968, the committee submitted its report and recommendations to
Prime Minister Eshkol in a very different Israel from that of 1966. In the intervening
period, the country had decisively won a war on three fronts, and, as a result, had much
51 Katchalski would later become the President of Israel, the symbolic head of state. At the time science and
scholarly activities were so highly regarded in Israel that all the first four Presidents of Israel were
renowned scientists or scholars.
52 See the letter of appointment to the committee Katchalski 1968. Pp. A/l-A/2.
88
more faith in its capabilities; it had also begun a massive industrial defense R&D effort,
and had to deal with the Arab economic embargo.
Apart from its various recommendations for changes in the management of the
public research institutes, the Katchalski committee report had a long-term influence in
two areas. The first was its recommendation for the creation of an official position of a
Chief Scientist in each of the main ministries. The role of the Chief Scientist was
envisioned as the overall manager of the public research institutes and other R&D
activities that related to the ministry's jurisdiction. The second role of the Chief Scientist
was to be the personal advisor of the minister for science-related issues. This
recommendation gave formal governmental legitimacy to the activities already conducted
in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Chief Scientist positions were specifically
designed as outside consultant positions. This allowed the ministries to hire people
outside the civil service and offer them better wages.53
The Katchalski committee also argued that the ability to convert basic science into
practical technology was the key to national economic success, and then sharply
lamented the fact that in Israel there was almost no civilian industrial research. The
committee urged the Israeli state to take responsibility and spur civilian R&D activities. It
contended that the Israeli state should act through the creation and restructuring of the
industrial R&D infrastructure and through the work of the public research institutes. This
turned out to be its more lasting influence.
Thus, the report not only led to the creation of offices of chief scientists in all of
major ministries, but also, on the basis of a comparison of Israel to other countries,
53 Positions of Chief Scientists exist today in all the major ministries and act more or less as envisioned by
the Katchalski committee. The OCS has been the only one of these to grow into an industrial development
agency.
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crystallized a consensus that the economic future depended on the creation of science-
based industries. These industries were portrayed in terms of R&D leading to new
products and technologies. This conceptualization, together with the extensive and highly
successful defense R&D efforts and a realization after the 1965-67 crisis of a need to
change Israel's industrial policy, would eventually lead to the evolution of the OCS as an
industry development agency.
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From a Part-time Chief Scientist to the Rise of the OCS as Israel 's Pilot S&TlIndustrial
Agency
Between 1968 and 1974, the OCS continued to work in its earlier format, a part-
time job of a university professor. 4 The OCS was inactive and most of its industrial
R&D budget was still channeled to the public research institutions. Even when
companies came with proposals, they faced a heavy bureaucracy, at times waiting for
more than two years without getting a final answer to their proposals. However, during
that time, the Ministry of Defense was busily developing the R&D capability of the
defense sector. Most of the data about those activities is still restricted. But it is quite
clear that the defense industry stimulated the changes of the Israeli labor force's skill
structure between 1967 and 1980. In that period Israel had, at 260%, the highest growth
rate of scientists and engineers employed in the industry in the world, twice the rate of
Japan's economic miracle age (Halperin and Berman 1990). The implementation of the
self-reliance in defense production doctrine was transformed in these years into major
R&D efforts on almost all fronts and on almost all the platforms and equipment used by
the military.55
Most of the decision makers in these years thought that there was a perfect match
between the goals of establishing a strong R&D-based defense industry and the economic
goals of the Israel state, viewed as building a strong globally successful R&D-based high-
54 Professor J. Gross was the first chief scientist, starting his tenure in 1965. He used to come to the office
for one day per week (interview with OCS' chief economist 5/7/2002).
55 This concentration on R&D was so high that in the first half of the 1980s the cumulative expenditure on
defense R&D was higher than the cumulative expenditure of final systems procurement (Halperin 1987;
Halperin and Berman 1990. Pp. 159.) Moreover, in 1984, one project alone, the Lavi (fighter jet), employed
10% of the overall supply of skilled R&D scientists and engineers in Israel. This demand, emanating
mainly from the defense sector, led to the rapid expansion of the universities' educational capacity. If the
total number of scientists and engineers in the industry (defense and civilian) in 1965 was 2427, by 1985/9
the annual rate of scientists and engineers finishing their studies (both graduate and undergraduate) in IT
related disciplines was 4785 (CBS 2004).
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technology industry. There is no doubt that the structural transformation of Israel would
have never happened so quickly without the thrust given by the defense sector. This is
especially true until the mid-1980s, when the negative effects such as the crowding-out of
the private industry in the labor market started to overwhelm the positive effects of this
strategy.
While these activities in the defense sector were on going and an internationally-
renowned massively R&D-focused defense industry was created, very little happened in
regard to civilian S&T industrial policy until the end of the 1973 war. By that time, two
major transformations occurred that would convert the OCS to an active development
agency: Elscient successfully went through an IPO in NASDAQ, supplying a "proof of
concept" and a model for imitation. Secondly, with the 1973 war, the perception of the
need to restructure the civilian industry became more urgent. In 1974, the Minister of
Trade and Industry Haim Bar-Lev, a former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Military,
recruited Itzhak Yaakov as the first full-time chief scientist.
From 1955 to 1973, Yaakov had served in commanding positions within the
military's R&D division. As head of the armament development department and as the
overall head of R&D in the military, respectively, he was responsible for the management
of the major transformation in defense R&D. Additionally, Yaakov's educational
background, as an engineer with an advanced degree in technology management from
MIT, and his international connections, not the least with the World Bank, made him
uniquely suited to this role.56 Yaakov was promised a free hand and sufficient financial
resources, as well as the political backing that allowed him to transfer his ideas to
56 Yaakov was also a prot6g6 of Katchalski, who was then serving as the President of Israel. After leaving
the OCS Yaakov served as a special advisor of the World Bank to Taiwan and South Korea at the time they
went through their rapid high technology industrialization period.
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reality.57 This was the first example of what has since become a pattern of S&T industrial
policy development in Israel. Managers within the bureaucracy, many of them recruited
from outside, are given a free hand to formulate and implement policies and build
programs and agencies.
On taking the position, Yaakov moved on four fronts. First he formulated the
goals and aims of the OCS. He prescribed an S&T industrial policy in which the state
role was to fix the market failure in R&D by lowering, but not eliminating, the risk
associated with R&D activities. The economic goal was the growth of industrial exports
based on new science-based products. Private firms were seen as the optimal agents not
only to conduct but also to decide what R&D projects to undertake and what technologies
to develop. The logic behind this assumption was that private firms, deeply embedded
within their markets, are far better equipped than the state or any other research
institutions to formulate and devise successful product R&D projects.
Therefore, the state's role was limited to motivate private entrepreneurs to
conduct more product R&D. The main way in which this was done was through the
central R&D fund that granted 50% of R&D costs to project proposals submitted to and
approved by the OCS in repayable loans (the loans were repayable as royalties only if the
products were profitable). In addition, the bureaucratic processes were simplified, so, for
example, a company could sign an agreement with the OCS within ten days of a proposal
approval (OCS 1974; OCS 1975).
Seeing private companies as the optimal source of R&D ideas and performance
agents, the OCS also sharply decreased the support it channeled to the public research
57 While vastly larger than the funds given to the OCS before, the sufficient financial resources proved to
be in the first year just above 15 million Israeli Liras (compared with the about 500 million Israeli Liras
that were channeled into defense R&D annually at that time).
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institutions, although it guaranteed that for joint ventures with private industry it would
sponsor the institution's 50% of the project's cost (OCS 1974). This was a major break
with the past, and since that day the importance of public research institutions to
industrial development in Israel has been marginal.
Third, in 1974 Israel reached the upper limit of what the World Bank then defined
as a "developing country." Yaakov, with the backing of Sapir and Bar-Lev, channeled the
last World Bank loan to Israel into a program titled - "national R&D projects," which
allowed the OCS to give 80% grants to up to eight projects. In addition, after President
Nixon's visit to Israel, an agreement was signed to create a cooperative R&D fund for
Israeli and American firms (OCS 1974). This fund, under the management of another
outsider, Ed Mlavsky, would later play a vital role in the development of the IT industry
as the BIRD foundation.
Yaakov also won approval for the OCS to grant the status of approvedfactory to
science-based firms, giving them all the benefits provided under the law for the
encouragement of capital investment, the same law used to grant aid to plants in the
newly constructed peripheral cities.58 That linkage became more important in later years
when MNCs with R&D centers that registered as a company in Israel were de-facto
operating under the same favorite tax regime they were granted in Ireland, and when
Intel, National Semiconductors, and Tower applied for aid under its provisions when
constructing silicon chip fabrication plants.59
58 Science-based firm was defined as: "a firm that its operation necessitate a high technological level and
highly educational workforce, and that the firm conduct R&D activities that are high in relation to its
overall activities and that a high percentage of its production and exports is based on these R&D activities"
(OCS 1974). This definition gave the OCS the ability to define as science-based firms all the firms with
approved project proposals.
59 While probably critical in securing the construction of the fabs in Israel, the overall economic effects of
the capital investment law were probably negative even in the 1990s, see Bregman et al. 1998.
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Fourth, Yaakov transformed the OCS into an active industry-engaged agency.
Very shortly after his nomination he initiated company visits throughout Israel and urged
the companies' managers to come up with ideas. These activities by the OCS quickly
bore fruit; by 1974 the OCS approved 70 million Liras in proposals, three and a half
times the amount approved in 1973. Yaakov recounted that some of his major problems
were to change the mind set of the agency:
"Civil servants thought that industrial R&D was a waste of money, that the
money could be better used to buy meat in Argentina, it was, don't forget, the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. There was also this belief that innovation
came from public research institutes... I had cases where the office workers
came to me and said: 'this project has no use and there is no need for it,' I'd
usually send them back to the company that proposed the project to check it in
person. More often than not they would return with their head between their
hands because the company, operating in the market, knew better. I really
wanted to get more industrial R&D activities in Israel off the ground, and I
must admit I cut corners. For example, I went to the founder of Elscient, and
told him, 'bring me one R&D project which you want to conduct and you
cannot for lack of capital and I will declare it a national project and use the
World Bank's finance to grant you 80% of cost.' He thought about it for a day
and told me that he decided that CAT Scan is the future <this is indeed the
technology on which Elscient flourished during the 1970s and early 1980s>. I
said O.K. I will give you a letter granting you up to half a million liras and
within a reasonable time send me a proposal and I will make sure it is
approved. Now because it was a World Bank project I needed to assemble a
prestigious research committee with a lot of academics. These professors
wanted to show that they are smarter than the industry and argued that in
Holland they already work on CAT Scan technologies. I had no choice, I fired
the whole committee on the spot and filled it with people from my office that
did not have a vested interest to show how smart they are." (Interview with
Itzhak Yaakov 9/28/2000).
The same picture of the OCS at the time was reflected in one of the OCS's first
employees' recollection of that period:
"During the Yaakov period we tried to create a dynamic of R&D activities, we
wanted the industry to routinely conduct R&D and to create a dynamic that
will infuse these ideas that R&D is something that should be done throughout
the industry. To create a sort of paradigmatic change in the way businesses
thought about what they are doing. Nobody in the industry even thought about
R&D at the time, it seemed to them as a horrible risk, so Yaakov just started
going around the country trying to convince managers to conduct R&D. We
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did not really care who, what, why, when, we just wanted to create an R&D
dynamic" (interview with OCS employee 5/7/2002).
Needless to say, this mode of behavior is far removed from Weberian ideals.
In early 1978, Yaakov left the office to become a consultant of the World Bank in
Taiwan and then in South Korea, before turning to private business and joining the
American firm CDC. True to the revolving door between state and industry, he became
instrumental again in the 1980s. Before he left, he submitted a series of policy papers
formalizing the goals and aims of Israel's S&T industrial policy, the role of the OCS in
achieving these goals, and the procedures that the OCS should use in order to achieve
them. These policy papers defined the role and scope of the OCS for years to come as a
quasi-independent agency and became the basis for the OCS operation, with many of
their provisions incorporated into the 1984 Law for the encouragement of R&D (OCS
1974; OCS 1975; OCS 1977; Yaakov 1974).
The most enduring legacy of these years has been, however, the ideological one.
In a 2000 interview, Yaakov expressed his belief that industrial R&D remains Israel's
only economic future:
"From the national point of view, a failure in a research and development
project is not a loss. This is especially true in the case of developing and
resource starved countries such as Israel. This was my sole guiding principle
when I gave grants to companies. This is the philosophy that guided me all the
time, and I had many arguments about it with the civil servants at the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry. If truth be told, if you took the long term, there was
almost no approved project that failed to deliver some tangible results from the
national point of view in the end. This is another thing typical to industrial
development. Like old soldiers, R&D projects never die. There is always the
sequel." (Interview with Itzhak Yaakov 9/28/2000).
Over the years the OCS developed a core of professional long-serving high-level
personnel with a special ethos and a strong identity. This is true even though a large
percentage of its staff, including the chief scientists and many of its top advisors, has
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been recruited for a limited period of service from the private market. Nevertheless, the
early recruitment processes of the OCS clarify more than anything the differences in
bureaucratic structures among Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland. People who were deemed
worthy were recruited to jobs at all levels of the organization disregarding formal
channels. For example, a top executive of the OCS recalled the ways in, and the reasons
for which, she was recruited:
"Just before the enactment of the R&D law in 1984 the State-Comptroller
came out with a report strongly lamenting the grant giving procedures of the
OCS. This was the reason I was recruited. It was quite amazing when I arrived.
There were neither coherent financial procedures nor procedures of how to
manage the relationships with firms and how to recognize R&D costs. My first
job was to create some semblance of order in this mess, the Chief Scientist at
the time was very thankful. He was quite worried and no one here had a clue
what to do" (interview with an OCS employee 5/7/2002).
Looking at our theoretical framework we can see that by formalizing the OCS'
role as fixing the general market failure associated with industrial R&D, Israel has
became the first state in the world to employ as its main S&T industrial policy a set of
policies that are both neutral and horizontal in regard to industrial sectors and technology
(Justman and Teubal 1995; Teubal 1983; Teubal 1997). The aim of horizontal
technological policies is to stimulate a certain set of activities and capabilities throughout
industry, without targeting particular industries or technologies. However, with the
success of companies in certain sectors, accordingly, the buildup of more focused
capabilities, and the general trends of demand for certain technologies in the market, the
system began over time to specialize in certain areas. The private market, not the state,
determined the areas of technological specialization. In Israel, for example, we see a
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build-up of capabilities in IT, particularly in telecommunication and medical
equipment. 6 0
The Reaffirmation of the Local-International Division of Labor - BIRD Foundation
In 1976, two years after the initial agreement between the governments of US and
Israel was signed, the Bi-national Industrial Research and Development Foundation
(BIRD) started operation. In a similar way to the reconstruction of the OCS, only after a
strong-willed outsider was put in charge did it become the critical and active
developmental agency it is today. The idea behind the creation of BIRD was to encourage
cooperation between firms from the US and Israel to jointly develop and sell new
products. An endowment, later increased to $110 million, was created as the financial
basis of the foundation. BIRD was put under the jurisdiction of the OCS and under the
auspices of the U.S.-Israel Advisory Council on Industrial R&D that consisted of senior
scientists, officials, and businessmen from both the US and Israel.
At first, BIRD did not have any impact. Under its first director, Wade Blackman,
an MIT graduate recruited in the US, BIRD did not manage to make even one
investment. Ed Mlavsky, then an American member of the US-Israel Advisory Council
on Industrial R&D and a cofounder and Executive Vice President of Tyco international
described these times and the chain of events that led him to become BIRD's second
director in 1978,
"I got a frantic phone called from Jack Goldman <then the VP for technology
at Xerox>. "Ed," he told me, 'We must find a new director for BIRD. Not even
one single project has been started, Wade is leaving, and the Israelis are
impatient.' The council convened a committee to select a suitable candidate.
We met in New York. The committee was filled with very impressive people.
60 In 1998, 78% of total R&D expenditures were spent in the optical and communication electronic sub-
sector (Bentur 2002). See also graphs 1 and 4.
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However, the candidates were not at all impressive. It was then that I made a
fateful remark that just shows you that one has to take full and firm control of
his mouth at all times. I said: "Gentlemen, this is horrible, even I can do a
better job than any of them." Before I knew it all these notable people,
including Jordan Baruch <then the Under Secretary of State under Carter> start
to pressure me to go to Israel and check it out. I told them that they are insane,
that there is no way I will do it. I even reminded them that I am married and
my new family is not Jewish, that we have no emotional connection to Israel.
In the end I agreed to come for two years. We put our US furniture in storage
and I took a two years Sabbatical from Tyco" (interview with Ed Mlavsky
6/12/200).61
Mlavsky came to Israel in June 1979, originally for two years, and stayed as
BIRD's director until January 1993 when he co-founded Gemini, one of the first Yozma
initiative VC funds. Under his management BIRD became an active organization that,
like the OCS, did not follow the Weberian ideas for bureaucratic management and
development. Mlavsky described this process: "we just started to do things and
crystallized a model after we had some cases to build on."
This model is still the cornerstone of BIRD to this day. BIRD funds up to 50% of
a joint project in which two companies, one from Israel and one from the US, agree to
develop and sell a joint product and to share the revenues. BIRD's aim has been for
Israeli firms to concentrate on R&D and the American on product definition and
marketing. BIRD coaches Israeli firms on how to approach, and cooperate with,
American companies, a key skill that was not widely available to the Israeli IT industry
until the end of the 1980s. BIRD also helps in the matching process and to that end
maintains a database of American companies that might be interested in R&D, including
61 Dr. Ed Mlavsky was Executive Vice President of Mobil Tyco Solar Energy Corporation, a joint venture
created by Mobil Corporation and Tyco Laboratories Inc. to develop and commercialize a novel
photovoltaic technology initiated under Mlavsky's direction at Tyco, a company of which he was a co-
founder in 1960. Until 1974, Mlavsky was a member of its Board of Directors and its Chief Technical
Officer; in 1973, he became President and Chief Operating Officer.
62 As of 2003, with the growth of large Israeli companies, this division of labor was weakened to an
assumption on BIRD's web site (BIRD 2004).
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their product R&D areas of interest. This database is gathered by visiting hundreds of
American firms.
Starting in the early 1980s, BIRD became prominent in luring MNCs to open
R&D centers in Israel. BIRD helps, first, by exposing the American firms to Israel's
R&D capabilities in a low-risk friendly environment. Second, BIRD actively convinces
MNCs to open operations in Israel. BIRD employs two modes of operation, one assisting
Israeli R&D executives who wish to come back to Israel, and the other approaching an
MNC that participated in several successful BIRD projects and offering it to open an
Israeli-registered R&D subsidiary. The financial benefit that BIRD offers is to recognize
some of the R&D projects (starting with the first) of the Israeli-registered subsidiary as a
BIRD project between the MNC's American headquarters and the Israeli subsidiary.
Moreover, as the OCS also recognizes Israeli-registered MNCs' subsidiaries as Israeli
firms for the purpose of R&D grants, they can enjoy both BIRD and OCS grants,
enabling the MNC to start R&D operations in Israel at low cost. Both Dan Vilenski, who
replaced Mlavsky as BIRD's director, and Dov Hershberg, the current director,
emphasized the importance that BIRD gives to the luring of American MNCs to open
R&D centers in Israel.
As with OCS, BIRD's financing is in conditional repayable grants, with the grants
repaid as royalties of 5% of sales of the product to third parties, and for up to a maximum
150% of the original grant.63 For many years BIRD has also been following the neutral
horizontal policy logic and does not limit itself to targeting only specific sectors or
technologies. BIRD became a spectacular success and a model for other bi-national R&D
63 This gives firms the financial advantage that BIRD's grants and payments are treated as off balance
financing with the royalties counted as pre-tax expenses but not as liabilities.
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funds both in Israel and abroad.64 It supports up to 35 full-scale projects (a support of
$500,000 to $1 million over 2-3 years), and 20 mini projects ($100,000 over a year)
annually (BIRD 2000; BIRD 2004; BIRD Various Years). BIRD uses the royalty
payments to increase the number of grants given. By the end of 2000, it had received a
total of $64 million in repayments, of which $6 million accrued in 2000. The reuse of
royalties by both BIRD and the OCS is another unique feature of the Israeli system.
Until the mid- 1990s, when VC financing became available in Israel, BIRD and
the OCS were the only two available sources of finance. Both of these institutions
diffused a particular model of high-technology companies in Israel. This model views
companies as R&D vehicles for the creation of new export-oriented products. The one
and only high technology industry model it stimulated in Israel sees the industry as
consisting of companies selling novel products based on intensive in-house R&D efforts.
By financially supporting only firms that followed this view BIRD and the OCS were key
factors in the creation of the particular model of the Israeli IT industry as a supplier of
new technologies to the global IT industry production networks.
BIRD was also important in strengthening the R&D focus by enhancing a
particular division of labor between Israeli companies and American MNCs. In this
division the Israeli firms concentrate on R&D while their American partners participate
in the product design stages and concentrate on marketing and sales. The relationship of
Israel to the global IT industry's production network, in which Israel is a supplier of new
64 BIRD's track record of success has made the foundation the subject of two Ph.D. dissertations in the US
that tracked BIRD's project success factors, one at Wharton and one at Northwestern (Bizan 2001;
Yahalomi 1991). By 1991, thirty-nine countries approached the US to establish similar programs, and
BIRD itself became in 1988 a model of a Department of Commerce program, which was called the
International Partnership for the Commercialization of Technology (IMPACT). In addition, many countries
have signed similar agreements with Israel, and many more signed agreements between themselves and
other countries built on the same model (Yahalomi 1991).
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technologies, was further reinforced by BIRD's activities, with OCS' support, in luring
MNCs to open R&D facilities in Israel.
Third, BIRD influenced the Israeli IT industry by enhancing its already existing
propensity, after the success of Elscient, Elbit, and Scitex, to look on the US as the main
market for both products and finance. In an environment where other financial resources
were lacking, BIRD's encouragement of this American orientation throughout the Israeli
IT industry cannot be underestimated. For example, in an internal evaluation of its
activities, BIRD found that 75% of the Israeli companies listed on NASDAQ in 1992
enjoyed the support of BIRD, with a large percentage of these companies building their
business around the basis of their BIRD project.65 Last, but not least, apart from opening
the doors of leading American companies to small Israeli businesses BIRD infused the
Israeli system with two key skills: (a) knowledge of designing new products for the
American market; (b) knowledge of conducting business based on new product R&D in
the American market.
A remark by the founder and CEO of one company that received BIRD grants
exemplifies these specific features of the foundation.
"For us BIRD was extremely important. We had a few BIRD projects. They
enabled us, a company consisting of eight young people, who just finished
their military service, to collaborate with big successful American software
companies. BIRD not only put us through the door so we could actually talk to
them and see what are the needs of the American market from the best sources
possible, but also enabled us to offer them a risk free model. They did not need
to put a dime on developing the product and if it was successful they
distributed it using their channels. I see no other way in which an R&D team of
65 During the interview with Ed Mlavsky, he insisted that this particular statistic is not of value because
practically every Israeli company operating before the early 1990s used BIRD. Without getting into the
debate of the exact influence of BIRD on NASDAQ IPO projects, the fact that BIRD assisted almost every
Israeli company in this earlier formative period is another testament to BIRD's critical position in the
Israeli IT innovation system during that period. In its first ten years of operation, 1979-1989, BIRD funded
156 full and mini-scale projects, of which 44% (69 projects) led to successful sales of new products
(Yahalomi 1991. Pp. 124.)
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eight Israelis could profitably sell so many copies in such a short time and also
offer the needed customer support. Later when we decided to open facilities in
the US our BIRD experiences proved invaluable. Our first two American
employees knew us from earlier BIRD projects and they brought their friends.
It would have been amazingly difficult for us, a god forsaken start-up from
Israel, to recruit American employees of such quality otherwise" (interview
with a software company cofounder and CEO 1/15/2002).
As the creation stories of the OCS and BIRD show, unlike the Irish and
Taiwanese cases, in Israel the policy was not built as a part of an orderly overall strategic
plan. Both the policies and the agencies were built in a process of trial and error, which
was managed at the levels equivalent to a ministerial division head. In addition, proper
bureaucratic procedures of orderly administration were not a defining attribute in the
creation and development of the Israeli industrial development agencies.
Nevertheless, there are a few firm principles that have always been the backbone
of Israel S&T policies. These can be defined as Israel's particular variant of
"Technonationalism" (Samuels 1994). First and foremost was the belief that new R&D
on the technological edge with the aim to create novel products is the sole and proper
basis for Israel's high technology industry. The second principle is a clear definition of
the role of the state, limiting it to a promoter and facilitator of R&D activities. The state
goal is to maximize industrial R&D demand in private industry and to lower the risk
associated with it. As a result, throughout the specific co-evolution of state-industry
relationships that was built on the basis of these ideals, private firms were seen as the loci
of both R&D-activities and ideas, a striking contrast to Taiwan.
With the formation of BIRD the Israeli state also started to advance a particular
division of labor between the local and the global IT industries, where Israeli firms and
MNCs who opened facilities in Israel were urged to focus on the R&D stages and
specialize in the innovation of new products. This specialization in R&D was further
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enhanced with the state's efforts to lure MNCs to open R&D subsidiaries in Israel, a very
different policy than was followed by both Ireland and Taiwan in the same period.
The Rise of the New Industry - The Evolution of the IT Industry in the 1980s and Early
1990s
After the 1973 war, Israel suffered multiple economic crises that lasted for over a
decade. Economic growth was almost halted, the balance of payments deficits rose in
alarming proportion, and inflation rapidly rose to over 400% annually.66 From 1977 to
1985, the first political transfer of power intensified the economic crisis. In 1985, a
rainbow coalition government led a stringent stability plan. The plan succeeded in some
areas; however, by the late 1980s, unemployment had become a problem, especially in
the periphery. 67
In the same years that the IT industry grew, the traditional and mid-tech industries
as well as agriculture continued to decline. Already by 1988, 59% of Israel's industrial
exports were high-technology products, by 1998 over 71% of Israel's industrial exports
were high-technology, and in 2000, the IT industry alone accounted for over 70% of GDP
growth (CBS 2001). At the same time, in direct contrast to the developments in Ireland,
Israel's corporatist wage agreement regime had been crumbling, with labor-union
membership in rapid decline and the socialist ideology in rapid retreat.68
By the end of the economic crisis in 1985, an IPO on NASDAQ was a legitimate
and well-trodden path for the more successful Israeli high-technology companies.
However, the IT sector did not pass through the economic crisis unscathed, and with the
66 Inflation in Israel was so high that by the end of the crisis Israel changed its currency twice. Between
December 1978 and March 1986 prices rose by 109187%.
67 For more about the causes of the crisis and the stabilization program, see an article written by the
chairman of Israel's central bank at the time (Bruno 1989). Also, see Ben-Bassat 2002; Ben-Porath 1986.
68 For more about the history of neo-corporatism in Israel, see Shalev 1992, and Grinberg 1991.
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collapse of the banking system, both the Elron group and Scitex were faced with their
biggest crises to date.
During the 1970s the growth of the IT industry was slow, the OCS found it
difficult to allocate its maximum annual budget, and not many new NTBFs were formed.
The main inhibiting factor, as in Taiwan and Ireland, was the unwillingness of private
entrepreneurs to take risk. This entrepreneurship failing was identified as acute in the
OCS' annual reports:
"It is evident that despite the opportunities described in this section on the one
hand, and the massive government support on the other, too few new
technology-intensive industries are being established... Clearly we have here a
problem of technological entrepreneurship. Despite opportunities and massive
government aid, there are not enough people willing to take the risk. To reach
the ultimate goal of industrial R&D, i.e., new increased exports, particular
attention must be given to this phenomenon as well " (OCS 1975. Italics
added.)
After Yaakov's departure, the negative side of Israel's more flexible and highly
embedded bureaucratic structure became evident. The OCS lost some of its standing. Not
anchored in law, it was to fight chronic budgetary battles. The OCS' image was tarnished
because of question marks over its capture by the industry appeared in the socio-political
context of only a few relatively strong high technology industrial groups with political
sway, and few new entrants (Stigler 1971). This was particularly true following political
lobbying by Elscient that ended with a tax-sanction law, aptly nicknamed the Elscient
law.
Until the mid-1980s when a decision was made to reduce defense R&D efforts
and cancel the development of the biggest project, the development of a fighter-jet ("The
Lavi"), the strategy of self-reliance in advanced weapon systems continued, and was
implanted mainly in the R&D phase. In 1984, the year before the decision on the major
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budgetary cuts was made, the annual defense R&D budget stood at $750 million (in 1984
terms (Halperin 1987; Halperin and Berman 1990)). However, it is also important to
remember that unlike the industrial defense sector the military did not cut down on its in-
house R&D operations. 69
The intensification of the economic crisis gave another window of opportunity for
the OCS to restructure itself and advance new programs, especially as it had the backing
of two strong Ministers of Trade and Industry, Arial Sharon from 1984 to 1990, and
Moshe Nissim until 1992. The approval of the R&D law in 1984, the recognition of
software as an industrial branch in 1985, and the cancellation of the Elscint law in the
same year marked a change in S&T industrial policies and the move of the high
technology industry to the forefront of Israel's industrial landscape. The period from
1984 until the beginning of the 1990s is the reconstruction period of the institutional basis
of Israel's political economy.70
However, under the new R&D law the OCS was quickly expanding its activities
together with BIRD's. Sanctioned by the R&D law, which designated the OCS as Israel's
official S&T industrial agency, the OCS regained its independence and public image as a
professional agency. Critically, until the mid-1990s the R&D law authorized the OCS'
main R&D fund to finance all of the projects that passed its due-diligence process. These
69 The military enlists and trains a few thousands technologists annualy. There are two paths in which the
military itself employs and trains R&D personnel, first, through the "academic reserve," soldiers who are
allowed to complete academic studies before starting active duty, serve as professionals, and in exchange
sign for longer period of service. Many of them work in the military R&D units. The second path in which
the military trains and employs R&D personnel, is the military's own training programs. These either
operate in conjunction with the universities and aim to train an elite R&D personnel (the most prestigious
program being "Talpiot"), or through in-house training, the most significant being software programming
and computerization training, which is the sole technological area where the military has built its in-house
technological school. For more about the military software school, see (Breznitz 2005a). The military has
several units where IT R&D is being conducted.
70 The transformation was not that apparent at the time and many commentators thought it had failed
(Teubal 1993).
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expanded financial resources significantly enhanced the ability of the OCS to create and
sustain the industry's demand for R&D. Private IT entrepreneurship became more
common, active, and successful.
The IT Industry in the 1980s and Early 1990s - The Growth of the Hardware Sector
Throughout the 1980s, with the available funds from OCS and BIRD reserved
solely for R&D, two models of new company formation and growth emerged. Both of
these models utilized the OCS and BIRD grants while answering two other financial
needs: (1) the lack of working capital, especially for marketing and sales; and (2) the lack
of expansion capital, especially acute during the first stages of international expansion.
Of the two broadly defined prominent organizational development models in this
period the first was the creation of company groups. Successful entrepreneurs quickly
found that they were being approached by other would-be-entrepreneurs looking for
organizational and financial help.
Probably the one group that was critical to the industry's development is the Elron
group, founded by Uzia Galil. It was Elron that pioneered the NASDAQ model, created
the first connection with the American VC community, and was influential in the creation
and early development of Israel's S&T industrial policy. Many of the group's companies,
such as Elron, Elbit, and Elscient, but also less closely held ones such as Zoran, grew to
become leading companies in the industry and listed on NASDAQ.71 Interestingly, the
Elron group, unlike other groups, did not have a common technological sector, but
71 Zoran, Silicon in Hebrew, was established in 1983 by Levy Gerzberg to try out one of his ideas in the
semiconductor industry. Today, after passing through a few transformations, Zoran is a fabless company
applying DSP technology (digital signal processing - one of the Israeli IT industry's strengths and another
indicator of its advanced R&D capabilities) to the image processing market, specifically DVD and digital
cameras. In 2003, Zoran was one of only a few Israeli fabless companies in the world's top thirty largest
fabless companies in terms of sales according to the 2004 McClean Report, with sales of over $216 million
a rise of almost 50% from 2002 (Insights 2004).
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supported spin-offs and start-ups in areas that seemed to suggest an opportunity at the
time to its management. 72
One of the companies growing out of this organization model, Orbotech, is also
one of the only cases of Israeli companies managing not only to pioneer its market niche,
automatic optical inspection (AOI) systems for Printed Circuit Board (PCB), but also to
control it for a significant period. Orbotech's history also illuminates the wild
competition and lack of planning in the Israeli IT industry in comparison to Taiwan and
Ireland. Orbotech is the merger of Orbot and Optrotech, two Israeli companies that
between them controlled the global market (85%) in their niche during the late 1980s,
and merged in 1992. Dr. Shlomo Barak founded Optrotech in 1981 with the backing of
the Elron group. Orbot was founded shortly after by a group of Israelis who first met in
Boston where some of them were either professors or attended MIT. Ormat, another of
the first globally successful Israeli high technology firms backed Orbot, which
commenced operation in December 1982.
The second model of organizational growth was to build a company on the basis
of OCS and BIRD foundation projects (as OCS grants are given per project, companies
can enjoy several of these grants). Among the most successful were Gilat Satellite,
Comverse, and Mercury, all of which became globally prominent companies in their
market niches. In the second half of the 1980s, the move of defense-oriented companies
72 For more on the early electro-medical industry in Israel see: Teubal et al. 1976; Teubal and Spiller 1977.
For a history of the semiconductors industry in Israel, see (Autler 2000). For a descriptive history of Israel
high-technology industry see Levav 1998. For three accounts which briefly discuss the software industry
and the causes of its success see, Ariav and Goodman 1994; Breznitz 2004b; de Fontenay and Carmel
2001.
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into the civilian market accelerated. The most successful of these has been ECI Telecom
that successfully moved, into the civilian market and listed on NASDAQ in 1982.73
During the 1980s the flexibility and reach of the "porous borders" structure of the
Israeli bureaucracy was crucial in securing another source of finance: "investor limited
partnerships." These partnerships were a classic example of state-business collaboration
to achieve a common goal. The limited partnership model was organized after Yaakov, at
the time working for CDC, discovered the existence of R&D tax incentives in the US.
Yaakov (with others following him) collaborated with the OCS to create a specific set of
legal entities to use the American tax shelter to channel finance into Israeli IT firms.
Groups of US investors were assembled to form limited partnerships investing in the
R&D efforts of a pre-selected set of companies. The OCS then assisted these limited
partnerships with additional financing that was classified as loans for tax purposes,
maximizing the tax returns for the American investors, and minimizing their risk
exposure. The first limited partnership started to invest in 1980, and a few more followed,
under the titles of Israeli R&D Associates (IRDA) or Israeli Technology Ventures (ITV).
In 1985, the Reagan administration changed the tax regulations that were the basis of the
limited partnerships. Activity continued in those that had already raised their funds until
the late 1980s. All in all, the limited partnerships invested in 25 different newly created
companies, the most successful of which were Technomatics, Comverse, Teledata, and
Lannet. The main effect of these limited partnerships was to further strengthen both the
73 ECI was established in 1961, and operated mainly as a defense contractor in the communication area. It
went public on the NASDAQ in 1982 on the basis of its first internationally successful civilian product,
which was an analog multiplexer; doubling the transmission capacity of telephone lines. After 1982, ECI
quickly grew to become one of Israel's most commercially successful companies until the end of the 1990s.
At its commercial zenith, ECI had sales of over $1 billion; today, the company is still in flux and its annual
sales plummeted to $421 million in 2003.
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R&D focus within the Israeli IT industry and its connection to the American financial
markets.
In the late 1980s, the growth of the telecommunication subsector of the Israeli IT
industry helped another group of companies, RAD, to rise to prominence. The story of
RAD is illustrative in several ways. Apart from the importance of the group itself, its
growth marks a generational shift in the Israeli IT industry and with it the growing
importance of graduates of the military R&D and intelligence units. Even more
importantly, the growth and limits of the RAD group is one of the best examples of the
strengths and the weaknesses of the Israeli model: creating the ability to secure a
technological edge and to react quickly to changes, on the one side, and the relative lack
of professional management, long term planning, and business development skills on the
other side.
The Zisapel brothers, Zohar and Yehuda, formally established the RAD group (or
the RAD-Bynet group as it is known in Israel) in 1981.74 The Zisapels are both engineers
and Zohar was a commander in one of the Israeli military's most respected electronic
R&D units before he joined his brother in the civilian market. In 1985, the brothers
decided to use their two companies as an incubator for R&D-based companies. Not
having any specific plan or product in mind, they recruited Benjamin Hanigal, a young
engineer who had just left the Lavi project and together the three started to search for
ideas.75 In 1986, Lannet was established and raised its first financing from the OCS and a
74 Bynet commenced operations as early as 1973. RAD, the manufacturing, R&D, and internationally-
oriented part of the group was established in 1981.
75 Hanigal later became a VC, first with Star Seed, and currently is one of the three Israeli partners of
Sequoia Capital, a prominent Silicon Valley VC firm with a dedicated branch in Israel.
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limited partnership. 76 Just as Lannet was raising its limited partnership finance the
American tax regulations were changed and Lannet managed to get only a third of the
original sum. As a result, the company quickly changed course, starting operations with a
different and smaller project. During its first year of operation Lannet started a second
line of products using the technology on which it would grow, Ethernet. A former Lannet
senior manager argued that the reason that Lannet could develop a product that sold
successfully worldwide was the existence of a large pool of engineers within the group
who were users of Local Access Networks (LAN) and could be asked to play the
customers, helping in building the product specification.
As Lannet had no other sources of capital, it needed to rapidly increase its
revenues and became profitable at a very early stage of operations. In 1991, Lannet had
its first public offering in NASDAQ, having already an annual revenue stream of a few
million dollars.77 However, very quickly, the LAN market matured and started to
consolidate. Lannet decided that it could not compete with the better-organized and more
financially capable American firms. It merged with Madge, de-merged, and was finally
bought by Lucent. In the end Lannet's Israeli R&D operations became Lucent's R&D
center in Israel.
Motivated by the success of Lannet, the Zisapel brothers expanded the RAD
group and opened about thirty companies following more or less the same strategy,
recruiting or backing engineer-founders with ideas for a new product within the
76 In an interview, one of the Lannet executives remarked that without the OCS' assistance, Lannet would
have never been established.
77 Unlike past public offering of Israeli firms, Lannet's IPO valuation of $190 million was considered high
even for NASDAQ in that period. Thus, Lannet's IPO, together with the IPOs in 1992, of the 4 th (new)
dimension, Teledata, Comverse, Lanoptics, and Sapiens, all of which with valuations of over $100 million,
was critical in changing the perception of American investors toward Israeli companies, to one which saw
Israeli companies as being able to supply a profitable exit even for American VCs.
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telecommunication market broadly defined. From one point of view, RAD is an immense
success story, with the group backing the largest number of companies listed on
NASDAQ apart from Elron. Another view sees it as a perfect example of the limits of the
Israeli IT industry, if only for the reason that none of the RAD companies managed to
grow even to the size of the still-privately-held anchor company, RAD Data
communications.7 8
The story of Lannet and its end as Lucent's Israeli R&D center also symbolizes
another trend that grew in importance in the 1980s, the R&D activities of hardware
MNCs in Israel. The rise in the scope of MNCs' activities was so rapid that it caused a
concern in Israel that the IT industry had become no more than a node in the MNCs'
global activities, with most of the innovation and spillovers going overseas and with only
few local spillovers (Felsenstein 1997). In the 1980s the MNCs that had major R&D
operations in Israel were almost solely American semiconductor MNCs. The most
important of these MNCs in the 1980s, apart from Intel and IBM (which opened its first
IBM research facility outside the US in Israel), were Digital, Motorola, and National
Semiconductors.7 9 All of these companies, apart from IBM, had VLSI chip design centers
78 As of 2004 the RAD group companies that are listed in NASDAQ as independent companies are:
Radware, established in 1997 by Yehuda's son Roy; Silicom, established in 1987; Radvision, established in
1993; RiT Technologies, established in 1989; Radcom, established in 1991; and Ceragon Networks,
established in 1996 as Giganet.
79 National Semiconductor activities were also important, as it was the second MNC to open fabrication
facilities in Israel. The fab was opened in 1986, was spun off as Tower Semiconductors, Israel's first
pureplay foundry, and listed on NASDAQ in 1994. Hence, Israel had one of the first pureplay foundries in
the world after Taiwan. The existence of Tower's and Intel's fabs helped Israeli firms to access and try new
semiconductor technologies, for example Saifun, in which Tower is an investor, develops some of the most
advanced technologies to maximize the performance of FLASH memory chips. However, Tower never
grew to become a globally leading pureplay foundry and many Israeli fabless firms prefer to subcontract
their chip fabrication to TSMC and UMC.
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in Israel, with all except Digital also having manufacturing facilities in Israel in the
1980s.8 °
The relative importance of Israel as a supplier of new technologies is evident
when we take into account that with one exception these Israeli R&D centers were the
first that the MNCs had opened outside the US. The exception was Motorola but even
Motorola's Israeli R&D VLSI center was the largest and most autonomous outside the
US, and in 1964, when Motorola Israel was established, it was Motorola's first fully
owned daughter company outside North America (R&D operations started in 1972, the
VLSI design center in 1982). These centers became crucial as one of the main training
grounds for the technological capabilities that enabled the Israeli IC Design industry to
grow to become the fourth largest in the world, and the most innovative after the US-
Canada, in the 1990s.
Thus, unlike Taiwan and Ireland, already in the 1980s MNCs viewed Israel as a
preferred location for R&D and the development of new products and technologies.
These R&D efforts were in some of the most advanced areas of research in the world at
the time, such as microprocessors and applications of DSP technology. By the beginning
of the 1990s, after the success of Israeli-based R&D operations of a growing number of
MNCs, many more American MNCs started to look seriously at Israel and to acquire
Israeli firms for their technologies. The fact that by that time both BIRD and the OCS
were actively offering MNCs R&D-activities-related benefits served as a catalyst.
80 VLSI stands for very large scale integration. To put the Israeli VLSI skills in context: TSMC's spin-off
in 1987 was the successful conclusion of ITRI's VLSI project in Taiwan. Ten years earlier, Israeli
engineers, in Israel, were already working on cutting-edge innovative design. The skills of the Israeli
industry were well enough known that when National Semiconductors decided to start CPU design and
manufacturing operations it chose to open an Israeli subsidiary to manage this new business venture.
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The importance of the OCS in that period, both in increasing the formation rate of
new IT firms and in focusing their operations on new product R&D cannot be
underestimated. Two prominent examples, out of a few hundred, are Comverse and
Mercury Interactive, respectively the second and third largest software companies in
Israel. The entrepreneurs behind both companies came back to Israel in order to utilize
the OCS' help.81
As is evident from the stories of ECI, RAD, and Comverse this period also saw
the early raise of the telecommunication sector to prominence within the Israeli industry,
a position it still holds, as can be seen in Graph 1 below.
81 Comverse's beginning was in 1982. Kobi Alexander, an Israeli, was working as an investment banker for
Shearson Loeb Rhodes (now Salomon Smith Barney) in New York, when he met an Israeli engineer, Boaz
Misholi. Misholi had an idea for a business venture developing centralized voice and fax messaging
hardware systems to enable big organizations and telecommunication service providers to offer voice and
fax mail to their customers. Within a week, the two returned to Israel and established Efrat Future
Technology with the aim of applying for OCS grants to finance their R&D. In 1984 the founders came back
to New York and established Comverse, which became the parent company of the Israeli Efrat. Similarly to
many Israeli companies in that period, Comverse went public on NASDAQ in 1986 and used its IPO as a
final VC round. During the 1990s Comverse moved to rely more on software than on hardware products
and started to grow also by acquiring other companies in Israel and the US. In 2000, Comverse's revenues
were $1.2 billion; in 2002, after spinning off two publicly traded software companies, Verinet and Ulticom,
Comverse's revenues were $735 million. While the full details of all the support Comverse has been
granted through the various OCS and BIRD programs are not public, Comverse companies were awarded
at least sixty-nine R&D grants for different projects through the main OCS program between 1990 and
2000. Mercury Interactive became Israel's third largest software company in terms of sales in 2003. It was
founded by Aryeh Finegold, an Israeli who was the founder and manager in the 1980s of a once high-flying
Silicon Valley firm, Daisy, and a group of former Daisy executives led by Amnon Landan the current CEO.
The group decided that although they were very well connected in Silicon Valley they would establish
Mercury with the help of OCS grants in Israel. At first Mercurym following the well-trodden path for
Israeli companies to focus on products assisting in R&D and software development developed a software-
debugging tool. The company listed on NASDAQ in 1993, started to acquire other companies in 1995, and,
with the growth in the importance of the Internet, changed its focus from software debugging to testing and
analyzing the performance of enterprise and web-based applications.
114
Graph 1
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Changes in both the domestic and international market in the telecommunication
industry completely transformed this industry and made it the fastest growing IT industry
worldwide in the late 1980s and all through the 1990s. These changes created a profitable
market for niche companies with new technology, a category of firms which the Israeli IT
industry, with its strong focus on R&D and new products, excels in.82 The first change
was the transformation in the regulation of the telecommunication industry and the
worldwide move from a regulatory regime that viewed the industry as a "natural"
82 It was also fortunate for the Israeli IT industry that the same technologies (telecommunication, DSP, and
command and control) have also been some of the core technologies developed as part of the defense R&D
efforts.
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monopoly to one that specifically aimed to spur competition, opening a market for small
R&D-based companies to sell into. The second was advances in telecommunication
technologies, specifically in wireless and data communication, both of which opened up
new, rapidly expanding markets with big firms looking for new services to offer and new
ways to manage their old businesses.
Israeli firms quickly excelled as suppliers of new technologies in all niches of the
telecommunication subsector pioneering for example Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
technologies, LAN systems and chips, DSP chips, urban networks, switches, routers,
software, mobile phone technology, and internet wireless and "last-mile-solutions,"
among others.
However, even in this sector success and sustained growth necessitate not only
technological edge, but also some access to management, and business skills, as well as
logistics and distribution resources. Acquiring these was not systematic and had more to
do with good fortune and random effect. The story of Amdocs, the only Israeli software
company to date to become one of the top 30 software companies in the world, and its
critical relationship with SBC, is such an example. By 1984, Amdocs, then called Aurek,
became a leader in selling automated telephone directory systems (Yellow Pages) in
Europe. This proved to be of immense strategic importance when on the first of April
1984, AT&T was divided into seven regional telephone companies that were desperate to
buy reliable software systems from companies other than AT&T. Very quickly
Southwestern Bell (now SBC) and Aurek started a joint venture to develop and sell
automated directory systems. With SBC backing and with a few software systems all
aimed at this market niche, Aurek soon became the global leader in this small niche.
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However, Aurek's transformation from a leading player in a marginal market
niche to one of the world's top 30 software companies came in the early 1990s and was
prompted not by Aurek but by SBC. SBC asked for, and assisted Aurek in developing, a
telecommunication billing system. In 1995, the new package, called Ensemble, was ready
for the market. The former partners in Aurek, together with SBC and a few other
investors, established a Channel Island company called Amdocs, a new holding company
for all of the Aurek group companies. Very quickly Amdocs, with the clout of SBC
behind it, became the leading provider of billing systems for telephone companies in the
US and later worldwide. In 1998 it went public on NASDAQ. Amdocs then showed
remarkable strategic planning skills for an Israeli company and employed a strategy of
mergers and acquisitions to become the leading supplier in another related niche - CRM
systems to the telecommunication industry. In 2002, Amdocs concluded its second
strategic transformation by becoming a full service provider to the telecommunication
industry, offering integrated systems of billing, CRM, and order management systems. At
the same time Amdocs started to offer outsourced services and a few companies, such as
Nextel, turned over all their billing functions to Amdocs. While Israeli managers and
engineers have been controlling and navigating this growth, without SBC's early
guidance and constant support Amdocs would not have been able to grow in the way it
did, and probably could not even recognize and realize the market opportunity in billing
systems.
Thus, the success achieved by many Israeli IT companies in these years should
not make us disregard the weaknesses of the Israeli R&D-focused model of development.
The particular limitations of this model are apparent on both the micro company level,
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and the macro level of the industry as a whole, and are caused by over-emphasis on R&D
and technological-engineering capabilities. This focus creates an Achilles' heel in other
areas of management, from marketing and market research to planning and business
development. The lack of these capabilities, in particular of managing sustainable long-
term expansion and defending market niches against new entrants, leave most Israeli IT
firms vulnerable to competition from better organized and managed foreign firms.
The Beginning of the Software Industry - the 1980s and Early 1990s
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, while the seeds of the Israeli IT industry were
planted and a few hardware companies achieved worldwide success, the software
industry was practically non-existent. The industry consisted of a few service-oriented
data processing centers and the IT units of government offices including the defense
apparatus and a few big organizations. However, the rapid expansion of defense R&D
and the fast accumulation of IT skills by both university graduates and graduates of the
military technological units created local demand for IT usage, the knowledge base to
supply it, and a positive attitude toward this nascent industry.8 3
The first product-oriented software companies appeared only at the end of the
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.84 Unlike the first software companies in Taiwan
and Ireland, they appeared within an industrial system that already had a few highly
successful IT hardware firms that were publicly listed on NASDAQ, as well as an already
well-developed local market that had many sophisticated users, most of whom were
83 For more on the role of the military in the development of the software industry, see Breznitz 2005a.
84 One company, Comet, that offered information management systems on IBM platform, was established
in 1969 and had an IPO in 1994, but very quickly thereafter declared bankruptcy.
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sponsored directly or indirectly by the state's defense R&D efforts.8 5 Even more
importantly, these software companies appeared in an industrial system where many
R&D activities, both civilian and defense oriented, were taking place. Hence, a critical
mass of knowledge on the problems associated with IT usage, the IT R&D process itself,
and software development was amassed in Israel, and a large market existed for software
products that solved them. As problems in R&D and software development are very
similar worldwide, an Israeli software company that developed solutions for these had
products that answered global needs. Moreover, the customers for these products, being
engineers and programmers, are more sophisticated than the average consumer. Hence,
software products that were too complex and crude in their user interface to be sold to the
consumer market could still be sold to these highly skilled customers.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the common thread of most of the successful
companies established in these years is that their products offered solutions helping with
IT development. As we usually categorize companies by industrial subsectors, and not by
their cognitive focus across sectors, some examples of the more successful companies are
in order: OptiSystems Solutions, established in 1982, focused on optimization of
computer systems; Magic, established in 1983, developed a Rapid Application
Development (RAD) tool for relational database applications; Cimatron, established in
1982, has been offering CAD/COM software for the tool industry; Nikov Haifa, now
known as Attunity, established in 1988, moved away from its origins in ERP consultancy
and started to develop RAD tools for reports programming, a product line which brought
it to NASDAQ in 1997 and has since been abandoned; and Sapiens, established in 1982,
85 By 1984 the local sales of the Israeli software industry were $365 million (1984 terms) higher than the
total sales of the Irish-owned software industry in 1994 (1994 terms); therefore, the local market could
support the growth of more than a few software companies.
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has been focused on rule-based systems for RAD.86 All of these companies were assisted,
after 1985, by OCS R&D grants that enabled them to conduct large-scale R&D efforts,
and all of these companies had an IPO on NASDAQ in the 1990s.
As venture capital to the industry was not available, the business model of many
of these companies was either to create a joint venture with a more established company
that acted as either the financial backer and/or the main customer, or to find their first
customer before they started their development phase. A few also developed from an IT
consultancy business, but not many of these managed to transform to a product-based
business model successfully. In addition, as most of these companies could not secure
enough capital to open an American branch, their first export market tended to be the
European market.
Another common thread in this period is the importance of the state apparatus in
being either the origin of the entrepreneurs, the companies' first and main customer, or
the source of the technology itself. Thus, Amdocs had its origin in a team that worked for
the Israeli Postal and Telecommunication Ministry and in a system developed as a joint-
venture with the company that had the license to organize and sell the telephone directory
of Israel. A team of former officers of the military's central computer unit (MAMRAM)
established Magic Software Enterprises, and its first breakthrough sale was to the Israeli
military. In addition, the state was sometimes the source of the software product itself; for
example the Fourth Dimension (later known as the New Dimension) acquired from the
86 For papers focusing on the evolution of the Israeli software industry and the histories of its various firms,
see Breznitz 2004b; Breznitz 2005d.
120
Ministry of Defense a product for operations automation developed internally for the Air
Force, in exchange for a promise to update and maintain it.87
In the late 1980s both domestic factors, described in the earlier section, and
external/international factors influenced the growth of the Israeli software industry. The
external factors in these years that completely changed the software industry were the
rapid diffusion of PCs, not only to the consumer and home market but also in the
corporate market, and the growth of Microsoft's OS and programming platforms (first
DOS and then Windows) as the dominant platforms and the de facto standards of the
industry. The two most important effects of these technological changes on the Israeli
software industry were: (a) the opening of new markets to the industry, while at the same
time lowering the cost of development; and (b) the manifold enlargement of the global
need for platform crossover and conversion technologies. This was a demand that the
Israeli software industry, already experienced in developing solutions for problems that
directly relate to IT development, was well positioned to supply.
Thus, during the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s many
software companies managed to enlarge their activities and penetrate foreign markets.
Two examples of veteran software companies that took advantage of the growth of the
global market and the new technologies are those of Magic and the New Dimension.
During the second half of the 1980s, the two companies managed to first secure critical
sales in Israel and abroad before moving into the American market. Both went public on
NASDAQ in 1991 and 1992. Another development in the second half of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s was a new cohort of internationally successful companies. The
87 Yossi Holnder, the technological founder of the Fourth Dimension, served as a software technologist in
one of the military intelligence units, and had looked into the idea of acquiring the rights to several
programs developed inside the military before settling on that specific one.
121
common ground of all the Israeli software companies established in this period,
differentiating the industry from that of Ireland and Taiwan, is that all these companies
were developed by software programmers who were actively looking for product ideas
that offered solutions needed in their own industry - software programming.
Another common theme of these companies was the relative lack of business,
management, and financial skills of their founders. This led many of them in the era
before the advent of the Israeli VC industry to either join forces with other companies or
to rely on luck and intuition, in their early product development and expansion to foreign
markets phases. Precise is such an example. Established in 1990, Precise specialized in
software systems optimization, and almost went bankrupt before it recruited Shimon
Alon, a former manager of Scitex. Under his management the company stabilized, listed
on NASDAQ, and was sold to the American software MNC Veritas in 2003.
The 1980s also saw the beginning of the subsector in which the Israeli software
industry truly achieved global fame - data security. In addition, more than a few Israeli
software companies have focused on the creation of new software technologies or new
applications of software technologies. The most prominent sub-sector in which these
companies operate has been the telecommunication market, which is also the sub-sector
of strength of the Israeli hardware IT industry. A well-known example of that period is
Vocaltec. Established in 1989 to develop speech recognition technologies, Vocaltec was
the first company to sell VoIP telephony products for the PC. Vocaltec went public in
1996, and was soon followed by a wave of Israeli companies in the same market niche,
such as Mind CTI that develops VolP billing solutions, and Arel Communication that
develops video conferencing over IP.
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These trends continue today. Looking at Table I below we can see that of the top
20 software companies by term of sales in the 2001-2003 period the products of nine are
addressed to IT R&D and development, and six more are providing products for the
telecommunication industry.
Table I - Israel's Top Software Companies by Sales 2002-2001 (USD millions)
Total Sales Total sales Total sales
Name Primary subsector 2003 2002 2001
Telecommunication billing,
mdocs CRM, and automated
directories 1483.3 1613.60 1533.90
Comverse* Voice mail (Telecommunication) 735.9 1270.20 1225.10
Mercury
Interactive Software Systems Optimization 506.5 400.10 361.00
Checkpoint Date Security 432.6 427.00 527.60
NDS Data Security 392.7 368.70 304.80
Formula
Systems HC and software house 366.8 283.30 376.90
Nice Systems Monitoring 224.3 162.50 127.10
Verinet Telecommunication 157.8 120.60 141.70
Precise Bought by
Software Optimization Veritas 76.00 55.60
Magic RAD 63.4 60.00 76.60
Aladdin Data Security 59.7 49.50 46.60
Sapiens Data Conversion 52.3 64.80 63.40
Crystal System
Solutions** Data Conversion 54.3 36.60 38.40
Radvision Telecommunication 51.3 49.10 46.20
Fundtech Financial 47.6 39.80 44.20
TTI Telecommunication 45.9 58.30 60.80
DSSI Software House 35 55.90 45.90
Ulticom Telecommunication 29.2 58.20 47.40
Cimatron CAD/CAM Design 21.6 21.68 22.95
Total 5215.88 5146.15
Source: Hoover's financial, companies' SEC filings.
* After spin-off of Verinet and Ulticom.
** After merger with Liraz systems now operating as BluePhoenix
Industry-State Co-Evolution - The Restructuring of S&T Industrial Policy
From the second half of the 1980s until the early 1990s the IT industry was
rapidly expanding and Israeli companies, both hardware and software, achieved growing
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international success. However, industry growth was limited by some severe weaknesses.
Two in particular were venture financing - especially at the pre-seed, seed, and the early
sales and distribution stages - and business management skills and capabilities. While the
knowledge of how to do business, and especially how to interact with the American
financial markets, already existed within the Israeli industry, it was limited to the few
firms that had been successful and there was no systematic sharing and dissemination of
that knowledge.88
Hence, by the beginning of the 1990s it became clear that the two bottlenecks of
the Israeli IT industry were, first, the lack of venture funds to enable both deeper and
more consistent R&D activities, especially in projects that related to the technological
edge and, accordingly, necessitated longer R&D efforts without any revenues. The
second bottleneck was the lack of management skills and knowledge, especially in regard
to planning, marketing, and finance.
In 1989, the latest period in the development of the IT industry began. The USSR
started its democratization and break-up process, and Jews, who had been unable to
emigrate until that time, started the last large immigration wave into Israel. This wave
was seen as bringing with it the best and the brightest technologically educated workforce
from the USSR, and together with the thousands of engineers who had been made
redundant by the defense industry, the question of tapping this body of knowledge sprang
88 One example was the 1987 crisis of the New Dimension, one of Israel's premier software companies to
be. The company found itself in acute financial difficulties. It had a couple of million of dollars in future
orders but not enough working capital. At that time, the founders, all technologists without any business
education, started to look around frantically for what venture capital was available. Fortunately, the wife of
one of them worked for Comverse, and Kobi Alexander, Comverse's financial entrepreneur, agreed to meet
with them. He was somewhat surprised to learn that they sought investment instead of using the simple
financial tool of bridge loans.
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to the top of the political agenda.89 In addition, the Israeli government secured the United
States' help in raising $10 billion in bonds to finance the settlement of so many
immigrants (20% of the total population in less than one decade), giving it some financial
resources.
Thus, the political and bureaucratic apparatus of the Israeli state, knowing it had
to act and having sufficient finances, was very open to new initiatives led by the OCS.90
Starting in 1991, the OCS, led by Yigal Erlich, with the strong political backing
of the then Minister of Trade and Industry Moshe Nissim, initiated and implemented
three new programs. The Ministry of Finance initiated another failed program aimed at
the VC industry. These programs were devised though a process of analyzing the
strengths and the weaknesses of the industry both internally by the OCS and in
conjunction with academics.91 The aim of these new policies was the enhancement of the
formation, survival and success rates, and R&D capabilities of firms. All of the programs
have been following the logic of neutral horizontal policies. While the OCS' three
programs, the Technological Incubators, Yozma, and Magnet, started operation between
1992 and 1995, they were all planned and approved in 1991, the year that can be seen as
the high point of the latest political window of opportunity.92 In 1991, two new programs
started operations, each aimed at remedying a perceived market failure at a different
development-stage of NTBFs. From the macro level the main effects of these new
programs have been twofold: increasing the R&D focus and usage of business models
89 During the early 1990s more than 20,000 employees, both skilled and unskilled, of the defense industries
were fired (Rehav 1998).
90 For more about the present R&D policy and schemes, see Trajtenberg 2000.
91 For four works that influenced the construction of these programs, see Brodet et al. 1990; JIM 1987;
Justman et al. 1993; Teubal et al. 1996.
92 Interview with Yigal Erlich 8/21/2000.
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based around novel products on one side, and increasing the embeddedness and
dependence of the Israeli industry with the US and its financial markets on the other.
The end of the 1990s marks another transformation. With growing public and
political interest in the IT industry and the OCS, its institutionalization and public
supervision on it increased. The manifestations of this are many, from the establishment
of a public committee process to recommend nominees for the position of a Chief
Scientist to the growing supervision of the OCS by the Parliamentary Committee for
Science and Technology. Indeed, of all developmental agencies in Ireland, Israel, and
Taiwan, currently it is the OCS that supplies the most comprehensive and transparent
information about its current and past activities.
The New Programs of the Early 1990s
The Inbal program, proposed and implanted by the Ministry of Finance, was the
first serious government attempt to induce the creation of a private VC industry in Israel.
At that time only two VC institutions were present in Israel: Tolkowsky and Adler's
Atena VC fund, a limited partnership fund established in 1985 based on the American
model, and Star, a private equity fund established in 1989 that became a Yozma fund
after 1993. The Inbal program was an attempt to foster publicly traded VC companies by
creating a government insurance company ("Inbal") that guaranteed a minimum value,
calculated as 70% of the value of their initial public offering, to new VC funds traded on
the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. As such, the program was similar to Taiwan's initiative,
structuring the VCs as companies, and viewed the VC not as an industry but as a pool of
capital, with no attempt to foster learning, or to import and transfer professional VC skills
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and capabilities. 93 Four funds were initially established, but initiated no follow-up
activity and the funds' valuation on the stock exchange tended to be low. The four Inbal
funds also faced what they perceived as excessive bureaucracy and in the end left the
program. Today all the funds are under the management of one holding company - Green
Technology Holding (Avnimelech and Teubal 2004).
When the OCS initiated the Technological Incubators Program, in 1991, the
program was presented as a solution to two problems. First, there was the inexperience
and inability of many technically-oriented or scientific entrepreneurs to become
successful commercial entrepreneurs and find very early stage financing for their ideas.
Second, there was the difficulty of many of the technologically skilled new immigrants
from the former USSR to find jobs and successfully integrate in a capitalist market. The
idea was to open a network of technological incubators that would help entrepreneurs in
their very early stages by giving them most of the financing and a large amount of
professional business and management help.
The incubator program is also the latest example of the pattern evident in the
restructuring of the OCS and BIRD - an outsider coming in as a manager and making the
program a reality. However, this time the early crisis period was prevented. Yigal Erlich
the Chief Scientist at the time, realized the need and re-recruited Rina Pridor, Yaakov's
right hand for many years, both in the OCS and afterwards in CDC and the limited
partnership period. Her return is yet another example of the OCS' porous borders and
networked structure. Under Pridor the program quickly commenced activities and grew in
importance.
93 On the importance of discerning between policies that treat VC as a "pool of capital," and these that treat
it as an industry, see Avnimelech and Teubal 2003a.
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The goal of the program has been that after two years, when they graduate from
the program, companies will be mature enough to secure private VC financing. In a
similar fashion to the other OCS programs, incubation proposals had to come from the
market.94 Until 2001 (when specialized incubators approved, even if none had yet started
operation), the incubators operated on the principle of neutral horizontal policy. While
some of the incubators became more specialized over time, overall the technological
incubators network did not pick any sectors, and R&D projects from all branches of the
industry were admitted. As a result, the distribution of projects by industry through 2000
was as follows: electronics and communication 11%, software 11%, medical 18%,
chemistry and materials 20%, biotechnology 20%, and others 23%.95
Two of what may be the most important impacts of the program have yet to be
considered and tested properly. 96 First is the major impact that the program has had on
changing the preferences of technologically and scientifically educated personnel to
become entrepreneurs. Second, as the technology industry crisis between 2000 and 2003
showed, the program is important in ensuring a minimum NTBF formation rate, which is
94 By the end of 2000, 24 incubators were in operation and 883 companies had been part of the program. Of
these, 240 were still in the incubation centers and 643 had graduated. Of those that graduated, 53% have
continued operations and 47% have been closed down. The total private VC financing that the graduating
companies managed to secure was in excess of $525 million. In addition, one company, Compugen, is
already publicly listed on NASDAQ, and a few more were acquired by American MNCs, with the biggest
sale being that of X-Technologies (a medical equipment company) to Guidant in 2003. Compugen is also
interesting as it is exemplary in showing how deep and multidisciplinary R&D skills are available in Israel
to even tiny new companies. Compugen's first product has been a dedicated computing hardware for
biological/molecular calculation (gene research) that the company stared to sell in 1994. The second line of
products is software based: algorithms that help in the discovery of new genes, which Compugen both sells
and also uses in-house to find and patent genes. Following that line of business Compugen decided, in
1998, that in order to be taken seriously in the gene discovery business it needed to develop strong "wet"
biology skills and opened a full scale lab and a third line of business. All of these extremely advanced and
multidisciplinary R&D activities were conducted before its IPO on NASADQ in August 2000. After the
IPO Compugen also spun off a subsidiary, Evogene, for plant and agriculture biotechnology.
95 Interview with Rina Pridor (2/8/2000), Trajtenberg, Ibid, and the incubation program web site
http:/,/www. incubators.org.il .
96 There are two recent reports on the incubation program. One was conducted independently (Shefer and
Frenkel 2002) and the other done under the auspices of the OCS (Economics 2001).
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independent of the volatile behavior of the VC industry in regard to the amount of
investment, and the herd mentality and fashion-like behavior of VCs in their sectoral
investment criteria. A comparison with Ireland is striking. In Israel, to a great degree
thanks to the OCS' programs, the annual formation rate of new companies remained
above a hundred even after 2000. In Ireland, with the Irish VC industry managing record
high levels of capital, in the whole of 2001 there were a total of three seed investments,
which together equaled $750,000, a sum which is slightly less than the support granted to
two incubator companies. For a state like Israel that is economically dependent on the
high-technology sector, securing this baseline is of critical priority.
In the same years that the OCS was busily developing and implementing new
programs, new developments in the private sector were changing the IT industrial
landscape in Israel. Before 1990 there had been a total of ten IPOs of Israeli firms on
NASDAQ. In 1991 alone, three companies went through IPOs, and in 1992 there were
another nine. Moreover, unlike the low valuation IPOs of the past, some of these IPOs
resulted in a large enough market capitalization to allow a respectable exit for an
American VC at the time. In addition, 1991 was also the year in which the first pure
software companies went public on NASDAQ.
In 1992, learning from the failure of Inbal, the OCS initiated another program
aimed at inducing the creation of a vibrant VC industry in Israel - Yozma. The aims of
this initiative were fourfold: increasing the amount of venture capital available to Israeli
firms, especially in their expansion phases; creating a professional VC industry that
would possess the business skills that the IT industry was lacking at the time; injecting
the Israeli high-technology industry with systematic knowledge of the American markets,
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both product and finance; and expanding what the OCS perceived as a too-tight group of
financiers. 9 7
This time, and in almost complete opposition to its behavior in the past, the OCS,
again led by Yigal Erlich as Chief Scientist, decided that the necessary skills and
knowledge did not exist in Israel, and that in order to succeed an Israeli VC industry
would need strong networks with foreign financial markets, and not with the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange. Yozma was created as a government VC fund of $100 million that had
two functions. The first was to invest $8 million in a series of ten private limited
partnership venture funds, which would be 40% or less of the total capital - the rest to be
provided by the other private limited partners. Second, a separate fund of $20 million
started operation at the same time. In order to get this financing, the funds' managers had
to secure investment and partnership from at least one established foreign financial
institution and from at least one local one. Moreover, the OCS made a deliberate decision
to pick one organizational model for the future Israeli VC industry, the American style
limited partnership fund, and focused on early-stage financing VC. 98
Unlike Inbal, Yozma became highly successful and was a model for VC-aimed
policy worldwide. The precise construction of the program, in particular the fact that it
treated the VC as an industry with specific skills to be acquired and capabilities to be
nurtured, unlike similar initiatives in Ireland and Taiwan, had a few positive impacts. The
first effect was the professionalism and education of the venture capitalists themselves. In
Israel, with its already long history of the R&D-based IT industry, there was already a
growing pool of experienced technological entrepreneurs who successfully managed their
97 Interestingly the need for government action to expand a "too tight group of financiers" was also strongly
emphasized in Ireland, see Chapter Four.
98 Interview with Yigal Erlich 8/21/2000.
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companies, and this, together with the demand of Yozma to bring in a professional
foreign partner, created a VC industry where the average background of the VC is as an
entrepreneur or manager of an R&D-based IT firm. This VC profile is very similar to the
ideal American background, and very different from the average profile of VCs in Ireland
and Taiwan, where most VCs do not have entrepreneurial or even IT management
backgrounds. Second, the Yozma initiative itself sponsored and cultivated many venues
of collective learning within the industry, which enhanced its capabilities (Avnimelech
and Teubal 2003a).
The first Yozma funds had excellent returns on investment thanks the growing
success of Israeli companies on NASDAQ, the fact that the Israeli landscape at the time
had many high quality NTBFs looking for capital, and the coincidence with the start of a
period of rapid growth in demand for IT and the related financial boom. This success
resulted in rapid investment of capital into the Israeli VC industry. Most of which opted
to use the limited partnership organizational model, as can be seen in graph 2. In turn the
existence and growth of the VC industry, both accelerated the rate of new company
formation and, even more importantly, finalized the transformation of the Israeli IT
industry turning it into the mirror image of the American one. Today the Israeli IT
industry has the same focus on the American financial and product markets and the same
milestones, namely either an IPO on NASDAQ or an M&A, as in the American IT
industry. 99
99 A three years study of the Israeli VC industry was recently concluded. For some of the results, see
Avnimelech and Teubal 2003a; Avnimelech and Teubal 2003b; Avnimelech and Teubal 2004.
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Graph 2 - Venture Capital Raised in Israel 1991 -2000
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As of 2004, the Israeli VC industry consisted of over 70 local funds, with many of
the top US and global VC funds having local operations in Israel and with total capital
under management of approximately $5 billion. The virtuous dynamic of both a growing
and successful IT industry and VC industry brought another facet of professionalism into
the Israeli VC industry - a career pattern where successful entrepreneurs who managed to
sell or publicly list one or more company would later opt to become VCs. 0° °
'00 Some examples are: Benjamin Hanigal of Lannet is now a partner of Sequoia Capital in Israel; Moty
Ben-Arie, cofounder and manager of Radcom, is now a partner of Walden Israel; Orna Berry, cofounder
and manager of Ornet before becoming the Chief Scientist joined Gemini in 2000; and Arad Naveh,
cofounder and manager of Class Data, an Israeli software company acquired by Cisco, is now a partner at
Benchmark Israel.
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In addition, the success of Israeli companies in the US in the 1990s transformed
the IT industry's own networks. Lately many Israeli IT companies have raised capital
directly from established foreign VCs and financial institutions in all stages of the
companies' development. This is highly important for the Israeli IT industry that to a
large degree imitates the American mode of start-up growth, based on an expensive R&D
phase, followed by an even more expensive build-up of marketing and distribution
channels, during which the firm is hardly able to secure revenues from sales. Hence, the
creation of the Israeli technological VC industry, and the ability of the Israeli IT new
product R&D-based firms to secure venture capital abroad make the Israeli IT industry
different from Ireland and Taiwan in being able to compete successfully with the
amounts of capital that American IT start-ups manage to secure.
The last initiative designed by the OCS in 1991, MAGNET, also started
operations in 1992. Unlike the other OCS programs, MAGNET, the Hebrew acronym of
Generic Non-Competitive R&D, aims to solve two problems relating to the later stages of
development and maintenance of the long-term R&D-based competitive advantage of
Israeli NTBFs. The first problem is the fact that in Israel a large number of companies
work in the same technological space, all of them too small to be able to compete on the
basis of cutting edge infra-structural research activities that are crucial for their ability to
sustain the competitive advantage against the bigger MNCs. The second perceived, if
more debatable, problem was the underutilization of academic research done in Israel.
Similar to other OCS programs, MAGNET grants aid to programs initiated by
private industry, and operates on the principles of a neutral horizontal policy. However,
as MAGNET aims to create a consortium to develop generic technologies, a consortium
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is created for a period of up to three years, and all IP outputs are shared among the
consortium members, who also agree to license this IP to local companies at a cost that
does not reflect monopoly status. A consortium, consisting of at least a few companies
and one research/academic institution, applies in a competitive fashion to MAGNET, and
if approved, is granted financing to the level of 66% of cost. MAGNET financial aid is
given as grants with no need to repay. A parallel process exists for users' consortia, with
the aim of distribution and implementation of generic technology.
Again a comparison with Taiwan is illuminating. In Taiwan, research consortia
were created by the government as an instrument to assist technological learning,
upgrading, and catch-up as part of attempts at industry creation. In Israel, the aim of the
state in establishing research consortia was to help pre-competitive advanced R&D. Thus,
the national goals behind the usage of a structurally similar policy vehicle are as different
as can be, and symbolize the very different policy and development path of the IT
industry in the two countries. °0
In addition to the new initiatives, OCS's budgetary growth during the 1990s was
quickly transformed into extensive investment in the industry. As can be seen in Table II
the success of projects financed by the OCS in turn increased the amounts the OCS was
able to channel to industry, even without an increase in the budget allocated to it by the
government, creating a virtuous co-evolution cycle throughout the 1990s. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the budgetary cuts imposed on the OCS in the last two years will
limit its ability to continue this level of support or to open new programs in the future.
101 In Ireland there has been no attempt by the Irish state to establish any program of research consortia, see
Chapter Four.
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Table II - the OCS's Budget 1988-1999 (in 2000 $USD million)
Year R&D Grants Paybacks Magnet Incubators Paybacks as Number of
% of approved
investment grants to
IT firms
1988 120 8 6.7
1989 125 10 - 8.0
1990 136 14 - - 10.3 380
1991 179 20 0.3 3.6 11.2 460
1992 199 25 4.7 16 12.6 458
1993 231 33 4.6 23 14.3 481
1994 316 42 10 28 13.3 605
1995 346 56 15 31 16.2 559
1996 348 79 36 30 22.7 556
1997 397 102 53 30 25.7 517
1998 400 117 61 30 29.3 505
1999 428 139 60 30 32.5 506
Source:(OCS 2000).
Note: Paybacks from each successful project are paid to the OCS throughout a several years period.
While the wave of immigration from the former USSR undoubtedly created the
pretext with which the OCS was able to secure finance and political agreement to start
these four programs, the Russian immigrants themselves have not, thus far, become
successful technological entrepreneurs. They seem to play the important but more minor
role of providing highly-skilled labor. A preliminary analysis of an original dataset that I
collected on the career paths of founders of Israeli IT NTBFs that went public on foreign
exchanges did not find one new immigrant from the former USSR among the 151
founders on which comprehensive data was acquired. 0 2 This finding is reinforced by an
102 The founder of one medical equipment company, Medinol, on which comprehensive data on the
founders has not yet been added, is a new immigrant. However, the story of how Medinol was founded by
Kobbi Richter, a very successful and experienced Israeli-born entrepreneur, who befriended Medinol's
new-immigrant technological founder on the beach, points to the exceptional circumstances of its founding
and to the difficulties that immigrants from the former USSR have has in establishing successful NTBFs in
a capitalist economy.
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analysis done by the Central Bureau of Statistics on the distribution of new immigrants in
the IT labor market (Abouganem and Feldman 2002. Pp. 27-28).0°3
In short, the industrial development agencies of the Israeli state proved quite able
and flexible in advancing the overarching goals of creating science-based industry in
Israel and advancing NTBFs as the cornerstone of this industry. The focus on R&D
activities as the source of the competitive edge of the industry has been reinstated and
even refined with two programs, MAGNET and the Incubators program. These programs
specifically aim to nurture R&D activities in early and advanced stages of companies'
lives this goal was also been strengthen with an another policy initiative, Yozma, that
treated VC as an industry with specific skills and a center anchored in the US. The view
of private companies as the source of R&D activity ideas was maintained, as were the
dual principles of horizontalism and neutrality with regard to sectors and technologies.
The division of labor between the local industry and MNCs that sees the role of Israel as
an R&D location was even sharpened by the Yozma initiative. The new programs,
together with the continuation of the older programs such as BIRD and the OCS' main
R&D fund, fortified and supported the organizational focus of the Israeli IT industry on
product R&D. 104 In addition, all these new programs were again initiated and
implemented by the OCS with the agreement of the Ministry of Finance as 'secretary
general instructions,' not anchored in law or in governmental decision. Only on the 7 h of
103 Looking at three sub-categories of the high-tech labor-markets from 1995 to 1999, the findings are that
the total number of new immigrant workers in industry (i.e., more routine and maintenance jobs) rose at a
higher rate than that of Israelis. In telecommunication there was a slight increase in the number of new
immigrants, but the number of Israelis grew faster 95% of the workers were Israelis. However, in the most
high-skilled labor market category, computerization and R&D (i.e., high level R&D and programming
jobs), the total number of new immigrants decreased while the total number of Israelis increased sharply
(over 25% growth).
104 By the end of the 2002 financial year, the OCS supported more than 4500 companies since 1968 (OCS
2002; OCS 2003).
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April 2005, did the Israeli parliament enacted of a new Industrial R&D law. This is a
repeat of the pattern of the first (1984) Industrial R&D law: anchoring in law activities
that the OCS has already been successfully running for over a decade.
Success, Growth, and its Limitations - The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Israeli
Model
As can be seen in Graph 3, the IT industry in Israel through a few years of
unprecedented growth. This growth was the result of changes in perception of the Israeli
industry in the global IT markets, especially within the American industrial and financial
communities, coupled with the dramatic growth in global demand for IT products and
services, a related boom in NASDAQ, and the growth of a local VC industry. However,
while this section briefly describes the development of the Israeli IT industry, its main
aim is to illuminate the current strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli IT industry
development model.
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Graph 3 - Total Sales Israel
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Years
Source: (IAEI 2002; IASH 2002). Note: Israel's software sales data is underestimated.
The second half of the 1990s saw significant growth of old Israeli hardware
companies that managed to transform themselves and achieve prominence in their chosen
market niches. Israeli companies continued to operate in every subfield of the industry,
from memory, in particular flash memory, where Israeli companies pioneered key
technologies, to telecommunication, which continued to be the main area of operations of
the global IT industry and even more so in Israel,. 105
While the defense state-owned companies continue to be in state of flux, many of
the sector's graduates, from both military and industry, left to establish their own
105 By 1998, 78% of R&D expenditure in Israel went to telecommunication. This is probably an over
concentration of investment from the national point of view, since it is 20% more than the equivalent
figures for Finland, which include the activities of Nokia, and 60% more than the OECD average (Bentur
2002).
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companies. RAFAEL, again, proved to be innovative in dealing with this trend,
establishing the RAFAEL Development Corporation (RDC) as an incubation company
with investment funds from Elron and Discount to commercialize ideas emanating within
it. The lengthening history of industrial success also created another advantage for the
Israeli IT industry: cohorts of young and middle-aged experienced managers and
entrepreneurs who had passed through at least one cycle of company creation and growth.
It is increasingly common in Israel to see serial entrepreneurs - entrepreneurs who
specialize in the creation of new companies.
The software sector has seen the most spectacular wave of successes in the late
1990s. While the average age and education level of the entrepreneurs stayed more or
less constant in the hardware sector, both the age and educational composition declined
sharply in the software sector. Graduates of the military's technological and intelligence
units founded growing number of software companies right after they finished their
period of service. The number of foreign IPOs increased and Israeli companies appeared
in almost all of the industry's market niches, as can be seen in Graph 4 below.
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Graph 4
Israeli-Related Foreign Software IPOs by Main Sub-Sectors (1985-
2001)
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Source: SEC filings, companies' website and press releases. Note: for companies that are no longer traded
the main business line at time of IPO was recorded as main sub-sector.
Toward the end of the 1990s, the growth profile of new IT Israeli companies
became increasingly similar to that of technology-based new American IT companies,
with IPOs and/or M&As by foreign MNCs becoming common. American semiconductor
MNCs are still the most active in Israel, and in the last five years Intel, Motorola, and
IBM, together with the Israeli universities, are the biggest Israeli international patent
issuers (TAF 2002). However, starting in 1995 with Siemens' decision to acquire Ornet,
MNCs from other parts of the world and other sectors of the IT industry have also been
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conducting more R&D activities in Israel and acquiring Israeli companies for their
technologies. 06
With the VC industry rapidly growing, the industry of creating, developing, and
selling companies became almost as important as the sales revenues of the Israeli IT
industry. The growing amount of VC finance, which necessitates 'exits' in order to make
a profit, enlarged both the rate of company formation and the trends toward the sale and
public listing of companies. Even with the known uncertainty of such statistics, it is
significant that the official annual rate of new NTBFs in Israel grew steadily between
1990 and 1995 from less than a hundred to a hundred, and then with the rapid increase in
VC financing between 1995 and 1999, the annual rate swiftly rose from 100 to 800
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2003a).
Nevertheless, a structural weakness limiting the ability of Israeli firms to achieve
sustained growth, which is a direct result of the Israeli industry basing all its advantage
on advanced R&D, also became more acute. By employing business models that rely
solely on either being the pioneers or technological leaders in a market niche, Israeli
firms have a window of opportunity lasting between two to four years in which to secure
their market position before facing intense competition from above and below. If
successful, Israeli firms quickly face competition from above when better organized and
more financially secure MNCs and American start-ups enter their market niche.
Additionally, as the technologies on which their products are based become
commoditized and cheaper, Israeli companies face competition from less technologically
advanced but cheaper competitors, many of them Taiwanese. Israeli companies imitating
106 Cisco is one MNC that is rapidly expanding its activities in Israel to rival Intel, IBM, and Motorola for
the top position as the MNC with the most R&D activities in Israel. Cisco bought six companies since 1999
and recently finished the development of the world's fastest router in its Israeli R&D center.
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the American model, without the American infrastructure and MNCs, the long experience
and skills necessary to grow and maintain leadership under these conditions, without a
local IT manufacturing industry with which to collaborate, and with the added
disadvantage of being far away from both their markets and their subcontractors - rarely
manage to sustain growth while staying in their original market niche.
The institutional weakness of the Israeli IT industry leads many companies that do
not believe they have the necessary skills to survive competition to choose one of two
strategies. The first strategy is to quickly change niches and products with the first hint of
intensified competition. If successful, this strategy allows Israeli companies to completely
reinvent themselves, moving from one technology trend to another; however, it also
severely limits the ability of these firms to secure significant and sustained sales or to
become the market leader. A perfect example is Attunity, which not only changed
markets and products three times but also its name. The second strategy is to agree to be
acquired either by a leading MNC or by another start-up deemed to possess better
management skills. A chief example here was Galileo Technology, a NASDAQ-listed
Israeli fabless communication company that continuously grew its annual sales by -50%
since it was listed in 1993 and was seen as one of the most promising Israeli firms. In
2001, Galileo suddenly agreed to be acquired by Marvell technologies, an American
start-up with a shorter history and smaller sales.
This structural weakness of the industry is glaringly apparent when we compare
the Israeli IT hardware industry to the Taiwanese, and nowhere more so than in the IC
design subsector. If the weakness of Taiwan's IC design industry is the lack of advanced
R&D skills, its advantage is that it developed as a part of a virtuous co-evolution within a
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system consisting of both the world's leading pureplay foundries and OEM/ODM
companies. This enabled the Taiwanese IC design companies to utilize a model of
competition from below, entering various market niches pioneered by Israeli or US firms,
gaining a controlling market share, and establishing long-term sustained growth (Breznitz
2005b; Breznitz 2005c; Breznitz 2005d). Israeli IC design firms are usually the pioneers
in their market niches. Nevertheless only two Israeli companies are now in the world's
top 30 fabless companies by sales, and both are in the lower third of that list. Thus, while
Israel's IC design industry is the fourth most successful in the world, its long-term
prosperity, sustainability, and even the ability of its firms to imitate the success of the
Taiwanese and become one of the world's ten largest companies in term of sales, is
questionable.
The growth of the American-style VC industry and the growing reliance on it as
the main source of finance might aggravate this institutional weakness. The positive
effects of the VC industry have already been discussed. In addition, its contribution to the
professionalism of the Israeli IT industry in the earlier stages of company life, and in
acquiring more business and financial management skills, has been invaluable. However,
the VC industry makes money through financial exits. Hence, its main aim is to
maximize the market capitalization value of firms in the shortest amount of time with the
minimum of effort, and then help to execute the financial transition in which the VC earn
their profits. For VCs, careful building of sustained long-term businesses is a goal only as
long as it increases the market value of the company. Accordingly, as long as it does not
significantly lower the firm's value, VCs have an inherent incentive to ensure that their
companies either conduct an IPO, or agree to an M&A, as early as possible. This is
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especially true for first-time VC funds that need to establish a track record in order to
secure investments for their next fund. The Israeli VCs of the early 1990s consisted
almost exclusively of first time funds. Furthermore, if from the national point of view
Israel might prefer that more of its companies stay independent, for VCs an M&A is
usually preferable to an IPO. The comment of one Israeli VC is common,
"To be honest, I would prefer to have only M&As, especially cash M&As. I
get my money quickly and have no further commitment to the company. I can
then focus my attention on new deals. Do you know how much pain it is to go
through an IPO process on NASDAQ? And why? As a VC it does not help me
at all. The only reason I might go for an IPO is that many excellent
entrepreneurs will avoid VCs that never back an IPO." (Interview with an
Israeli VC 8/20/2000.)
It is regarding this key issue of the proper role of VCs in the IT industry's future
development that the over-embeddedness of the OCS in the industry is a source of some
concern. Yigal Erlich, who stepped down in 1993 as Chief Scientist to manage the
Yozma VC fund, also immediately became the chairperson of the Israeli Venture
Association (IVA) and stayed in this position until 2002. Under his management the IVA
became Israel's best-organized high technology industry association and an effective
lobbying group. In addition, of the five former and present Chief Scientists that are still
active, three (including Erlich) are VCs, and the last private industry position of the
current Chief Scientist was that of a VC.
Additionally the high involvement of MNCs in the Israeli IT industry has become
even more pronounced. By now it is noticeable that MNCs control most of the productive
parts of the Israeli industry, a large and growing share of the IPR created in Israel, and an
ever-increasing share of the industry's revenues and profits. While this might actually
improve the long term sustainability of the Israeli industry, from the national point of
view the growing loss of control, the fact that Israelis working for most of these MNCs
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will not acquire business development and management skills, and the fact that a large
percentage of the fruits of the industry success are not redistributed in Israel, might be a
concern.
The way in which most MNCs enter Israel has also changed and most now opt for
utilizing acquisitions. The list of MNCs opting to buy an Israeli firm and convert it into
their local R&D center includes all the major players, both software and hardware. Israel
has truly become a key location for new product R&D for these MNCs. For example a
former VP for business development in a leading US MNC remarked in an interview,
"Our first acquisition of a company outside North America was of an Israeli
company in 1999. In 2001, when I became VP of business development for the
rest of the world, the company was very attracted to Israeli technology. We
discovered that in every technology that we are interested in, there is an Israeli
company developing something. When I became VP it was obvious that for the
organization, Israel is the capital of the 'rest of the world"' (5/9/2002.)
If there is one subsector of the Israeli industry that from a national industrial
development point of view exemplifies the best and the worst of the development of the
industry and the Israeli model since the mid-1980s, it is the software data security sub-
sector. Throughout the 1990s the data security subsector has been the most successful
subsector of the industry (Teubal et al. 2002). In addition, it is the only sector of the
software industry in which all three countries, Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan, have
companies that are globally successful and listed on NASDAQ.
Of the three industries, the Israeli industry had the best starting point. It had
strengths in all the necessary technological areas for data security. The source of these
strengths was both in the defense sector and within its universities, in particular,
Professor Adi Shamir, whose research was central to the development of the public key
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infrastructure technology that became the global standard.'0 7 Israeli companies pioneered
many key market niches such as encrypting, authentication, IPR protection, antiviral
protection, and firewalls. On one hand, the industry has been a tremendous success, with
five IPOs on NASDAQ and two of the biggest five Israeli software companies, NDS and
Checkpoint, being data security companies. Israel has also become a key location for the
development of data security technologies for leading MNCs. For example, CA acquired
three Israeli companies to establish its data security worldwide R&D center in Israel, and
many other MNCs conduct their data security R&D in Israel, not the least Microsoft's
efforts in firewall technologies.
On the other hand, there are no longer any independent Israeli antivirus
companies, while Taiwan's Trend Micro, starting in a far worse market position,
managed not only to stay independent but also, with $449.4 million in revenues in 2004,
became larger than all Israeli data security companies. In addition, in the authentication
and PKI fields, the Irish industry, with the success and subsequent failure of Baltimore
and the continuous success of Trintech, demonstrates that better business and market
analysis skills may be more important than a technological edge. From over twenty
Israeli companies that existed long enough to secure significant investment and some
sales, only three managed to remain independent and significant players in their own
niche. Of these one, NDS, managed to accomplish its sustained growth only after being
acquired by News Corporation and with the help of its superb financial, market
penetration, and management capabilities.
107 Professor Adi Shamir of the Weizmann Institute of Science is one of the three developers of the famous
RSA algorithm (the S stands for Shamir), which has been the basis for the public/private key data security
infrastructure, and from which RSA corporation took its name.
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A closer analysis of the growth of a few of the more prominent companies clearly
shows all the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli IT industry discussed in this chapter.
The industry's strengths have always been superior technology and pioneering R&D, its
weaknesses the lack of market knowledge and, frequently, management skills, as well as
the difficulties that even its leading companies have of growing into a true leader of the
field. For example the beginning of the data security sector has more been due to a
random event and good technology than to superior management and planning skills.
Aladdin, the first globally successful data security company, and one of the only three
that are now both publicly listed and independent, was established in 1985 in order to
build an expert system for graphology.' 08 The technological founder, Yanki Margalit, a
young self-taught software programmer, was very aware of the software piracy problem
in Israel, and developed an anti-piracy software plug before commencing sales. By the
end of the first year of sales, only two expert systems were sold; however, so were more
than 2000 copies of the anti-piracy plugs. Good fortune continued to be the company's
trademark even after the other three partners but Margalit left the company and
Margalit's brother, Danny, joined the business, focused now on IPR protection.
Completely innocent of any knowledge of how to start exporting, the Margalit brothers
decided to buy a small ad space in Byte, the leading industry newspaper of the time,
without even knowing the tax procedures for export sales. European customers responded
in earnest, and in less than four months after that first ad, Aladdin had distributors all
over Europe.'0 9
108 Graphology is analysis of handwriting for personality testing procedures.
109 During 1991-93, the Margalit brothers found out that while this strategy works very well in Europe, they
did not manage to sell in the US. After the establishment of a US subsidiary, Aladdin Inc, in 1991, Aladdin
went public on NASDAQ in 1993. Aladdin continued to grow through 1991-1996 through revenues and
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Almost the same technological virtues, utter lack of professional management and
financial capabilities, and pure good fortune are evident in the story of Israel's first
antivirus software company, now turned technology investment house, BRM. The two
original founders of the company, Omry Man and Yuval Rakavy, at the time computer
science students at the Hebrew University, developed what was probably Israel's first
antiviral software during one night of work trying to fix Omry's PC. They then
distributed it for free on the Hebrew University campus. Only a couple of months later
the two came up with the idea of developing a generic antivirus program, and the two
joined forces with the Barkat brothers, Eli and Nir, to establish BRM.
For about a year the company survived without any substantial growth as the part-
time hobby of the four partners, each of whom had either another company or a full time
job. 1 10 BRMs major turning point came when the founders met Hanina Brandes, one of
Israel's leading lawyers at the time, who agreed to represent and coach them, and to delay
his payment until BRM made enough money to pay for his services. I '
acquisitions of Israeli and foreign companies. However, since 1998, Aladdin, with its base in software IPR
protection, has faced difficulties in adapting itself and its products to the new era of the Internet, as well as
in its moves to new areas such as defense against malicious code. Nonetheless, in 2003 Aladdin sales were
$54.7 million, just over 17% growth from 2001.
110 At the time a few more antivirus companies were established in Israel such as Iris, Carmel, and Eliashim
that was later bought by Aladdin.
l Following this turn of events, BRM quickly signed an OEM agreement with a leading American
software company at the time - Fifth Generation - that renamed their product and sold it worldwide. In
addition, as Fifth Generation R&D capabilities were weak, BRM started to do more and more R&D
projects for its American partner. As a result, it started to diversify and tried, not very successfully, to
imitate the business model it had with its antivirus program with other technologies. In 1993, partly for the
reason that before the advent of the VC industry no bank in Israel was willing to secure a working capital
loan for what was deemed to be a small company with no tangible assets, BRM sold its antivirus
technology to Fifth Generation (which was later bought by Norton) for what was then considered in Israel
to be a significant amount of capital. While still in a flux after the sale and without any clear business
strategy BRM stumbled on what turned out to be Israel's most successful data security company,
Checkpoint. Following Checkpoint's success BRM transformed itself into a technological investment
house.
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The story of Checkpoint, Israel's premier data security company, also shows
some of the same weaknesses as well as of some learning in the management and market
analysis realms. Checkpoint has been the inventor as well as the market creator and
leader of firewalls, now a basic security feature. Three friends, all graduates of the
military's technology and intelligence units, founded the company. Unlike the stories of
Aladdin and BRM, Checkpoint founders had a very clear idea of what the firewall
technology should be, gained from their service in the military. Moreover, realizing that
the civilian market was not mature enough, they waited a few years before commencing
operations. The company was established in 1993 as NSK, and if only to show the
relative lack of financial experience in the Israeli IT industry as a whole, got its first seed
finance (and some R&D help) from BRM in the way of selling 50% of its shares for a
$300,000 loan." 2 Checkpoint secured a strategic OEM agreement with Sun
Microsystems that counted for most of its early sales, and secured an important VC
investment with a leading American fund, Bloomberg. In addition, showing the growing
management savvy of the Israeli industry, Checkpoint established and led several
industry forums that helped it in securing its technologies as the industry's standard. In
1996, Checkpoint went public on NASDAQ, and has since aggressively been
diversifying its products through both in-house development and acquisitions. However,
with the growing success of firewall technology Checkpoint is facing increased
competition, not the least from Cisco, Juniper, and Microsoft's forthcoming Longhorn
Operating System. Hence, its continuous growth and even independence are not assured.
112 This proved to be a boon for BRM that not only profited from the high share price of Checkpoint when
it went public but also got its $300,000 loan back.
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Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the development of the IT industry and the co-evolution of
state-industry relations in Israel. In particular, it inquired into the different ways that the
state acquired its technological and scientific skills and capabilities as well as the
industry's evolution. It evaluated policy vehicles and the amount of control the state
attempted to have on the IT industry's technological development path. In addition, the
chapter examined the role of the state in shaping the local industry's relations with the
global markets.
Since the 1970s, the Israeli state has promoted a particular model of IT industrial
development. This model has seen R&D activities leading to new product innovation as
the sole basis for Israeli industrial growth. The particular interpretation given to this
concept perceived private firms as the agents for both ideas and their execution, and the
state role as stimulating these agents in order to maximize R&D activities throughout the
industry, in all sectors and technologies.
This conceptualization also led the Israeli state, with its particular model of civil
service, which is not fully consistent with Weberian ideals, to disinvest itself from most
of its R&D conducting agents and any attempts to control or guide the industry's
technological path. Hence, in contrast to Taiwan, and in more or less the same period,
Israel decreased both the size and the support it gave to its then-extensive network of
public research institutions and concentrated on acquiring and maintaining a more limited
set of skills. These skills were acquired through the development of agencies that had
porous borders with, and embeddedness within, private industry. A pattern emerged in
which strong-willed outsiders were given political backing to construct these agencies
and implement their own interpretation of S&T policy ideas.
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The ideal of building up Israel as a location for cutting-edge R&D activities is
also prominent in state actions aimed at establishing specific relationships between the
local industry and the global IT production networks, both with regard to activities of
MNCs inside Israel, and with regard to the relationships of Israeli firms with foreign
products and financial markets. This has been apparent throughout the activities of the
OCS and BIRD, from the early programs sponsoring a particular mode of cooperation
between Israeli and American firms, in which the Israeli companies focus on the R&D
stages, to OCS and BIRD actions in luring MNCs to open R&D centers in Israel, to the
Yozma program that deeply embedded the newly created Israeli VC industry in the
American one. Furthermore, the OCS always followed the dual principles of neutral
horizontal policies, never targeting specific sectors, products, or technologies. This has
been true both for its broader programs such as BIRD and the general R&D fund, and for
its latest more stage-focused programs, such as the incubation program or MAGNET.
Since capital for any high technology industrial development in Israel was
chronically lacking for many years, particularly for the IT industry, one cannot
underestimate the influence of the various OCS programs, the main source of capital, on
the specific organizational modes and business strategies chosen by Israeli IT companies.
The OCS promoted a specific model of organizational development and business models
focusing around the innovation of new technologies and products. These policies have
assisted the Israeli IT industry to evolve in two phases, which more or less correlate to
the technological and market evolution of the global IT industry, first developing the
hardware sector, and only then developing the software sector.
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Throughout this industrial development process the OCS, while crucial, was not
the sole source of policy ideas. The network structure of the OCS and the overall
construction of the Israeli civil service, which aims to give political leaders significant
control, supported the transfer of many policy ideas that originated in the private
industry. For example, the original idea for the OCS creation was formulated in the
private market; the NASDAQ-orientation model, while later significantly and
deliberately encouraged by state actions, was developed in the private market; and even
the first attempts to create a VC industry and the legalization of the limited partnership
fund model were first tried out by private entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, this embeddedness
and networked structure of the OCS, together with the relaxed attitude toward orderly
bureaucratic procedures, has not been without problems, as seen in the cases of the
Elscient law and the amount of political power the VC industry has recently accumulated.
In short, the growth story of the Israeli IT industry and the particular mode of its
development as a supplier of new technologies to the global production networks show
the utility of our theoretical framework. Helping us to analyze the development of rapid-
innovation-based industry in Israel, it pointed us to key areas of inquiry, and assisted us
in understanding them. However, our framework also illuminates for us the fact that our
ability to generalize lessons from the Israeli case might be limited.
Since many commentators have looked to the Israeli case as a case of success to
be emulated, it is important to note that Israel's S&T industrial polices were all built
around the notion of diffusion of already domestically existing top notch R&D and
technological capabilities. Therefore, it might be that the lessons other countries can learn
from Israel are limited, and helpful only in certain stages. Israel is a particularly useful
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case from which to learn when there is a need to diffuse already developed R&D
capabilities throughout the innovation system. However, states that do not already
possess R&D capabilities should look to other countries as their model.
The Israeli IT industry, while being one of the world's most successful in the
1990s, is not without some serious weaknesses. These weaknesses are a direct result of
Israeli industrial development path with its sole focus on product R&D and its intimate
connection with the US. Undoubtedly these two are also the main causes of its
tremendous growth. The first weakness of the Israeli IT industry is that the pull of the
American market on Israeli NTBFs is becoming ever more pronounced. With not only
their customers, but also a growing share of their investors and shareholders being
American, and with the Israeli market becoming less important, more and more Israeli
companies feel the need to become as American as they can.
This development is emphasized by the growing importance of American MNCs
in Israel and their ability to capture a large percentage of its innovative capacity. If we
return to our patent data it comes as no surprise that American MNCs are, apart form the
universities, the leading patent issuers in Israel. The acquisitions of Israeli firms by
MNCs looking to establish R&D centers in Israel continued in the last four years even
under more averse market conditions. This fact makes the question of the ownership of
the IT industry, and more importantly of who enjoys most of the fruits of its growth, even
more keenly felt.
These trends have been intensified in correlation with the growing importance of
the VC industry in Israel, and the fact that Israel's VC industry, unlike the Taiwanese or
Irish, relies almost exclusively on financial exits in foreign markets. Since VCs make
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their money only via financial exits, the growth of the VC industry correlates with a
growth in the number of Israeli firms going through foreign IPOs or M&As.
The last widely felt weakness of the Israeli IT industry is the still limited ability of
Israeli firms to achieve sustained growth. This weakness is a direct result of the Israeli
industry and state focusing all their energies on securing advantages that are based solely
on advanced R&D. Israeli companies are in fact imitating the American model, but
without having the American infrastructure and MNCs, and the long experience and
skills necessary to grow and maintain leading rapid-innovation-based companies under
intensified global competition. In addition, the Israeli IT industry does so without the
Taiwanese advantage of a local IT manufacturing industry with which to collaborate, and
with the added disadvantage of Israeli firms being far away from their markets and their
subcontractors.
The combination of all these trends put the ownership and control of Israelis over
the Israeli IT industry in question. Furthermore, it raises significant issues in regard to the
distribution of the fruits of its success and the connection it has with the rest of the Israeli
economy. However, they do not put the continuous existence of Israel's IT industry in
serious question. As long as the Israeli IT industry, MNC-controlled or not, can continue
to come up with breakthrough innovations it continuation is assured. A much more
serious question mark will hang over the future of the Israeli IT industry if Israel's
education system deteriorates and its ability to produce highly qualified R&D personnel
diminishes. It is therefore worrying that Israel's education system from K-12 to the
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higher education institutions is indeed in crisis with declining quality and standards in the
teaching of math and science. l '3
It seems as if the future of Israel's IT industry is in danger due to a double
jeopardy caused by its own success. The growing success of the IT sector not only turned
public attention away from the growing problems of Israel's education system, it also
aggravated them by tempting many good researchers to leave the academy. All of these
developments have been happening in a time of flux in the Israeli higher education
system with the establishment of regional colleges in the 1990s and the growing question
marks over the long-term commitment of the Israeli government to building the academic
R&D infrastructure and sponsoring university level research. " 4
Hence, while Israel's model of development with its R&D focus and particular
division of labor between industry and state, as well as between local and global
companies and markets, brought its IT industry to unprecedented success, it also makes
the Israeli IT industry more vulnerable than the industries of Ireland and Taiwan.
113 Reliable longitudinal international comparative studies of elementary and secondary student
achievements are notoriously rare. However, the TIMSS study of 1995 and the Repeat-TIMSS of 1999, the
biggest international studies conducted to date, might give us a glimpse. In both, the Israeli students scored
lower than average in math and science and their scoring had one of the sharpest decreases= from 1995 to
1998 (Beaton et al. 1996; Martin et al. 2000; Mullis et al. 1997; Mullis et al. 2000).
114 According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics the level of state support for universities in the 1990s
was about 51 % to 57%, the OECD average for 1997 was 82%, a gap of more then 20%. In addition, while
the OECD average of the state expenditure on third level education out of total expenditures was 2.7%, in
Israel the average stood at 2.2% (Bentur 2002; CBS 1999a; CBS 1999b; CBS 2000a; CBS 2000b).
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Chapter Three - The Development of the IT industry in Taiwan - Public
Research Institutions as Growth Impetus?
"Ifyou want to build something new where nothing was before, go to the US. Ifyou want to build
something that would last for 20 years, go to Japan. If you want to work successfully under always
changing conditions and changing regulatory systems, go to Taiwan. "
A founder and manager of one of Taiwan's first IT companies
Introduction
Even within the world's most distinguished group of successful emerging
economies, the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), Taiwan has one of the
most inspiring stories. Taiwan is the only society in the region that has closed, in many
critical aspects, the gap in innovational activities with the leading western industrial
nations and Japan. 115 Taiwan has also developed a vibrant industrial system of
indigenous new small and medium size enterprises, a system that is not dominated by a
few huge conglomerates or subsidiaries of foreign MNCs (Wu 2001).
Taiwanese companies have become a prominent force in the IT industry's global
production network. During the 1990s Taiwanese companies pioneered the model of the
pure integrated circuit (IC) silicon chips fabrication foundries (hereafter: pureplay
foundries) in semiconductor, and more than half of the world's silicon chips are now
being fabricated in Taiwan. Designing and manufacturing products for the world leading
MNCs, Taiwanese IT companies manufactured, in 2001, 70% of global production of
motherboards, 55% of laptops, 56% of LCD monitors, 51% of color-display-tube
monitors and 36% of digital still cameras. 16 In addition, with 225 companies and
$147.8NT billion in sales the Taiwan's IC design sub-sector is the second largest in the
115 In international patent issuing, one of our most reliable proxies for industrial innovation, Taiwan moved
from issuing one patent in 1973 to issuing 3693 in 1999, reaching as early as 1997 a ratio of international
patents per capita, which is higher than any of the G7 countries except Japan and the US (Hall et al. 2001;
Trajtenberg 2001).
116 In addition, Taiwanese companies operating in the mainland manufacture a large percentage of the same
products that are made in China.
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world after the US. The total sales of the Taiwanese electrical and electronics industry in
2002 reached almost $88USD billion and on top of that the semiconductor industry added
another $21.4USD billion."17
How did this transformation happen? In Taiwan the state itself, acting as the
technology-creating agent, has spurred the growth of the IT sector, the Taiwanese state
acquired the necessary technological information and skills for high-technology industrial
development policy by embedding the technology creating agents within its structure.
The main policy vehicle behind this achievement was the establishment of two public
research institutions responsible not only for making the decisions on what R&D to
conduct, but also implementing and executing them.
Nonetheless, the Taiwanese approach to S&T industrial policy was not without its
limitations, mainly the stagnation of the software sector and the limited new product
innovation capabilities developed by the private industry. In addition, under the KMT,
the state purposely built a financial system with a severe scarcity of patient capital, in
stark contrast to both Gerschenkron and the developmental state models following it
(Amsden 1989; Amsden 2001; Gerschenkron 1962; Johnson 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999).
Taiwanese companies' average equity/debt ratio has been as low as in the US and, at
times, even lower (Cheng 1990; Cheng 1993; Fields 1997; Gold 1986). This helped the
Taiwanese economy to remain relatively unscathed from the East Asian financial crisis
(Park 2000). However, it limits the ability of Taiwanese companies to compete in many
IT manufacturing sectors (Fuller et al. 2003). Even in comparison to Israel and Ireland
the state has taken limited financial commitments (Cheng 1990; Cheng 1993; Pack 1993;
Park 2000).
117 Sources: III various years; ITRI various years; MoEA various years.
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Taiwan has also followed a distinct policy in regard to MNCs and the shaping of
the relationships between its local IT industry and global markets. Early in its industrial
efforts, its policy goal was to make Taiwan into a supplier of components, systems, and
design and manufacturing services to the global IT production network. Thus, the story of
the spectacular and unique growth trajectory of the Taiwanese IT hardware industry, and
the less than spectacular growth of the software industry, do not stem from massive
investment of patient capital, but from a distinctive institutional system of industrial
innovation. A system built around public research institutions-led R&D S&T industrial
policy, and a policy goal of attaining a defined position within the IT industry's global
production network.
This chapter analyzes the general growth of the Taiwanese IT industry and the
Taiwanese Science and Technology (S&T) Industrial policies. It pays special attention to
the successful political processes of co-evolution between the Industrial Technology
Research Institution (ITRI) and the private hardware industry, and the unsuccessful
process of co-evolution managed by Institute for Information Industry (III) and the
software industry. The chapter also analyzes the state's strategy in acquiring the
necessary technological skills and information and its affects, and the state's attempts to
control and plan the technological development path of the IT industry. Lastly, the
chapter inquires into the changing roles of the state in the construction of MNC's
activities in, and relationships with Taiwanese companies, within and outside Taiwan.
My conclusions are, first, that the success of the hardware sector and the relative
failure of the software sector stems from the different politics of state/industry co-
evolution in the two sectors. In hardware, ITRI evolved from being the initiator and
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leader of the industry to a position of a supporting actor; in the process this instigated the
move of the Taiwanese industry to leadership positions in semiconductor manufacturing
and design as well as desktop, laptop, and other electronic systems, and components'
design and manufacturing. In software, from the beginning, III evolved to a position of a
competitor to the private industry doing as much to compete with it as it did to support it.
III never managed to take a contributing leadership position in any software technology
development project in the same way that ITRI did in hardware. Thus, the Taiwanese
software industry that developed, did so in spite of III, not because of it. These
differences originate, I argue, from the different positioning of the two institutions by the
Taiwanese state, as well as from some inherent differences in the industrial sectors for
whose development they were nominally responsible.
My second conclusion is that the institutional system of Taiwan, a system with
strong division of labor between industry and public research institutions, limits the R&D
capabilities of private firms by motivating these firms to concentrate more on the
development part of the R&D. This system was developed by the particular decisions of
the state on how to acquire its own technological skills and knowledge. In this system, it
is the public research institutions that decide which R&D projects should be pursued,
conduct the lion-share of R&D, and only then diffuse the results to the private industry;
accordingly, core R&D capabilities' development is concentrated almost solely within
the public sector. Thus, in Taiwan, specifically because of this institutional system, the
industry focused and successfully developed world-leading capabilities in second-
generation, process, and manufacturing innovation, but not in new product development.
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My third conclusion is that the decision of the state to focus its attention on
building a local supplier network for MNCs, coupled with the way it constructed its
capital markets, paved a development path for an IT industry that concentrates on several
complementary activities of the global IT industry's network: components development
and design, coupled with manufacturing and OEM/ODM services. This development path
correlates very well with the IT innovation system, which has been developed around the
private-public division of labor, with its strength in second-generation innovation and
integrated design capabilities. However, it remains to be seen if Taiwan can, or should,
move to original new product R&D activities in the future, the main declared goal of
government policy are the last decade.
Historical Background
Looking at the successful Taiwanese IT industry in the beginning of the third
millennium, one easily forgets that in the 1950s Taiwan was a poor agriculture-based
island with almost no industrial and technological infrastructure, ruled by what was for
eighty five percent of its population a foreign force, the defeated mainland China KMT.
Taiwan's emergence as a democratic society has been equally remarkable since its
politics started from foreign domination and the KMT's organized killing of many of
Taiwan's native intellectual elite (Gold 1986).
Much of the literature that attempts to explain Taiwanese economic growth
depicts Taiwan as a "poster-child" neo-development state. In almost all accounts, Taiwan
is described as a society in which the state takes the lead in new economic activities,
always, however, with the aim of spurring private entrepreneurs and always through
interactions with private industry (Amsden 2001; Amsden and Chu 2003; Evans 1995;
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Fields 1997; Fuller 2002; Hong 1997; Hung 2000; Mathews and Cho 2000; Wade 1990;
Wang 1995; WB 1993). In most accounts, Taiwan's industrial and innovation systems
come through as a humming machine of industrial development, with a smooth and well-
functioning division of labor between government and industry. It is this division of labor
that is considered responsible for Taiwan's leading role in the global Information
Technology industry. Indeed, from the point of view of the development of the IT
hardware industry, Taiwan does seems to be an exemplary case of a state managing to
handle the complex, changing, and sometimes contradictory roles our theoretical
approach argues, that a state needs to handle to spur the growth of innovation-based
industry.
Three recent accounts of Taiwan's high-technology industrialization exemplify
this point by reaching an almost complete agreement on the ways in which the state and
industry in Taiwan have co-evolved in developing the IT hardware industry since the
early 1970s (Amsden and Chu 2003; Hong 1997; Mathews and Cho 2000). While each
author has a different vocabulary, each describes a similar two-phased process. First, the
state's research agencies acquire a technology from abroad, absorb it and improve it, and
then spin-off private companies to spur the industry. Second, after the private industry
has emerged, the industry and state settle on a new division of labor in which the state's
role is to locate, absorb, and infuse the industrial system with new technologies, and to
assist private firms with their own advanced R&D projects. However, the actual socio-
political-economic history of these developments was far from smooth.
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The 1960s - the world's semiconductor industry going global
The beginning of Taiwan's modem IT industry dates to the 1960s.?8 At that time,
the semiconductor industry - a new industry - had evolved in the US to become the first
to have truly globally fragmented production. During the 1960s, new developments made
it feasible to geographically disconnect the heavily low-skilled-labor-intensive final
assembly stages from the rest of the production processes. At the time Taiwan opted to
follow an MNCs-FDI industrial policy very similar to Ireland's, and the state marketed
Taiwan as a business friendly place with an unlimited supply of stable, reliable, hard-
working labor, and a growing market (Klintworth 1995). In these years, Taiwan had
many of the same attractions to western companies that Mainland China now seems to
possess.
With the help of USAID, the Taiwanese state was actively targeting foreign
MNCs, following the same tactics that will become the hallmark of the Irish IDA in later
years. Extensive background work on individual executives was performed to create a
feeling of personal connection. Executives of US firms coming to Taiwan were treated
like honored guests; they were ushered to personal meetings with Ministers who were
thoroughly briefed on their personal background and sometimes even managed to put
symbolic pictures, emphasizing a common past, between them and their visitors in their
office (Wade 1990).
As part of those early efforts at FDI attraction, Taiwan also established export-
processing zone (duty-free manufacturing area), again a striking similarity to Ireland's
first attempt at FDI attraction around the duty-free industrial region around Shannon
118 Local assembly of radios started in the 1940s; however, only in the 1960s did the MNCs start to
reorganize their global IT production networks and embed Taiwan within it (Wade 1990).
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(Hwang 1991). The year 1961 marks the beginning of the transformation of the global IT
industry into an industry ruled by global fragmented production networks. In that year,
Fairchild of the US and Phillips of Holland established their first semiconductor final
assembly factories in Asia, Fairchild in Hong Kong and Phillips in Taiwan.
In 1964, after aggressive overtures by the Taiwanese government, General
Instrument opened its first facility in Taiwan. In 1965, what the Taiwanese claim to be
the world's first export-processing duty-free zone was opened near Kaohsiung and
between 1964 and 1966, twenty-four US firms joined Philips and GI in opening
manufacturing facilities in Taiwan. 19 These efforts also mark the beginning of the rise to
prominence of Taiwan's two most influential S&T industrial policy leaders, the
technologists-politicians Dr. Y.S. Sun and Dr. K.T. Li (Cheng 1990; Hong 1997;
Mathews and Cho 2000; Wade 1990). In 1965, by creating Taiwan's first data processing
and software company - the China Data Processing Center - the state also pioneered
what would later become a pillar of its IT industrial policy, the establishment and
subsequent privatization of public firms in new technological areas.
The FDI-based IT industrial policy proved, at first, to be very successful. Exports
of electronics boomed at 58% annual growth rates between 1966 and 1971. However,
relatively quickly it became apparent that the US semiconductor companies have no
intention of locating any higher-skilled operations in Taiwan. Therefore, the
sustainability of this first success in semiconductor and advance electronics relied on
relative low wages (Amsden and Chu 2003; Wade 1990). With wages rapidly rising as a
result of the early economic success, it became apparent that unless something was done,
this success in semiconductor would only be temporary.
119 The world's first export-processing duty-free zone was opened in Ireland around Shanon in 1958.
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In the same period, and even earlier, the electronics manufacturing industry in
Taiwan was already rapidly growing. Here, the Taiwanese government policy sharply
diverged from that of Ireland. The Taiwanese state started to demand that a large and
growing percentage of the components used for final assembly in Taiwan by MNC
subsidiaries and joint ventures would be locally manufactured. 20 The policy proved to be
very successful in breaking the enclave positions of MNCs. This was especially true in
the case of the Japanese MNCs, which aimed to sell to the local market and hence were
more susceptible to the new local components requirements. By 1971, 37% of all
components used by the electronics industry in Taiwan were manufactured locally.
Moreover, the first Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) relationships between
Taiwanese companies and foreign MNCs started in these sectors, becoming prominent
first in the manufacturing of color TVs (Amsden and Chu 2003).121
This policy had far-reaching impacts on the future of the Taiwanese IT industry
and S&T industrial policy. From its early beginning, the political situation of Taiwan,
which led to the creation of a financial system that specifically limited the use of large
investment of long-term capital and the accumulation of debt led to a particular vision of
the future of the Taiwanese IT industry. Accordingly, the goal of the Taiwanese S&T
industrial policy was to spur the growth of a local IT industry that supplies, first, many of
the necessary components, especially the higher-value ones, to the global IT production
120 The Taiwanese government also urged MNCs to establish joint ventures with local manufactures in
which the MNC transferred some of its manufacturing technology to the local suppliers instead of
establishing a fully-owned subsidiary. In electronics and electrical consumer goods, unlike semiconductor,
the Japanese have always been a more important source of FDI and technology to Taiwan than the US.
121 OEM is a sub-contracting manufacturing relationship in which one side manufactures equipment for the
other side to be sold under the second sides brand name and in accordance with the second sides detailed
specifications. ODM - Original Design Manufacturing - is a subcontracting relationship in which the
manufacturing side is also giving detailed and integrated design services to the brand name company,
which supplies it with only high level design specifications. OBM - Own Brand Manufacturing - happens
when the manufacturer is manufacturing products to be sold under its own brand.
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network. Second, the goal was to develop a local IT industry that provides manufacturing
(and later design) services of increasing sophistication to the world's leading MNCs. It
has never been the goal of the Taiwanese state to create big vertically integrated national
champions in the same way as other Asian NICs, such as S. Koreas, did. Nor, was it ever
the goal to create cutting-edge innovation-based firms similarly to Israel or the US. Of
our three cases, Taiwan was much more persistent in its efforts to convince MNC
manufacturing subsidiaries to embed themselves more deeply within the Taiwanese
industry, and in urging them to transfer more and more responsibilities over growing span
of activities to local suppliers.
For these reasons, by the time the economic and political crises of the 1970s hit
Taiwan, its electronic industry was already geared toward a specific relationship with,
and embeddedness within, the global IT industry production network. Moreover, the
Taiwanese innovation system and industrial policy were already centered around
components manufacturing, thus, on manufacturing and process innovation, not on the
generation of R&D-based new products.
The Crisis of the 1970s and the Crystallization of the Public Research Institutions-Based
Industrial Policy - The Creation of the Semiconductor Industry
In the early 1970s, the global economy in general and Taiwan's economy in
particular went though several waves of severe economic and political crises. In 1971 the
Bretton Woods system was dismantled; in 1973, the first oil shock resulted in a steep rise
in the price of oil, and many of the advanced industrial economies started to suffer from
stagflation. Taiwan's exports, then mainly textile and footwear and low-level electronics,
started to face competition from less developed countries and protectionists' measures in
their target markets. In addition, with the reemergence of China on the global political
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scene and the de-recognition of Taiwan in the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan has started
a long period of formal political isolation. It was under those conditions that Taiwan
reformulated its S&T industrial policy. Nonetheless, for many years many politicians and
bureaucrats did not view the IT industry is a primary source of growth. As will be
discussed in details below, the overall budget of ITRI's semiconductor technology
development efforts have been minuscule in comparison to the amounts dedicated to
other industries by the Taiwanese state and in comparison to the investment of other
states in their semiconductor industries.
By 1973, some Taiwanese-owned subcontracting firms for assembly and
packaging of semiconductor appeared; however, there were still no direct forward or
backward linkages and the semiconductor industry was still an MNC enclave utilizing
relative low labor costs and focusing on low-skilled final assembly stages. In January
1973, Dr. Yun-Hsuan Sun, then the Minister for Economic Affairs (MoEA) and later the
Premier, oversaw the establishment of ITRI near Hsinchu, a strategic location close to
Taiwan's two leading engineering universities, National Chiaotung University and
National Chinghua University. ITRI was created through the merger of three existing
governmental labs. Using his considerable political power, Dr. Sun managed to transfer
the responsibility for electronics R&D from the Ministry of Telecommunication
laboratory to the newly formed ITRI. However, very similarly to the beginning of Israel's
OCS, ITRI was not at the time considered to be a major policy initiative, and its overall
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financing was negligible from the point of view of the state's overall industrial
policies. 122
The idea behind ITRI's creation was to form one main national lab, which would
be responsible for the upgrading of Taiwan's industrial technology through technology
transfer, development, and diffusion. The objective was that the government would take
it upon itself to solve the risky and more challenging part of the R&D process and would
then diffuse the results to the industry, which would concentrate on final development
and manufacturing. Thus, the state has opted to bring the R&D-creating agents within its
own structure, developing a particular division of labor between the industry and the
state. This division of labor, which after a few successes became prominent in the
innovation system of Taiwan's semiconductor and electronics industry, has had
significant influence on the kind of capabilities private firms developed, and on the kind
of business models and business strategies that gained paradigmatic hold in Taiwan.
In August 1974, Dr. Sun met his friend Dr. Wen-Yuan Pan, a Chinese-American
engineer working at RCA's David Sarnoff laboratories, in Princeton, New Jersey. The
two agreed on a plan to formulate an S&T industrial policy geared toward the creation of
a semiconductor industry in Taiwan. Dr. Pan, subsequently, established a group of mostly
Chinese-American engineers working for leading American semiconductor companies in
the US. The group regularly conveyed at Princeton as the Technical Advisory
Committee. The committee submitted specific recommendations for the establishment of
a specialist lab in ITRI that would act as the focal launching point for the industry. In
September 1974, the Electronic Research Service Organization (ERSO) was established
122 The total amount of resources dedicated to the first ERSO project which culminated in the creation of
UMC was less then $1 S5USD million given over five years between 1974 to 1979 as part of the first stage of
the Electronic Industry Development Program (EDIP) (Fuller et al. 2003; Hong 1997; Meany 1994).
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in ITRI with its main first goal being the development of technological capabilities to
spur the growth of a semiconductor industry.
ERSO started to look for sources of IC fabrication technologies. However, it did
not manage to find any suitable partners until, through Dr. Pan's influence, in 1976 RCA
agreed to transfer its already obsolete technology to ITRI. At that time RCA decided to
get out of semiconductor and saw this as an opportunity to earn royalties from its old and
soon to be unused 7-micron CMOS fabrication technology. This was a technology that
was already far behind the world limit of 2-micron. A group of 40 engineers, many of
whom later became the leaders of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, spent almost a
year in RCA's facilities in the US, and ERSO built its first IC fabrication plant with
RCA's guidance. In 1977-78 the first trial wafers were produced and the Taiwanese team
started to test its own experimental designs. In 1979, the ERSO team advanced to such a
degree that it had better yields than RCA's and started to sell small amounts of chips to
supplement its financial resources.
At the same time, the Taiwanese state was establishing the physical and business
infrastructure needed for the semiconductor industry. It is here that Dr. Kuo-Ting Li
leadership over Taiwanese S&T industrial policy became crucial. Dr. Li served as
Minister of Finance after serving as the Minister for Economic Affairs. In 1978, Li
conveyed a special conference on Taiwan's economic and scientific future. The result of
this well-attended event was "The Science and Technology Development Program"
which was adapted by the Cabinet and called for: (a) the creation of a special permanent
advisory body for science and technology: the Science and Technology Advisory Group
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(STAG), to be chaired by Li, that would report directly to Premier Sun; and, (b) the
creation of an infrastructure focused on the needs of science-based advanced industries.
The latter project was championed by the president of National Chinghua
University, S.S. Hsu, who urged for the creation of a science-based industrial park next to
Taiwan's three prominent engineering institutions in Hsinchu to imitate what he
perceived to have happened around Stanford University in California (Hong 1997).'23
The park, named Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park (hereafter: Hsinchu Park), was
put under the jurisdiction of the National Science Council (NSC) and launched in
1980.124 Hsinchu Park became an extremely important factor in Taiwan's subsequent
success in the semiconductor industry. Hsinchu Park has been accepting only firms with
significant R&D operations, for which, apart from providing specialized infrastructure, it
has been granting these special subsidiaries, such as tax holidays, duty exemption on
equipment importation and commodity exports, low-interest-rate loans, and matching
R&D funds.
However, it was not private industry that established the first, and many of the
subsequent, leading firms of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. In the late 1970s,
facing what seems to them to be large initial investment with high uncertainty, no private
entrepreneur, industrial group, or investor was willing to invest capital in
commercializing the technologies developed in ERSO. Under these conditions both Dr.
Sun and Dr. Li decided against the establishment of a fully state-owned company and
123 At the time, advancement to the higher administrative positions in Taiwanese universities was political;
hence, S.S. Hsu, the president of Taiwan's leading technical university, wielded considerable political
power within the KMT.
124 Some authors argue that in building the Hsinchu Park the Taiwanese state was utilizing the same model
of the export-processing zones geared, this time, toward the development of a local industrial sector
(Hwang 1991).
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chose to create a joint private-state venture. In 1978, the head of ERSO, together with one
of the 40 engineers who went to RCA, proposed a plan for the establishment of a private-
state company. MoEA accepted their proposal and invited some of Taiwan's biggest
companies as investors. 125 At first, none of the companies invited agreed to join. MoEA
then used its direct influence and organized a coalition of local companies who finally
agreed to invest in the project, and between them, 51% of the shares of the new entity,
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), were distributed. The total sum invested
stood between $14USD to $20USD million. 12 6
Apart from receiving all of its technical staff and technology from ERSO, UMC
was also granted technical assistance from, and the use of, ERSO's fabrication plant, a
source for many subsequent conflicts of interest. UMC quickly engaged in another series
of fund-rising and built its own first fully-owned fabrication plant in the newly
established Hsinchu Park in 1982.
Diversifying and Deepening the Technological Base of the Semiconductor Industry -
ERSO Strategy of Parallel Capabilities Development
ERSO's prominence over the development trajectory of the Taiwanese
semiconductor industry did not end with the spin-off of UMC. On the contrary, the
successful launch of UMC encouraged subsequent formal and less formal spin-offs, i.e.,
teams of engineers leaving to establish their own companies. Following the establishment
of UMC, ERSO itself slightly changed its focus. At the urging of its American advisors,
ITRI/ERSO made a few important decisions, the first was to stay clear from what would
125 In order for the company to have the legal status of private company the government could not to own
more than 49% of the shares.
126 As with many other records and statistical data regarding the IT industry in Taiwan, there seem to be a
slight disagreement between different researchers and official statements. For two different cost statements,
see Hong 1997; Mathews and Cho 2000.
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become an extremely capital-intensive market niche, memory chips, specifically
DRAM.12 7 The second decision was to base the Taiwanese semiconductor industry
around capabilities that would allow it to competitively and quickly design and
manufacture custom-tailor chips (also known as Application Specific Integrated Circuit -
ASIC), and not just around specific products. ERSO argued that by developing this
technological capability Taiwan would, first, strategically differentiate itself from Korea
and Japan, who had embarked on a strategy of high-volume rapid-generational-upgrading
chips such as memory chips, which necessitate extremely deep-pocketed companies of
the kind Taiwan did not posses. ERSO further argued that this strategy would enable
Taiwan to focus on the consumer industry, where Taiwanese electronic manufacturing
companies were already globally successful and reached substantial revenues using
relatively simple technology. ERSO rightly contended that by developing these
capabilities, Taiwan's semiconductor industry could innovate across the whole spectrum
of the IT industry (Wade 1990).
The Taiwanese semiconductor industry developed capabilities that: i) both
strengthened the Taiwanese IT hardware OEM and ODM industry; and, ii) allowed it to
excel in the market niches open to it by the existence of the Taiwanese OEM and ODM
firms. In other words, the decision by ERSO to prompt the development of strong ASIC
capabilities in the semiconductor industry positioned the industry perfectly to take the
advantage of the opportunity structure offered by the successful IT design and
manufacturing subcontractors industry, and strengthened the competitiveness of that
industry in turn. As the next part of the chapter shows, this, in turn, has reinforced
127 DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) chips quickly became the focal point of, first, Japanese-
American, and then Korean-Japanese, investment and price wars.
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Taiwan's embeddedness in the global IT production network as a supplier and innovator
of components and design and manufacturing services and processes.
As part of its strategic decision to focus on ASIC technologies and capabilities,
after UMC's spin-off ITRI/ERSO pursued a dual capabilities development strategy. The
strategy focused on developing both ASIC capabilities and the fabrication technologies
needed to manufacture them. ERSO managed to move its own fabrication capabilities to
4.5 micron in 1981 (still far behind the world's technological edge at the time at 2-
Micron), and to acquire and develop complementary technologies that would enable
Taiwan to excel in ASICs. In the early 1980s, ERSO expanded its capabilities in design,
testing, and several other stages of IC production, including masking. It was in this early
stage that many teams of ERSO employees started to leave ITRI to open IC design
houses that utilized ERSO's and UMC's fabrication facilities, one of the first being
Syntek in 1982 (Chang and Tsai 2002). Hence, even before the establishment of the
pureplay foundry model by another ERSO spin-off- Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) - more than a few design houses were operating in
Hsinchu Park and within a year after the establishment of TSMC their number was
estimated at forty.
Transforming the Global Semiconductor Industry - Establishing the Pureplay Foundry
Model in Taiwan
The pureplay foundry business model, pioneered by ITRI/ERSO and spun-off as
TSMC in 1986, developed as part of ERSO's efforts to infuse the Taiwanese industry
with Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) capabilities. ERSO's foreign advisors, who did
not view the progress to 4.5-micron technology as fast enough to close the gap with the
world's technological leaders, urged these efforts on. In 1981, STAG, chaired by Li,
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argued that Taiwan should achieve VLSI capability of 1-Micron or better, the
technological frontier at the time.
A political battle immediately ensued, as this view was attacked from almost all
quarters in Taiwan's economic development bureaucracy, including the Ministry of
Finance, the Council for Economic Planning and Development, and a large percentage of
ERSO's personnel. However, with the backing of by-then Premier Sun and Dr. Li a
decision was made to go foreword with a VLSI 1-micron technology development
project, simultaneously with ERSO's other activities. In 1983, $72.5USD million were
allocated to a five year program on various semiconductor projects, a larger amount by
far than those given before, but still insignificant in both international terms and in
comparison to other Taiwanese industrial policies. The goal was to reach 1-micron
capabilities by 1988. Once again, ITRI was leading the private market.
The decision on the implementation of the VLSI research project was a
continuation of the earlier strategy of a division of labor in R&D between public
institutions and private companies, with the public institutions commencing most of the
research and the results diffused to private companies that focused mostly on
development and design. After a battle with UMC, which argued that it should be
responsible for the development of the VLSI technology, ITRI/ERSO was again the
chosen agency, in part to prevent an over-concentration of power and capabilities in one
private company (Fuller et al. 2003; Hong 1997; Mathews and Cho 2000; Meany 1994).
This time ERSO decided to follow a joint-venture technology development strategy and
did not go for technology transfer contracts. The chosen party was Vitelic, a small Silicon
Valley firm founded by Chinese-American engineers in 1983. The R&D phase was
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successful with a DRAM chip developed by June 1986. However, at the time, neither the
government nor the private sector in Taiwan was willing to supply the necessary
manufacturing facility, and as a result Vitelic sold its technologies to various Korean and
Japanese companies (Meany 1994).
This awkward situation strengthened politically those who argued for more direct
state intervention in the building of VLSI fabrication facilities in Taiwan (Hong 1997). In
addition, by the end of 1986 it became obvious that there is a wider demand for VLSI
fabrication facilities as many of the new design houses in Hsinchu Park opted to follow
Vitelic and sold their technologies to Korean and Japanese firms.
In the same time that ERSO developed VLSI technologies, UMC also developed
its own similar technology, utilizing both in-house development and joint-venture
agreements. This technological competition was straining even more the conflict of
interest between ERSO and UMC, especially as at the time Morris Chang, the head of
ITRI, was also serving as the Chairman of UMC. Morris Chang also epitomizes another
important trend in Taiwan's rise to prominence in the semiconductor industry, the
returning immigration wave of graduate level-trained engineers from the US. 128
Taiwan has one of the highest numbers of engineering and science students who
immigrated to the US to get advance engineering and science degrees. For most of the
period until the early 1980s, these Taiwanese ex-patriates did not see any opportunity to
employ their skills profitably in Taiwan and most of them stayed on in the US. However,
with the creation of ITRI and even more so with the growing success of the
semiconductor industry, a large percentage came back or established cross-country
128 Before his return to Taiwan to head ITRI, Morris Chang had been the highest level Taiwanese executive
of an American semiconductor MNC, Texas Instruments. He was persuaded to come back to Taiwan to
head ITRI by Dr. Li and Bob Evans, one of STAG's most influential American members.
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businesses. This so-called reverse brain drain has been one of the most important factors
in the rapid growth of the semiconductor industry (Saxenian and Hsu 2001).
However, while the influence of the returnees has been important, we should
remember that this pullback started and strengthened only after many of them saw an
economic opportunity in Taiwan, not vice-versa. Moreover, while returnees established
many companies, locals founded most of the key companies.' 29 In addition, while the fact
that many of them came back from Silicon Valley is celebrated, the influence of returning
immigrants from other parts of the US, notably the large contingent coming back after
long stints in Bell Labs and IBM, has been at least as important, a fact that was
repeatedly referred to by our interviewees during our research trips to Taiwan (Amsden
and Chu 2003; Saxenian and Hsu 2001).
In 1986, after some internal debate, a decision was made to move foreword with
the privatization of ERSO's VLSI efforts and the construction of a VLSI fabrication
facility employing an innovative business model - the pureplay foundry. This decision
marks a turning point, not only for the Taiwanese semiconductor industry but also for the
global semiconductor industry. Similarly to UMC, the decision was to commercialize and
privatize the VLSI project by creating a joint public-private company, TSMC. Again, the
Taiwanese state faced a similar investment landscape to the one it faced with UMC.
Although by now the success of UMC and the growth of the industry was proof that the
semiconductor industry in Taiwan can be profitable, the private market was still
unwilling to commit to a leading investment. This ironically proved to be a boon for
129 It is rare to find a returning immigrant in the founding teams of any of the key companies, apart from
Morris Chang, who returned not to establish a company but to head ITRI from which he moved to head
TSMC. This should not surprise us since the returning immigrants usually lack strong local knowledge and
social networks, which were necessary in the early phases of the industry to secure finance, customers, and
high-quality workforce for newly established companies.
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TSMC as Phillips, the Dutch MNC, agreed to invest 27.5% of TSMC's initial investment
and became its leading private shareholder, with another 48.3% of the investment coming
from the China Development Corporation, an investment arm of the ruling KMT party
(Fuller 2002; Fuller et al. 2003). Apart from securing some business from Phillips, having
Phillips as its main shareholder gave the new venture legitimacy, and even more
importantly a full patent swap agreement that was critical in the beginning in protecting
TSMC from offensive legal actions. 130
The pureplay model had major revolutionary influence on the global IT
production network, on Taiwan's embeddedness within it, and on the reshaping of
Taiwan's semiconductor industry. The pureplay foundry model is one of the best
examples of an organizational innovation that enabled new levels of fragmentation of the
semiconductor industry's production network. An innovation spurring a rapid process of
advances in product stage specialization and product stage economies of scope and scale,
consequently in stage specific innovation. Before the establishment of TSMC and the
pureplay foundry, the semiconductor industry consisted mainly of companies that utilized
the business model of integrated device manufacturers (IDM). The IDM model calls for
the creation of large vertically-integrated firms that perform both design and fabrication
in-house. The leading semiconductor firms were all IDMs that built their own dedicated
fabrication plants. The industry also consisted of design houses that were smaller and
marginal and that needed to secure their fabrication capacity from IDMs with no
standards for information transfer, and with the added risk of sharing their IP with
potential competitors. Moreover, the process was lengthy and cumbersome, putting the
design houses in distinct disadvantage.
130 Interviews with TSMC's president and senior VP for corporate development 5/31/2001.
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The pureplay foundry model calls for the creation of companies whose sole
business is fabrication. Pureplay foundries receive codified designs from the design
houses and fabricate their chips for them. Thus, they enable stage specialization in both
design and fabrication. In 1986, the viability of the pureplay foundry was still unclear, as
the technology for full codification of the designs was not yet developed. However, in the
particular case of Taiwan: the industry's growth limited by the political choice of a
financial system that limited the use of long-term financing and debt; the already growing
number of design houses in Hsinchu Park; the political pressure arising from the lack of
VLSI fabrication capability that brought many of these design houses to outright sell the
IP to foreign firms; and the political constraints that the existence and lobbying of UMC
put on ITRI/ERSO, the pureplay foundry model seems to be worth these uncertainties.
The additional advantage of the model was that a pureplay foundry could also learn from
its customers. Many of TSMC's early customers passed on their technologies to TSMC
so it could fabricate their chips. They were willing to do so only because TSMC's
pureplay foundry model allayed their fears of it becoming their competitor.
Consequently, TSMC has been using customers' feedback to refine and expand its
fabrication method (Fuller et al. 2003).
For a few years, TSMC's growth was slow. Nevertheless, even then its effect on
the Taiwanese semiconductor industry was immense. Its services enabled a growing
number of fabless companies to profitably commence operations. This unleashed the
commercial potential of the Taiwanese industry's ASIC specialization and skills. By
1994, there were already sixty-five design houses in Taiwan (ITRI 2003; ITRI various
years). In this year the design codifying and transfer technology was fully developed, and
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from 1997 the pureplay foundries have been fabricating the lion-share of chips in Taiwan
with many of the IDMs, including UMC, converting to the foundry model or being
bought by pureplay foundries in need of more fabrication facilities.
The pureplay became the prominent production model in the global
semiconductor industry, completely transforming it in several ways. First, the pureplay
model enables groups of engineers to quickly bring innovative designs to market with
only limited financial resources, fostering even more rapid innovation cycles in the
semiconductor industry. Secondly, the lower cost also enables group of engineers to
profitably utilize the business strategy of offering cheaper chips in already developed
niche markets using second-generation technologies. Third, the pureplay model
transformed the industry by creating virtuous cycles of internal innovation and growing
efficiency that make it even more profitable, vis-A-vis the IDM model. Today, thanks to
their head start, the Taiwanese pureplay foundries, TSMC and UMC, are the global
market leaders, with sales in 2002 of just below $5USD billion, and just above $2USD
billion, respectively. TSMC and UMC and are the main reason behind the growth of the
Taiwanese semiconductor industry to its current status as the world's fourth largest IC
producer.
Apart from UMC and TSMC, ITRI/ERSO was also responsible for a few more of
the leading Taiwanese semiconductor firms before ERSO was closed and the computer
and communication lab (CCL) remained ITRI's sole semiconductor technology division.
The Taiwan Mask Corporation (TMC) was spun off ITRI in 1989, ending the successful
development of the masking technologies project at ERSO, began with technology
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transfer from the US in 1977. TMC successfully grew in the years since, and in 2000 it
bought Innova, Taiwan's second masking company. 131
The two other important quasi-official spin-offs from ERSO were Vanguard and
Winbond. Vanguard was the official spin-off of ERSO's submicron project that
culminated in an industrial-size fabrication plant in Hsinchu Park. It was auctioned in
1995, with TSMC becoming its main shareholder. While not an official ERSO spin-off,
Winbond should still be looked upon as quasi-official due to its particular history. In
1987, after the launch of TSMC, ITRI/ERSO was still in possession of its first pilot
fabrication plant and its personnel. The plant manager, Dr. Yang, engineered an MBO,
secured with financing from the Walsin Lihwa Corporation, launching it as Winbond.,
Unlike other Taiwanese companies, Winbond has been following the OBM model and
has stayed as an IDM company, moving into both memory and logic. In 2002, Winbond's
sales were slightly less than $1USD billion.
From OEM to ODM: The Technological Upgrading of the Electronics Suppliers - ITRI's
Role as a Supporting Actor
Taiwan's ODM/OEM firms are as important, if not more so, to Taiwan's success
in the IT industry as are its semiconductor firms. Taiwan's OEM/ODM firms are
successful in all sectors of the IT industry, employing many different business models.
The range of strategies moves from more focused OEM/ODM companies, such as
Quanta or Inventec that design and manufacture most of the world's laptops, and Asustek
that does the same in motherboards, to more flexible OEM/ODM firms such as Sampo,
131 Masking is a discrete stage in the production of IC chips. It is estimated that because Taiwanese
companies have local masking services available, about twenty days in the IC production cycle are saved
(Amsden and Chu 2003. Pp. 108; Lin 1987). Hence, the perfection of the masking technology was an
important part in ERSO's strategy of building a semiconductor industry whose competitive capabilities are
related to its ASIC technologies.
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BenQ (formerly part of the Acer group), Tatung, and Mitac that operate across a wider
array of products.
The existence in Taiwan of local world leading OEM/ODM companies also
propelled the growth of the semiconductor industry in a particular trajectory. The
existence ODMs have given the Taiwanese IC design industry a competitive advantage
and a unique opportunity structure focusing on second-generation innovation. These
opportunity structures are not available to Israeli, Irish, and American IC design
companies. The OEM/ODMs, in turn, have been strengthened by the success of the local
IC design industry, which caters specifically to their needs and help them to improve
their quality while lowering their costs.
ITRI and the Taiwanese state have been as important to the success of this sector
as they were to the semiconductor industry. However, if in the semiconductor industry
ITRI was the first and, for a long time, the only actor in the field, in the case of the
OEM/ODM electronics, ITRI's main goal has been to technologically upgrade existing
firms, some of which, like Tatung, have been around since 1918. Therefore, this sector
give us an excellent example of how the Taiwanese state has pursued the same goal -
developing a local IT industry that supplies many of the necessary components and
manufacturing services to the global IT production network - applying the same division
of labor in R&D, while using a different mechanism - the state-led research consortia. In
addition, the case of OEM/ODM enables us to follow another angle of the co-evolution
of industry-state relationships.
As has been vividly argued by John Mathews, the main goal of the Taiwanese
R&D consortia has been technological learning, upgrading, and catch-up as part of
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attempts at industry creation (Mathews 2002). This is a very different objective from
Israel's goal where, as described in Chapter Two, the state constructed a special program
to sponsor collaborative R&D efforts in an attempt to enable smaller Israeli firms to
successfully compete with MNC on the basis of their own developed cutting-edge
technologies. 132 Like the Israeli state, the Taiwanese state also realized that the smaller
size of its manufacturing-oriented companies, with their lack of sophisticated in-house
R&D capabilities, hinders the ability of the Taiwanese IT industry to upgrade and
compete in global markets. The solution was to assemble a series of ITRI-led research
consortia. From the start of this process, the same division of labor in R&D that had been
used in the case of semiconductor was applied, with ITRI conducting the R&D and the
private companies concentrating in manufacturing and final product development. Even
in the later research consortia, in which private companies assume leadership roles, this
division of labor has been maintained.
The first few, and some of the most significant consortia, were developed as part
of ITRI's multi-client projects in the early 1980s. These projects assisted in the creation
of a PC development and manufacturing industry in Taiwan. The first such project started
after Apple clamped down on the thriving Taiwanese Apple II cloning industry in late
1982. The industry, then a highly fragmented one with no prior experience with IP
protection laws, came to MoEA and ITRI for help.'3 3 ITRI/ERSO already possessed
some experience working with Intel processors, and advised them to concentrate on the
132 On the Israeli state-supported research consortia program, see also Breznitz 2004a; Breznitz 2004b;
Breznitz 2005d.
133 Because the American IP protection laws were revised to include computer codes only in 1980, Apple's
lawsuit was one of the first of such suits worldwide.
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new IBM Intel-based PC instead of Apple (Noble 1998). The real activity started after
February 1983, when Acer approached ITRI/ERSO with a request to develop a PC.
After various halts and requests from other computer-manufacturing companies
ITRI/ERSO devised the project as its first multi-client project with the title of MCP-1. A
decision was made to limit the number of participants to nine. By the end of 1983,
Taiwanese companies had started manufacturing IBM PC clones, hoping to ship them to
the US in time for Christmas sales. However, IBM counterattacked, claiming that ITRI's
basic input-output system (BIOS) was infringing on its IP.'34 ITRI/ERSO engineers
rewrote the code, but by the time IBM agreed that the new version was legal, it was
already May 1984. By then, most of the projects participants either sold their PCs in less
IP-strict markets, such as Europe and Asia, or followed Acer and used a different BIOS
system (Noble 1998).
Although this project was deemed less than satisfactory, as soon as IBM
announced its new PC AT system in August 1984, ITRI/ERSO announced its intention to
launch a new multi-client project. This time the participants were limited to three,
including Tatung, which used this project as an entry into the computer business. The
prototype was transferred by ITRI/ERSO to the companies by July 1985, and soon
thereafter the companies started to bring their own products to market (Chang et al. 1999;
Mathews 2002; Noble 1998). This project was considered a great success and paved the
way to a series of related multi-client projects. From this point onward the projects were
run by the newly established Computer and Communications Laboratory (CCL) and were
more formally viewed as consortia and not as ITRI's multiple clients research projects.
134 The BIOS system was the main, if not the sole, sub-system that IBM uniquely developed for its PC;
most of the rest of the PC was build on the basis of open-system from standardized components that could
be bought in the market.
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By 1990, the Taiwanese industry was firmly established in desktops and other
related products; nonetheless, its technological capabilities were still far behind what was
needed to succeed in the then-new lucrative market, laptops. This time, ITRI/CCL
formally drafted the project as an R&D consortium with the aim of developing a set of
key components to become the standard on which the different companies would build
and develop their products. The biggest computer-manufacturers trade association in
Taiwan was involved and recruited as a joint coordinator. In July 1990, the Taiwan
Laptop Consortium with 46 subscribing companies was officially announced with capital
of $2USD million (Mathews 2002). The project was concluded quickly and by the end of
1990 Taiwan achieved the status of the world's leading supplier of laptops. This time,
ITRI/CCL not only transferred prototype machines, but also constructed extensive
training programs and many of its staff moved to private firms. The main problems of the
project were oversubscription and a too tight division of labor. The companies were given
an almost complete product that was developed solely by ITRI/CCL, and were unable to
differentiate and further develop their products, leading to a relentless price competition
between the Taiwanese companies. These lessons were learned and throughout the ITRI-
led consortia in the 1990s private companies were given slightly more R&D
responsibilities, or at least slightly less finite prototypes. In some of the projects one of
the declared aims was the creation of R&D, or at least integrated design capabilities,
within the participating private companies.
As the Taiwanese industry has grown to become globally important, many of the
leading MNCs happily supported many of ITRI's consortia. The MNCs have hoped to
spur the growth of an industry based on their technology, and find it easier to have to deal
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solely with ITRI, not separately with every private company. The best examples for such
a project was the NewPC project, which was based around the PowerPC processors
developed jointly by IBM, Motorola, and Apple (Dedrick and Kraemer 1998; Mathews
2002).
However, in the key area of developing the R&D capabilities of private
companies, the research consortia are still far from being successful. For example, during
an interview a top official of ITRI's CCL bitterly described the situation as:
"Technology transfer from CCL is very important in Taiwan. The companies
use us to train their people, take our technology, and create some products.
After which they go to their customers, show them the products as a proof that
they can do OEM, sign some OEM contracts, and just do the same things a
couple of years down the road. Our aim is to help and spur them to routinize
R&D and product innovation. However, the end result is that they do not do it.
A main reason being that they can more cheaply rely on technology transfer
every time they need to upgrade their skills, which allow them to operate as a
pure OEM." (5/24/2001).
The state also used the research consortia mechanism not only to develop and
create new IT products industries, but also to upgrade the Taiwanese electronic
components industry, following its strategy from the early 1960s of trying to localize the
creation of key components.
One of the most illuminating such projects was the CD-ROM project, which
evolved from a MoEA's decision to view CD-ROM as a strategic product in 1992. As a
result of this project, by the end of 1999 Taiwan moved from being a supplier of less than
one precent of the world's CD-ROMs to supplying more than fifty precent, with almost
49 million units sold (Amsden and Chu 2003. p. 104). This project evolved into a series
of consortia and moved on to DVD technology.
From the point of view of our argument about opportunity structure, it is
important to note that one key sub-component that none of the consortia managed to
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develop was the IC chips. By 1997, the development in the CD-ROM industry, and
ITRI's inability to develop the needed IC chips, created an ideal market opportunity for a
new IC design company that was just spun off UMC's, MediaTek. MediaTek succeeded
where ITRI's consortia failed and quickly developed chips for the CD-ROM industry,
breaking the monopoly of Japanese companies in the area. MediaTek's technologies
moved together with the industry's, first to CDRW and then to DVD.135 In the process,
MediaTek became Taiwan's most successful IC design company and the world's fourth
largest in terms of sales in both 2002 and 2003.136
Nevertheless, even in the IT hardware sector not all of the Taiwanese state's
initiatives have been successful. In parallel with ITRI, the Taiwanese government has
also sponsored and expanded an even bigger pubic research institute - Chungshan
Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) - Taiwan's defense technology research
institute. Apart from funds received through the defense establishment, CSIST was, as
late as 1999, the receiver of the second largest amount of funds from MoEA's
Department of Industrial Technology after ITRI (Hsu and Chiang 2001). Not a lot of
information is available on CSIST, but while ITRI's efforts resulted in significant
commercial success for relatively low investment, CSIST's, many times working on
similar technologies with vastly larger resources, did not achieve even one commercial
success in the semiconductor industry. 13 7 This compares poorly not only with ITRI, but
also with Israel's experience. Interestingly the main difference between CSIST and both
135 While not being part of ITRI's consortia, after being spun off by UMC MediaTek did subcontract
various ITRI's labs for the co-development of specific R&D (Chang and Tsai 2002).
136 Interview with MediaTek executives (11/5/2003).
137 The full extent of CSIST's resources is concealed as a matter of national security; however; just in terms
of manpower during the early 1980s, CSIST employed 20,000 researchers compared with ITRI's ,4000.
Today CSIST employs about 14,000 and ITRI 6,000.
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ITRI and Israel's RAFAEL is in the fact that CSIST does not maintain close relationships
with the private industry and instead prefers to work in isolation under the guise of
secrecy.
The Development of the Semiconductor Industry in the 1990s - The Growth of the IC
Design Subsectorl38
Of the many subsectors of the global IT hardware industry in the 1990s, the IC
design (or fabless) subsector was one of the most innovative and most successful. By the
early 2000s, Taiwanese IC design houses companies were the only non-North American
companies to reach the top ten position in terms of worldwide sales. As a matter of fact,
Taiwan and Israel are the only non-North American countries to have any companies at
all in the top thirty companies in terms of worldwide sales, with no Japanese, South
Korean, or European firms even making it to the list. By 2003, the Taiwanese IC design
industry was already the second largest in the world in terms of sales after the US's. The
IC design industry was the focus of attention for the Taiwanese state in the 1990s, and
has been key in the attempts of the Taiwanese state to spur more cutting-edge
innovational activity.
As can be seen in Table III over the last ten years the Taiwanese IC design
industry experienced a remarkable growth. From an industry that consisted of 51
companies in 1991, the industry grew to 66 companies employing 2,109 people in 1996,
and to 225 companies employing 11,800 in 2002. This rapid growth, with sales of over
$6USD billion in 2003, made it one of the three biggest IC design industries in the world
(ITRI 2003; ITRI various years).
138 The next two sections of the chapter are partly based on Breznitz 2005b; Breznitz 2005c.
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Looking at the largest ten companies by sales in 2000-2002, in Table II, we see
that the industry's skills are quite developed and flexible, as attested to by the ability of
Taiwanese IC design firms to excel in almost every subsector of the semiconductor
industry. In addition, it is apparent that these successful companies have built their
businesses around the opportunity structures offered by the existence of the large
OEM/ODM companies in Taiwan and ITRI's efforts to develop local manufacturing of
key components. For example, MediaTek's core business has been the PCs' CD and
DVD industries; VIA is developing PC chipsets with its customers being the motherboard
and PC manufacturers; Ali's main business is laptop chipsets; and Sunplus is catering to
the consumer markets, especially to toys OEM/ODMs.
187
Table I - Top 30 Fabless Companies By Global Sales
2003 2002 Company Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 (f)
ranking rankin
1 I [ acom J US 1,215 1,395 1,942 2,510
2 2 [ Nvidia US _ 699 1,275 1,915 1,835
3 . 4 Broadcom US 1,096 962 1,083 1,595
4 3 Xilinx US 1,560 1,149 1,125 1,265
5 5 [MediaTek Taiwan 411 447 854 1,170
6 8 ATI Canada 520 480 645 1,135
7 10 SanDisk US 602 317 493 930
8 7 Altera US . 1,377 839 712 1830
9 11 Marvell US 135 275 482 780
10 9 Conexant* US - 646 1,942 650
11 6 VIA Taiwan 909 1,009 729 620
12 12 [Qlogic US 362 1 357 415 520
13 18 GlobespanVirata* US 348 1 265 229 360
14 ]16 JSunplus Taiwan I[ 201 195 250 1 320
15 23 Novatek Taiwan 121 1 124 193 F311
16 24 Silicon US 103 74 182 310
Laboratories
17 15 Realtek Taiwan 174 214 265 300
18 17 SST US 1490 259 244 250
19 21 PMC-Sierra (Canada 695 323 213 245
20 20 ICS US 195 1 155 228 237
21 19 Lattice (US I568 1295 1229 218
22 29 Zoran US 1 6 8 100 141 213
(Israel)
23 22 Genesis Canada 56 126 196 211
Microchi
24 128 SMSC US 163 128 145 202
25 Zarlink** Canada 1- - - 201
26 125 Ali Taiwan ]98 1159 1 176 200
27 13 Cirrus Logic US 1729 534 304 198
28 14 ESS US 303 271 273 180
29 32 DSPGroup usI 85 1 88 125 170
(Is~rael)
30 26 Semtech ]US 215 1170 170 160
... J Others - 3,512 2,504 2,210 2,514
1Total 17,010 15,1351 16,795 20,640
Source: IC Insights' Mclean Report 2004
Conexant and GlobespanVirata plan to merge in 1Q 2004.
**Became fabless in mid-2002.
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Table II Top 10 Taiwanese Design Houses by
Main Product
Rank Name Sales Line
2002 2001 2000 2002 2001 2000
1 2 2 MediaTek Inc. 295 154 129 Optical storage
2 1 1 VIA 252 343 309 PC Chipsets
3 3 5 RealTek 92 73 54 Networking
4 4 3 Sunplus Technolo 86 66 63 Consumer
ovatek Microelectronics
5 6 8 Corp. 67 42 42 Consumer
PC chipsets/DVD
6 5 - ALi Corp. 61 54 31 Player IC
7 7 9 Elan Microelectronics 0 36 39 Consumer
8 9 7 Elite Semiconductor 34 30 43 Memory
- - Faraday 4 24 - Memory
10 8 6 Holtek Semiconductor Inc. 3 32 45 Consumer
Source: Bandaoti Gongye Nianjian (The Yearbook of Semiconductor Industry in 2003), ITRI, 2003.
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Sales - (NT 00 million)
Table III - Size of the IC design sector in Taiwan 1991-2000
Number of companies Employees
1991 57
1992 59
1993 64
1994 65
1995 66 2109
1996 72 2141
1997 81 3349
1998 115 4200
1999 127 6000
2000 140 7600
2001 180 9800
2002 225 11800
Sources: (ITRI 2003; ITRI various years)
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Another common trait appears if we analyze the strategy of the leading companies: none
of them develops completely new innovative products that are first to the market.
Furthermore, even the most innovative firms, those that manage to develop some brand
recognition for their products, such as VIA and ALi, rely on developing secondary
innovations on the basis of technologies developed by the leading American MNCs. This
tends to leave many of them in a weakened position, where changes in technology or in
the behavior of leading MNCs can rapidly deteriorate their market position.
The story of VIA, the largest Taiwanese IC design company in terms of sales until
2002, is a case in point. PC's chipsets are VIA's main product line. As long as Intel's
Pentium 3 was the leading PC CPU, VIA gained global market share on Intel's expense,
reaching almost 50%, in part because of Intel's decision to stick with the more expensive
Rambus technology. With the move to Pentium 4 technology, Intel attacked VIA on
multiple fronts: it did not license VIA its P4 technology and it took VIA to court over
patent infringement allegations in October 2001. As a result of these moves, all first-tier
PC manufacturers, such as Asus or Gigabyte, refrained from using VIA's chipsets,
fearing legal action from Intel. VIA counter-sued Intel for both patent infringement and
usage of monopoly status, and the legal battle was fought in five jurisdictions. In April
2003, the two companies reached a settlement that includes a patent swap agreement and
a licensing agreement. By that time, however, VIA has lost substantial market share and
revenues. Moreover, because it agreed to pay royalties to Intel it can no longer retain the
profit margins it enjoyed before. If, in 2001, VIA was the biggest Taiwanese IC design
house, with about $1 USD billion in sales and control of almost 50% of global market
share, in 2002 VIA was only the second largest Taiwanese IC design house, with sales
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down to $729USD million and global market share of less than 25%. In 2003, VIA's
sales continued to drop and its sales were only $600USD million (AFX 2001; FT 2003a;
FT 2003b; FT 2003c; Hille 2003; Hung 2002).
Another example of the vulnerability of the Taiwanese IC design industry
position within the global production networks is the fact that this legal battle was fought
after VIA had already changed its ownership structure to placate Intel's demand. In order
to do so VIA separated itself from its main shareholder, First International Computers
(FIC). This restructuring was done since Intel viewed the combination of motherboard
producer, FIC, and chipset producer, VIA, as a threat. 139
As can be seen from the rapid growth of the design, or fabless, subsector after
1996, the main impetus for growth had been the establishment and rapid growth of the
pureplay foundries. Both major foundries, TSMC and UMC, have taken leading roles in
the development of the design subsector. Both established exclusive foundry-IC design
house relationships with what they term club members, which they also assisted
financially. Many of the top IC design houses such as MediaTek and NoveTek were spun
off from UMC when it turned its business model from IDM to pureplay foundry.
Structure, Development, and Business Models in the Taiwanese IC Design Industry
Taiwanese fabless companies employ one main business model, apart from the
few cases where a Taiwanese company manages to sell its own branded products to final
customers. This business model is based on the utilization of the unique advantage that
the Taiwanese IT industry's structure offers: the co-location of both the world's biggest
and most advanced pureplay foundries and of some of the largest OEM/ODM companies.
139 Interviews with VIA and FIC executives (1/17/2000; 3/24/1999).
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Most of the Taiwanese IC design houses employ two variants of the same
strategy: to supply the Taiwanese (and more recently the Chinese) OEM/ODMs with the
chips they need in order to supply finished products at competitive prices and of
sufficient quality to OBM MNCs. The Taiwanese fabless companies rely on the
proximity of the world's biggest pureplay foundries. This geographical proximity enables
them to produce cheaply and speedily large quantities of newly-designed chips and to
inspect and assure quality in almost real-time. All the Taiwanese IC design houses we
interviewed specialize in chips based on second-generation technologies with the aim of
lowering costs and increasing reliability; they also do some process innovation. Apart
from an unsuccessful attempt by ICreate, a subsidiary of Etron, to develop and market
advanced chips in a joint venture with the Israeli company Zoran, no Taiwanese IC
design house that we interviewed tried to develop original products, new technologies, or
products that are based on cutting-edge technology. Figure I below provides a graphic
representation of the main differences between the market relation and information and
communication flows of the Taiwanese industry in comparison with the Israeli and US
industries. 14 0
140 For an article that analyzes the relative technological advantages of the Taiwanese IC industry, coming
to a similar conclusion, see Hsu and Chiang 2001. Ernst, trying to explain the move of the IC design
industry to East Asia, also follows the same argument in regards to Taiwan's relative strengths (Ernst
2004a).
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The Taiwanese fabless companies' business model has two variants that are not mutually
exclusive. In the first variant, the design houses custom-design chips for clients using the
clients' specifications (a local OEM with specific contracts with an OBM), test and
quality-assure them, and then manufacture and deliver them using a pureplay foundry for
fabrication. In the second variant, the IC design house builds "standardized" chips for
OEM companies and other customers, manufactures them using a pureplay foundry, and
sells them either directly or through distributors. The firms we interviewed claimed that
as the market for standard chips is vastly larger, revenues using the second variant with
successful products are much higher. However, because custom designed chips have the
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advantage of a secure customer and higher profit margins per fabricated chip, a
significant number of companies use both business models.
As the custom-made business model also has lower costs and companies can
secure quick revenues, until recently it has been the preferred mode of operation for new
companies. The story of Sunplus, consistently one the top four companies in term of sales
since 2000, is illuminating. Sunplus was established by a group of former ITRI-ERSO
engineers who left ITRI to join Silicon Integrated Systems (SiS) and left SiS after its
restructuring in 1989. The idea of the founders was to focus on the consumer market,
especially toys; thus reliability and price have always been much more important than the
latest technology and features. Using their own money to seed the company, the founders
immediately sought revenues to supplement their capital and started operations with
custom-made ASIC designs. In 1994, Sunplus manufactured its first standardized chip, a
micro controller for toys with LCD monitors, from which it branched out to other
multimedia-related chips. Currently, Sunplus uses the custom-made business model for
its entire gift and toy business and the standardized chips business model for the rest.
Most of Sunplus's revenues now originate from its standard chips; however, as
there is fierce competition in the multimedia mass market, a large percentage of profits
come from the smaller custom-made chip division. Sunplus realizes that even though it
does not use cutting-edge technologies, in order to excel, it must keep abreast of new
technologies and be able to implement them quickly once their price goes down. In order
to do so, Sunplus, in a way similar to many successful Taiwanese fabless companies,
employs a few strategies. First, it maintains a close relationship with ITRI, especially
with its CCL lab, using ITRI as a channel for new technologies. Second, Sunplus has
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established its own investment arm that invests in foreign and local start-ups in fields that
Sunplus thinks it might need in the future. Third, Sunplus directly licenses technologies.
The Taiwanese IC design houses do not rely on in-house developed cutting-edge
IP to give them market advantage, but on their ability to deliver moderately sophisticated
products more speedily, cheaply, and reliably than their competitors. This is true even for
companies that pass through the new government-sponsored SBIR program and/or ITRI's
incubation center. For example, one interviewee told us: "Our game plan is to focus on
the China market. The US is far too technologically advanced for us."''4 Another
interviewee, a serial entrepreneur, the founder of a company that was then still in ITRI's
incubation center added, "The customers we aim to have need good chips but not state-
of-the-art chips. They care more about reliability, mass production, and unit costs than
cutting-edge technology. They are not looking for new innovations." Two other
interviewees, from two of the most technologically advanced communication Taiwanese
fabless companies, were even more pessimistic about the status of innovative activities in
the industry:
"There is only one place in Taiwan that develops new technology and cutting
edge products - ITRI - I sometimes miss being there. The only reason I left is
because I wanted to get rich."
"I do not know about any real R&D-based company in Taiwan, apart from ITRI
of course. Everybody is interested in revenues and profits. MediaTek is the
biggest model of success. The biggest problem for any R&D-based model to
work is the stock options/bonus regulations. These pull all the talent into the big
manufacturing companies." (Interviews with companies in Hsinchu Park
1/30/2003).
Interestingly, this is also true for all the companies that have been established by
returning immigrants from the US, including those that have successfully founded and
managed new product-based IC design houses in Silicon Valley. Hence, the decision to
141 Interview with an ITRI incubation center' graduate IC companies (1/28/2003; 1/30/2003).
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utilize only the second generation innovation business model has less to do with skills
and capabilities and more to do with the institutional structure of the Taiwanese industry
and its links with the financial markets.
In sum, the fabless chip sector evolved around a particular business strategy that
has relied on the unique institutional features of the Taiwanese IT industrial system as a
whole. The main three features are, first, the existence of large OEM/ODM companies
that sell in foreign markets, which creates a large demand for chips based on second-
generation technologies. Second, the close proximity of the world's largest and most
advanced pureplay foundries. Third, the industry is based on an innovation system with a
division of labor between ITRI and the private sector that excels in quick technology
transfer and second-generation innovation, while continuously infusing the system with
the most recent foreign technologies.
Utilizing this strategy, the IC design subsector provides complementary assets to
the Taiwanese OEMs and pureplay foundries. First, it supplies the pureplay foundries
with a constant stream of orders in a variety of IC designs, helping them to stay profitable
and to extend and maintain some of their own technological capacities. Second, in regard
to the OEM/ODM manufacturers, the Taiwanese IC design industry is supplying them
with the chips they need either to profitably offer solutions for Western OBMs or to
compete successfully with western and Japanese OBMs by lowering their cost structure.
The development of the IC design subsector thus enriches the Taiwanese IT
industry with positive feedback, strengthening the Taiwanese position as mid-level
suppliers within the global IT product networks. Each part of the Taiwanese IT hardware
industry, OEM/ODMs, pureplay foundries, and IC design companies, strengthens and is
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strengthened in turn by the existence, outputs, and demands of the others. Despite this
virtuous cycle, or maybe because of it, the IC design industry is unable to develop
alternative business models for capturing the higher rents that come from original
innovative designs.
We should not, however, discount the magnitude of Taiwanese achievements in
IC design. Taiwan, a small and until recently technologically backward society,
developed the second largest IC design industry in the world, far surpassing the South
Korean, Japanese, and Western European industries. The industry is not only growing but
also enhancing the overall competitiveness of the Taiwanese hardware industry. Whether
or not there is a move to innovative products, the industry's growth seems secure in the
near future.
The Taiwanese Software Industry
If the story of the hardware IT industry is one of impressive growth and
successful policies, the software industry offers a less sanguine tale of industrial policy
and growth. Official statistics are inflated, but even they show the one major failure of
the Taiwanese software industry: it is mostly a domestic-oriented industry. Official
figures present a picture of rapid growth in sales from $22NT billion in 1991 to $149NT
billion in 2001, but exports in 2001 amounted only to $16NT billion, or a little over
$490USD million, only 10.73% of total sales. For comparison, the annual export figure
for the whole of the Taiwanese software industry is just slightly higher than the quarterly
sales of Amdocs, Israel's largest software company. These figures are tiny in comparison
with those of the hardware sector, or even with those of the IC design sector alone (for
example MediaTek's sales alone are more than twice as large than even the official
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exports figures of the software industry). Moreover, the annual sale revenues of two of
the three largest Taiwanese software product companies, Ulead and Cyberlink, were
around $30USD million in 2003, too small to put them in the league of medium sized IC
design houses in Taiwan, or large software companies in Israel or Ireland. Table IV,
compares the rapid growth of exports of the IC design sector, the smallest and latest
subsector of the semiconductor industry, with that of the whole software industry, putting
this failure in perspective.' 42
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Source: (III various years; ITRI 2003; ITRI various years; MoEA various years)
The relative failure of the software sector is even more puzzling if we take into
account the amount of high level software development critically needed by the hardware
industry, especially the IC design sector. Thus, the success of the hardware sector in the
development of what is usually termed embedded software, coupled with the global
142 In addition, it is not clear what percentage of the total sales figures should be attributed to foreign
companies, and what part of sales are software and not bundled (i.e., hardware and software which are sold
together). Furthermore, the official figures include in the definition of the software industry several
activities, such as internet service providers, that are usually not counted as software.
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success of a few Taiwanese software companies, shows that the cause of this failure
cannot be explained by lack of software programming skills in Taiwan. 43
With this in mind we can understand why a high-ranking official in MoEA mused
in one of our interviews,
"Look where we are and where other countries like India, Israel, and Ireland
are with their software industry. Nobody heard about them 30 years ago. I must
admit that we <Taiwan> are not doing very well with software" (5/30/2001).
In striking contrast to the electronics and semiconductor industries and the positive role
played by ITRI, III, the Institution for Information Industry, has no stories to tell of
ERSO-like successful spin-offs or any other initiatives spurring the creation of an
industry. III has very little to say about its positive role in the development of the
software industry. Indeed, III can be seen as one of the main obstacles for the industry's
development.
The impetus behind the establishment of III in 1979 was Dr. K.T. Li's. The hope
of Dr. Li was that III could play a similar role in software to the one played by ITRI in
hardware, and he remained influential behind III for some years after its establishment.
Thus, III and ITRI were structured in the same way. Moreover, they were established
within six years of one another and under the same political leadership. Hence, if the
structure of the bureaucracy and its policies is indeed the explanatory variable, we would
expect a similar industrial outcome. Nonetheless, the political process of sectoral
industry-state co-evolution moved ITRI and the hardware industry, and III and the
software industry, on two opposing paths.
143 Indeed a critical part of ITRI's efforts in developing the IC design industry was the development, and
subsequent transfer to private IC design companies, of design testing and EDA software tools. The case of
ITRI and EDA software tools companies shows that it is quite possible for a public research institution to
have positive effects on the private industry by developing and diffusing technologies (Chang and Tsai
2002).
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Unlike ITRI, III was created after some of the early leading software firms had
been established. The private sector, in contrast to the semiconductor industry, was active
in the software sector. The agenda and the funding granted to III by the Taiwanese
government were vastly different from ITRI's. First, III was asked to promote the
software industry. Secondly, III was given the task of promoting the use of IT and
software throughout Taiwan and was asked to help the government with its own
computerization. Finally, III was also asked to generate enough revenue to cover most of
its activities. The different agendas proved to be contradictory, with the end result that III
transformed itself into one of Taiwan's biggest IT consultancies and software houses, and
has been competing directly with private software firms.144
The responses of many software firms to our questions about the role of the state
in the industry's development offer the view of III as the biggest hindrance to the
industry's growth. The response of a founder of a financial software company is typical:
"The state does not have any positive role; as a matter of fact III is our greatest
competitor. They also compete unfairly. I need to sponsor my R&D from my revenues.
They have all their R&D covered by the state" (1/17/2003). A founder of another
software company replied:
"In our 17 years we had direct conflicts with III only once so I am very lucky.
However, I do not think III is good for the industry. They get government
money to help the industry and nothing happens. III do not really care about
the industry - they just talk and talk but do not do anything for the industry.
They do not even properly do the more simple and straightforward task of
144 Again exact statistics are hard to come by. In 2003 the funding III received from the agency that is
responsible for the budgeting of Taiwanese research institutions, the Department of Industrial Technology
(DOIT), was $760NT million. DOIT statistics estimate III's 2003 total budget at $3NT billion, out of which
a third is received from projects with other government departments and a third is received in the private
market (DOIT 2003). In comparison, the combined total sales of Cyberlink and Ulead, the two leading
Taiwanese software-product companies in 2002 were $65USD million or $2NT billion (Trend Micro,
which is now a Japanese company, had sales of $364USD million). In a few interviews in 2001 with III's
management team, we were told that of III's budget, half originates in sources other then DOIT.
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consulting the government on policy issues so policy making is all tangled up.
Even in the basic task of changing the perception of the software industry in
Taiwan they do nothing. Customers think software and software companies
should not be paid because they do not see software as a "real" product"
(11/6/2003).
This view of III is shared not only by those we interviewed in private firms and in
industry associations, but also by officials of other developmental agencies. One official
of an industrial R&D agency responded to a question about the role of III in the software
industry's development, "III is a funny organization. It both competes with and tries to
assist the local software industry. On a charitable estimate I would say that they compete
at least as much as they assist" (1/29/2003). Another official, a head of a different
department gave a similar response, "I agree that III is a very problematic institution. I
think that the problem of III is the confusion or the strange positioning that they are in.
They try to compete and help at the same time" (11/4/2003).
III is well situated to play a role as a facilitator of collective action and organizer
of consortia. However, even in this role both researchers and industry leaders criticize III.
Even in the crucial case of agreeing on a standard for Chinese writing input/output and
internal conversion, a basic need for the software industry's attempts to grow, Noble
claims that III's actions fostered distrust and hampered the industry's efforts to reach
agreement. In the end an international body, on which Taiwan had no influence, settled
the issue almost a decade later (Noble 1998. Pp. 123-147). This impression of the failure
of state efforts is strengthened by our analysis of the software industry. As I describe
below, the most successful subsectors are those in which III never intervened.
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Structure, Development, and Business Models in the Taiwanese Software Industry
The structure of the Taiwanese software industry reveals a divide between the
older companies, focused on the development of software applications for big
organizations who fiercely compete with III, and a newer cohort of companies
developing software technologies, most of which were founded after the success of the
hardware IT industry in Hsinchu Park. This division tempts one to contend that there are
in fact two Taiwanese software industries. However, the reality is more complex.
As was mentioned earlier, it is extremely hard to gather precise sales figures on
the software industry in Taiwan. Most of the bigger companies, faced with intense
competition from III, have branched out into sales and distribution of hardware and even
into completely unrelated fields at times of severe need. Even public game development
companies, such as Summit, earn much of their revenues from bundled sales - the sales
of their products on top of sales of DVD and other entertainment electronics. Estimating
software sales in Taiwan is also complicated by the fact that PC manufacturers have been
for many years some of the biggest software developers.
Nevertheless, the picture of the industry that emerges is one in which until a
decade ago most of the Taiwanese software companies merged both IT consultancy and
bespoke development, as well as the sales of specific software systems (such as
automation or finance) that were developed as part of earlier work with customers and
then packaged. Most of the PC manufacturers were also successful software producers,
especially in the 1980s when each manufacturer had its own slightly different version of
the Chinese input/output system, and when most of the classic PC software packages
from western companies, such as spreadsheets, were unavailable in Chinese.
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Because III had captured the big governmental contracts and the big global IT
companies were competing directly on big projects, the industry was unable to develop
big software houses specializing in customized development. A remark from a founder of
one of the companies that managed to survive these times is illuminating,
"Competing with III is like competing with Microsoft. If you compete you get
killed on the spot; if you cooperate you get less money and you might be killed
later, but at least you get some work. However, III always wins more contracts
than they can program themselves, so they then subcontract some of them.
They will pay me less than what I would get if I could compete on the project
in the free market but I prefer to cooperate with the Microsoft of Taiwan, and
not get killed by it." (11/6/2003).
As a result most of the industry has evolved around a particular market niche that
was neglected or considered too small by III, such as international banking or securities
trading systems. Today many of these companies are realizing that their future lies with
Mainland China. Interestingly it is here that they find that their former relationships as
subcontractors of American MNCs in Taiwan are an important asset. For example, a
CEO of one of Taiwan's oldest software companies described his decision to move to
China:
"The funny thing is that we never wanted to go to China, but our American
MNCs partners asked us to come, both HP and Oracle. The best example is
HP. They won the whole IT systems project for a big new plant and they asked
us and three other Taiwanese companies to open a China branch and do
subcontracting for them. We did that and before we knew what happened
Oracle asked us to do subcontracting for them when they won a big Chinese
state-owned company contract. I think that without the mainland my company
would not have been able to grow at all in the last 3 years. Only because of
China we have a chance to survive." (11/4/2003).
In addition, for the most part the industry has not been able to develop unique
products or strong enough brands that guard their own products when the big software
MNCs launched Chinese versions of their products. Thus, when Western companies such
as Microsoft came around to localize their products to Chinese these companies' products
were wiped out of the market.
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The one sector that evolved differently is the PC game industry. Unlike other
sectors of the software industry, the video game industry had four tremendous advantages
that allowed it to thrive in Taiwan. First, III was not at all interested in this sector.
Second, video games, unlike many other software products, benefit from certain cultural
traits, and Chinese-born garners were very keen on playing "Chinese" games. For
example, almost every Taiwanese game company has had a strategy or fantasy-role-
playing (FRP) game based on the classic tale of the Three Kingdoms. Third, the costs of
game development were very low for many years. Most video game companies either
started by sponsoring teams of high-school students who develop the games as a hobby
on a cost-only basis, or had a mixed development strategy of in-house and semi-
independent teams. Fourth, with 7/11 and similar popular chains in Taiwan selling local
games on the comer of every block, video game companies have had distribution
channels that reached each and every Taiwanese on a daily basis.
It is not surprising that until 2000-1 video games were deemed by many in both
the private and public sectors to be the most successful part of the software industry in
Taiwan. All the medium and large sized companies such as Softstar, Summit, Gamania
(formerly known as Full Soft), Interserv, and Soft-World had gone public on the
Taiwanese stock exchange in the 2000-2002 period. Since then, the industry has been
hard hit, and in 2003 most of the companies that we revisited had either retreated from
original game development or were cutting down their development activities to the bare
minimum. Apart from the worsening economic situation in Taiwan, the two changes that
transformed the business environment of the Taiwanese video game companies were
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technological: the wide diffusion of CD Read and Write technology and the rapid
emergence of on-line gaming.
These two technological changes have significantly and swiftly lowered the
revenues coming from the sales of PC games, with most but not all, of the leading
companies reporting at best sales of tens of thousands of copies of their new games
instead of hundreds of thousands of copies. These developments coincide with the
maturation of the international gaming industry. The quality and technological
sophistication needed to make competitive game titles has drastically raised the costs of
development per title. In addition, the Korean gaming industry, for many years the poor
and unsophisticated cousin of the Taiwanese industry, was the first to develop on-line
FRP games, winning market share and financial backing and overtaking the quality and
technological sophistication of the Taiwanese industry at a critical moment. At the end of
2003, all but one of the extremely successful massive-multi-users-on-line FRP games
running in Taiwan were developed by non-Taiwanese companies.
The Taiwanese video game industry, without the financial resources of the
Korean and Western industries, finds itself technologically backward and stuck with
business models that are based on low cost development. It has been unable for the most
part to compete. Individually, video game companies do not have the financial resources
to regain the technological lead vis-A-vis the Korean industry, and as the industry is
widely fragmented it has been unable to coordinate collective action. A few industry
leaders approached III and asked for leadership or help, only to be rebuffed until October
2002. A CEO of one of the biggest companies recounted a tale of a failed attempt to
cooperate with III in late 2002:
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"The worst of the worst is III. A representative of the video game industry
approached the president of III, the new one who promised to change III for the
better and help the industry, and asked him to help our sector. Mind you, we
are the only sector that was really successful in the Taiwanese software
industry. After a few talks his answer came back from his secretary - 'This is
not III core business, therefore, we are not interested.' I ask you: 'what the hell
is their core business?' They say their goal is to help the software industry, not
to make profits, but they do not give a damn about anything but making
money" (1/20/2003).
This failure by III is even more surprising because starting in October 2002 the
Taiwanese government declared digital content as a high priority technological area, and
specifically targeted on-line games as one of the more promising digital content sectors.
However, both government officials and industry leaders see the digital content initiative
as a failure so far. One of the industry's representatives in the initiative described:
"This is the latest government fad. They finally realized IP is important. So we
sit there for a year, so many important people and so many people from the
government and talk and discuss for hours every week and nothing happens. It
is running for over a year now and still nothing happened. Elections are
coming in six months time so nothing will happen until after the elections
because the civil servants are waiting to see who will be their master and are
afraid to do anything" (10/30/2003).
This view of the efforts of the digital content initiative in the area of on-line
games was also strongly expressed by the responsible Minister of State, who described
the efforts so far in regards to the gaming industry, in contrast to government efforts in
the hardware sector, in a similar way:
"Nothing much is happening with on-line games. We basically did nothing; we
do not even have a budget. We have to admit that a lot needs to be done with
software and digital content. However, we <the government> still think that
Taiwan's future is more in hardware" (11/7/2003).
As of the end of 2003, most of the Taiwanese video game companies are fast
retreating from game development. From an industry whose leading companies had
operations and sold their own published products throughout the greater China region, the
industry is transforming itself to an industry whose core competency is game distribution
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and resale. This does not mean that two or three of the leading companies will not
continue to prosper and grow and develop original games. However, the number of
Taiwanese game developing companies is declining sharply with no new entrants
coming.
In the last few years, a cohort of software companies with new business models
have emerged and succeeded. These companies are much more technologically oriented.
Their products either directly deal with software technology itself, or with new
applications of IT technology, e.g., anti-virus software, OCR application, or systems
recovery. These companies appeared after the success of the IT hardware industry in
Hsinchu Park; indeed, many of them are tightly connected to the industry. There are two
types of operations: (a) firms supplying the Taiwanese hardware industry with software
technology that enables it to add features to its products, differentiating them from the
competition, or supplying critical software that the hardware industry would find difficult
or prohibitively expensive to get abroad; (b) companies producing software products that
are directly associated with the software industry itself, such as anti-virus or application
development tools.
One prominent example of a company focusing on software technology itself is
Trend Micro, which develops corporate anti-viral protection products. In 2002, Trend
Micro became one of the largest software security companies in the world with sales of
$364USD million. Trend was established by Taiwanese, grew in Taiwan, is run by
Taiwanese, and still conducts a large share of its activities in Taiwan, but its management
felt that it needed to leave Taiwan in order to be globally successful. In 1998 Trend
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moved its management team and headquarters to Japan, reestablished itself as a publicly
traded Japanese company, and is also traded on NASDAQ.
The two most successful software companies that followed more closely a
business model of alliance with Taiwan's hardware manufacturers are Ulead and
Cyberlink. In 1989, three friends who worked together at III left the institution to try out
their own ideas for software development and established Ulead with finance from the
Taiwanese scanner manufacturer Microtek. Ulead's first business was to supply OCR and
image processing software to the then-fast-growing Taiwanese scanner industry. The
scanner industry was facing difficulties in securing key software from American
companies. A few years later, realizing that there was no true color imaging processing
editor for the PC (Adobe was selling its Photoshop software only for Mac at the time),
Ulead launched its own product called Photostyler. In 1992, Adobe bought the company
that held the copyrights for the technology Ulead was using. Since then Ulead has come
out with its own product for the mid-range user.
Hoping to use the same OEM model it used with the scanner industry, Ulead
wrote software for video imaging for the video capture card industry. The Taiwanese
video capture card industry never took off. Ironically, this proved to be a boon for Ulead,
which started to work with foreign manufacturers. Today, apart from its image processing
products, Ulead also develops video and DVD processing and authoring software. Ulead
sells either directly to private users or through OEM agreements with hardware
manufacturers. In 1999, Ulead became the first software company to go public on
Taiwan's stock exchange. By 2002, Ulead had sales of over $30USD million and
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operations in all five continents. It is striking that one of the three most successful
software product companies in Taiwan has total revenues that are so relatively small.
The latest globally successful Taiwanese software company is Cyberlink.
Cyberlink is also interesting as it directly employs business techniques its CEO, Alice H.
Chang, learned as a top executive at Trend Micro during Trend's rapid growth and IPO
period. This is a clear case of learning and economic capabilities' diffusion in the
industry. Cyberlink is also the most successful company to be spun out directly from a
Taiwanese university lab, attesting to the growing capabilities of Taiwan's computer
science academic research.
Dr. Jau Huang, Alice H. Chang's husband, the cofounder of the multimedia lab at
National Taiwan University, established Cyberlink in 1994 together with four of his
students. 45 Encouraged by Mrs. Chang, then the Executive Vice President of Trend
Micro, the team decided to develop a software product instead of a hardware product. In
1995, using self-financing, Cyberlink was formally founded. The company finished
developing the first product, a video decoder (VCD decoder), in November 1996. In
January 1997 Mrs. Chang stepped in as CEO and embarked on a strategy of OEM sales
to Taiwan's VGA card manufacturers, the world's largest.' 46 These OEM agreements
gave Cyberlink immediate market recognition and the company went on to develop a
complete suite of DVD products that now has about 50% of the world market in the DVD
PC's multimedia tool niche. Currently Cyberlink sells multimedia management tools and
has just started to sell development tools for e-training and e-learning solutions. In 2000,
145 The story of Dr. Jau Jaung, a graduate of UCLA, marks a very similar dynamic to one commonly
encountered in the hardware sector: the growing stream of returning Taiwanese with graduate degrees from
leading American universities.
146 VGA stands for video graphics array, which is a graphics display system developed for the PC by IBM
in 1987. VGA has since become one of the industry's standards.
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Cyberlink went public on the Taiwanese stock exchange. In the financial year 2002,
Cyberlink had sales of over $35USD million with most of its sales originating with its
DVD products done through OEM agreements with PC and notebook manufacturers in
the US, Taiwan, Japan, and Europe.
In short, the Taiwanese software industry today seems to have a dual structure.
On the one side are the older private companies dealing with business solutions that need
to directly compete with III, which has become the biggest business software solutions
provider. On the other side are the younger and more successful companies that are much
more technologically oriented, developing in market niches in which III has no dealing,
with a few of them beginning to have true global reach. Overall, the Taiwanese software
industry is still mostly oriented to the domestic market. Only a few companies possess
the necessary capabilities and skills to develop products and services for the global
market. Hence, relative to the Taiwanese hardware sector or compared with software in
countries such as Israel or Ireland, Taiwan's software industry is a stark example of a
stage II failure -- the inability of the state to change its roles in tandem with the industry's
growth.
Government Actions, Institutions, and Market Structure in the Divergent Growth of the
IT Hardware and Software Sectors in Taiwan
Using our explanatory framework we can now position Taiwan on it, to gain
understanding of the institutional systems in which the Taiwanese industry evolved. First
and foremost, we notice that the Taiwanese state has opted to deeply intervene in the IT
industry development path by encompassing the R&D creating agents within its
bureaucratic structure, as well as by trying to intensely influence the industry's
technological development decisions. The Taiwanese state initiated policies with a clear
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division of labor between private industry and the public sector. The public sector has
been conducting the lions-share of R&D and then diffusing the results, developed to the
stage of working prototypes, to the industry. The state also sees itself as the proper loci
for making decisions on which R&D projects to pursue and which technologies to
develop and obtain. This is almost in direct opposition to the role played by the state in
both Ireland and Israel. A recent example is the current "System on Chip" development
program (SoC).
The SoC program is the last in a long tradition of technological capability
upgrading programs. It is organized in three discrete stages. In its first stage the
government focuses on specific products it thinks that the Taiwanese IT industry needs
be able to manufacture in the mid-future. In the second stage, the universities and ITRI
are asked to give proposals as to which intellectual property and technologies they think
are necessary to develop these products, and how they are going to develop these
technologies and transfer them to the industry. In the third and final stage, the universities
and ITRI will develop the technologies and intellectual properties and transfer them to
the industry. Hence, in a way similar to the past, the envisioned role of private industry in
this innovation capability development program is limited to one of developing products
decided upon by governmental officials using technologies developed by the public
sector.
The SoC program also exemplifies the different role for universities envisioned
by the Taiwanese state. 147 If in Israel the universities have been, for many years, geared
147 SoC follows a long tradition of upgrading programs in which various agencies, including the National
Science Council (NSC), the Ministry of Education and ITRI, team with universities to develop the
capabilities needed to build specific technological fields in Taiwan. The final aim of all these programs is
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toward academic research and were given wide academic freedom in defining and
pursuing their goals, in Taiwan the universities were viewed mainly as skilled-labor
creating mechanisms. This view is especially evident in the new career path and tenure
regulations. 148 Recently the envisioned role of the universities has somewhat changed,
and the government realizes that the universities should be seen as a key agent in the
development of new technological and innovational capabilities.' 4 9 Nonetheless, the
overarching technological goals of Taiwan are still defined by the state, and the
universities are seen as a subsidiary tool that is used to achieve these aims. The
universities, therefore, are urged to develop their faculty and departments in accordance
with the state's S&T industrial policies. Part of the SoC program is a detailed
development of the technological capability of the university sector, sponsoring eighty-
five new faculty positions in pre-defined sub-fields of specializations.'50
Another example of the state's direct intervention in the industry's technological
development path is the R&D tax incentive program of one of the main governmental
investment vehicles, the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs (IDB). This program gives tax incentives and other benefits only to companies
that make products that are specified in extensive detail by the IDB itself. The products
the creation of a particular industrial sub-sector and products. The expansion of the universities is planned
as a derivative of this industrial objective.
148 As of late 2003 tenure track and career path positions in the Taiwanese universities have been streamed-
lined around the US model (assistant-associate-full professor) with publications being the main criteria for
advancement. In the period preceding, publications were not given such a strong emphasis and career
patterns were less structured. After the creation of Taiwan as a separate entity under the KMT one-party
system, professorships and higher academic administrative roles involved political as well as professional
decision-making processes.
149 Once we take this overarching view of the universities as a factor needed in order to establish the
Taiwanese "techno-national" goals, we can easily understand why the NSC, the agency whose main
responsibility has been to fund and develop academic research, has also been chosen as the agency to
manage and develop the Science-Based Industrial Parks, Hsinchu being the first.
150 Interview with the Minister of State and S&T policy 11/7/2003.
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are gathered in a list based on market research by the IDB every two years. Therefore, the
list does not include truly innovative technologies whose market is unpredictable or does
not yet exist. Moreover, the program specifies that the tax incentives are to be given only
to companies that control the whole production chain, i.e., from the design to the
manufacturing and sales, and only with products that an official described as, "are not in
niche markets that are so innovative that we cannot predict the future so we cannot really
help" (5/28/2001).
There are various other government programs to finance industrial R&D. In fact
several of our interviewees from the major developmental agencies complained that
Taiwan has too many small agencies and programs, each with its own bureaucracy, with
the result a policy hodgepodge and confusion. Of these programs the three that have been
most relevant to the IT industry are the SBIR, the Technology Development Program
(TDP), and the Leading Product Development Program (LPDP), all of which are
sponsored by MoEA Department of Industrial Technology (DOIT). Aside from SBIR,
most programs mainly assist in the development of products that are based on some R&D
effort, disregarding whether they are new to the world markets or not. Most of the grants
to IT hardware companies assist them in pursuing second-generation product innovation,
and do not provide incentives for a riskier approach.
Moreover, although DOIT has been leading the way in fostering more R&D
activities in the private sectors in the last three years, it started to channel grants directly
to private companies only in 1998. DOIT started to channel these resources directly to
industry only after intense lobbying of the industry convinced the government to channel
a small percentage of the funding that was formerly given to the public research
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institutions (ITRI and III) directly to the private industry. l' 5 Both the SBIR and the TDP
are staffed with ITRI personnel who are seconded to the programs. Indeed, according to
our interviewees around 1/3 of the IT companies that are funded through SBIR also have
contract research relationships with ITRI.
These constraints are still more severe in the case of software R&D. For example,
thus far software is not even included in the IDB's tax incentives scheme. During the
interviews many software companies complained that apart from a brief period in the late
1990s, before the latest government budgetary cuts, they have not been able to get any
grants. In addition, the Taiwanese state policy of focusing on specific niches is not
appropriate to the current state of the Taiwanese software industry as its outcome is to
deny many promising software companies access to R&D capital, while hardly
promoting the creation of new companies in the targeted niches. Software companies that
did manage to secure a state grant complained that the bureaucratic regulations forced
them to spend more money on getting the grant than the grant itself. Those that did get
the grants in the late 1990s though, did tell us that, as other sources of financing were
lacking, these grants were critical in helping them to finish their first R&D projects.
In sum, even today government policies define a strict division of labor in R&D
between state and industry. The state assumes control of research and development
activities from screening the technological development path to the creation of prototypes
of specific products. Furthermore, the state focuses on specific technologies up to the
level of particular product specification. Our theoretical approach suggests that the likely
151 The amount DOIT channels directly to the private industry started at about 1% of total DOIT budget in
1998 with $200NT million, and under the new head of DOIT it has been growing steadily both in size and
as a percentage of budget to $2.8NT billion out of a total budget of $17.2NT billion in 2003. For more
about DOIT activities and programs until 2000 see a paper by Chiung-Wen Hsu and Hsueh-Chiao Chiang,
then of ITRI and DOIT respectively (Hsu and Chiang 2001).
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influence of such policies is that private companies have little incentive or scope to
develop innovative R&D capabilities. The end result is the continuation of the same
capability development trajectory that the Taiwanese IT developed so far, focusing on
second-generation innovation, integrated design, and process and manufacturing
innovation.
Analyzing the ways in which the Taiwanese state regulated and interacted with
the financial markets, our theoretical approach suggests that these also strengthen the
tendency of the Taiwanese IT industry to focus on developing only a narrower set of
innovational capabilities. There are two main financial constraints on IT companies that
wish to develop new innovation-based products in Taiwan, one in the beginning of a firm
life, and one toward the end of its development stage. The first constraint is the almost
utter lack of finance in the beginning stages of firms' development process for
technologically cutting edge R&D. The second constraint derives from the fact that the
Taiwanese stock-option system gives enormous advantages to companies that have
already gone public, not only granting them stronger financial capabilities, but also
giving them an almost total stranglehold on hiring the best engineering graduates.
The main cause is Taiwan's employees' stock-option regulations. These prohibit
companies, both public and private, from giving stock options to employees (one of the
main attractions that a cash-starved start-up can offer to entice new employees in the US,
Israel, and Ireland). However, the same regulations allow already-public companies to
give actual stocks (i.e., not an option on the stocks but the stocks themselves) to their
employees at a sharply discounted rate under the "profit sharing system," where the stock
is treated as profit sharing. Moreover, the stock-bonuses are taxable only at the time of
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sale and only on the nominal par value (set by law at $1 ONT per stock no matter what the
stock's market price is), which gives the employees an enormous and tax-free financial
bonus. For example, according to TSMC's annual reports, the average profit per
employee received by TSMC employees through stock per year was more than $1.5NT
million in 1996 and reached more than $2.5NT million in 1998; engineers with a masters
degree earned much more than the average. A CFO of a leading IC design house
calculated that after four years, an engineer with a masters degree will get an annual
bonus worth about $300,000USD; a good annual salary for the same employee stands
today at $18,000USD (IPC interview with IC company's CFO 11/5/2003). Hence, a
graduate of a good university with an advanced degree who wants to become well off
needs only to join an already public company to be virtually assured of reaching that goal
in a few years. Not surprisingly, new private companies find it very difficult to recruit
graduates of the top engineering schools.
Consequently, the regulations regarding employees' stock options in Taiwan
motivate new companies to seek the shortest and surest route to an IPO. In order to go
public on the main exchange, a company needs to display five years of disclosure
statements showing constant profits. 52 Hence, most Taiwanese IT companies use a
business model that assures quick revenues, in contrast to one employed by innovative-
product-based firms that involve incurring a few years of heavy losses during their R&D
152 In an effort to induce younger IT companies as well as software companies to list, new regulations
allowing listing in the secondary exchange were put in place. Some software companies have indeed opted
to use them. However, the young hardware companies and some of the more established software
companies interviewed regarded the use of this option as giving a negative signal to the market, preferring
instead to use the old regulation and list in the main market. In addition, even under the new regulations the
same laws regarding stock options apply, hence, the effect of the new listing regulation is mostly in letting
IT companies go public faster.
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phase before sales. In addition, the state puts significant restrictions that dissuade
companies from having an IPO on a foreign stock exchange.
The VC industry was created as part of an initiative of Dr K.T. Li who viewed
VCs mainly as a missing pool of finance, and not as a distinct industry. 53 Moreover, Dr.
Li's and subsequent governmental initiatives have taken great care to make sure that the
Taiwanese VC industry stays Taiwanese, devoting all their attention to motivating local
investor participation. The main policy with which the state spurs the creation of the VC
industry and maintains its existence are tax credits. In the beginning the industry was
heavily regulated and many of the main VC funds had ties to various KMT investment
vehicles such as Kung-Kwang and Century. As of the end of 2003, according to the
Taiwanese VC association, foreign capital still amounts to less than seven percent.' 54
Looking at private VCs we found that, unlike their Israeli, and even more than
their Irish counterparts, most of them prefer to invest only in the later stages of
development, and only after firms have already proven their success by becoming
profitable. There are several institutional reasons for the conservative behavior of VCs.
First, by law VCs in Taiwan must be registered companies, not limited partnerships. 55
This limits their ability to invest in young companies in two ways: i) as a registered
company a VC is not allowed to invest in a venture that is not already registered, ruling
out true seed funding; ii) as a registered company the VC (that is, the person who acts as
a VC, who in the US and Europe is called the general partner) must submit all his or her
153 On the importance of this distinction, see Avnimelech and Teubal 2003a and Chapter Two of this
dissertation.
154 Interview with TVCA's secretary general, 11/3/2003.
155 The establishment and the specific laws regulating the VC industry are another brainchild of Dr. K.T.
Li, who, after being exposed to the American VC industry, decided that a local VC industry was a critical
component for the development of Taiwan's IT industry in the early 1980s and masterminded its creation
(the industry's official birth year is 1983).
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investment decisions to the board of the VC firm, thus making the VCs more
conservative.
Taiwanese VCs also are more reticent because of the sources of their capital and
the education of the VCs themselves. Most VC funds have strong ties to one individual or
company and operate in accordance with the sponsor's investment strategy, which is
usually more risk-averse and tends to select firms with established business models that
the sponsors can easily understand. This is especially evident in software where most VC
companies do not invest at all.' 56 The VCs themselves are drawn mostly from the
financial industry or the traditional industries. Hence, they do not have intimate
knowledge of IT, and prefer less risky endeavors.
Lastly, but at least as importantly, we must remember that VCs' main aim is to
make profit on their investment in a limited amount of time. The structure and listing
regulations of the Taiwanese Stock Exchange, where most of the exits take place, favor
companies that are already profitable for a few of years.' 57 This, in turn, motivates the
VCs to invest in companies with a business model that is focused on achieving large sales
figures without a long loss-incurring R&D phase. Even when Taiwanese VCs do invest in
young Taiwanese companies, they usually prefer companies that follow the well-trodden
path of producing products based on second-generation technologies with the prospect of
near-term revenues. 58
156 Interview with the Taiwanese VC association, 11/3/2003.
157 The regulation involving the fixed nominal par value of a stock applies also to private companies. While
this does not prevent investors from investing in companies based on changing valuations as they progress
through their business plan, in theory this might increase the transaction costs and the risk associated with
VC investment in Taiwan. Our interviewees, however, did not regard this as an obstacle.
158 Exit refers to the change of ownership in which the VC sells its share in a company and "exits" it.
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The industrial institutional system and the opportunity structure it gives
companies was heavily influenced, on the hardware side, by the explicit Taiwanese S&T
industrial policies aiming to develop an industry supplying critical components and
design and manufacturing services to MNCs. The current innovation system of the IT
industry motivates new companies to pursue known business strategies, and limits the
ability of companies that tries to truly innovate. The Taiwanese system, with the
existence of world leading OEM/ODMs and pureplay foundries, supplies virtually
infinite opportunities for small new companies that follow either the second-generation
innovation or OEM/ODM models. Furthermore, the economic and management skills
that are needed in order to profitably run those kinds of operations are abundant. To use
different words, the Taiwanese industrial system is richly endowed in the "specific
economic competencies" needed to succeed in second generation innovation-based
design and OEM/ODM operations (Carlsson 1995; Carlsson and Eliason 1994).
The whole Taiwanese system of innovation is primed to give private companies
constant access to new technologies from abroad. In the last few years this kind of
technology channeling became one of ITRI's main roles. ITRI, especially its computer
and communication lab (CCL), has changed from being the leader and initiator of the
industry, especially in semiconductor, into being a supporting actor in the 1990s, mostly
as the main R&D services provider in the industrial system as well as an important
channel for foreign technology. For example, the answer that each and every IC design
company interviewed gave to the question of whether there is any company that conducts
technological cutting-edge R&D was that the only organization in Taiwan involved in
these activities is ITRI and its CCL lab. Top officials of CCL attest to the fact that CCL is
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only too aware as to the affect that its technology transfer programs and this division of
labor has on the incentives of private industry to develop original product innovation
capabilities.
On the other hand, a company that wants to innovate faces significant obstacles,
from the lack of finance, the difficulty in recruiting highly skilled personnel, and the
relative scarcity of business and management skills to run a Silicon-Valley-like operation.
All of these problems are also augmented by the fact that if geographical proximity to
both their customers and suppliers helps companies to either sell to, or become an,
OEM/ODM company, their distance, both physical and cultural, from their main market
for innovative products, the US, makes their operation more complex and more
expensive.
In software the unsuccessful approach of III and the industry's stagnated growth
have strengthen our hypothesis that unlike the preaching of the old development school, a
too heavy handed intervention by the state without a dialogue with private industry will
not lead to industrial growth. The Taiwanese software sector shows that in the case of
RIB industries attempts by the state not only to lead the industry, but also to be the
industry are doomed. III is a clear case of not only wrong positioning of the
developmental agency, but of a failure of the developmental agency to manage the co-
evolution processes and the unavoidable diminishing of its own power with the growth of
private industry. The divergent paths of the software industry and III, and the hardware
industry and ITRI, strengthen our argument that structure and timing alone are not the
explanation: the sectoral politics of co-evolution are.
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However, while III has played an inhibiting role in the development of the
software industry there are also other reasons for the particular development path taken
by this sector.' 59 First, one of Taiwan's main industries has been PC manufacturing, and
each of those companies was also busily producing software for its own machines, and
hence, preventing the development of a large standardized market that could support
independent product-oriented software firms. Second, until the early nineties, partly due
to internal competition within the state apparatus and III failure, there were no standards
for Chinese input/output and internal conversion (Noble 1998). This spurred many
companies to produce Chinese programs of the equivalent popular English packages, all
of which were practically wiped out as soon as the western companies published a
Chinese version of their package. The third reason is that neither the private hardware
industry nor the government saw software as an independent industry but as a service
component needed by other industries. This handicapped the industry in two ways: first,
software has never been on an equal footing with hardware in the competition for
government budget and grants; and, second, software companies had difficulties selling
pure software solutions for reasonable prices in the market.
The software industry has also suffered acutely from the lack of capital. Until the
advent of the Internet, VCs were unwilling to invest at all in pure software companies
unless they were already well established. Even today software has a more difficult time
securing VC finance than does hardware, as many interviewees in the VC industry, the
Taiwanese VC association, and software companies pointed out. As for public finance,
for many years pure software product development did not receive any grants. Even
159 Indeed in a remarkable contrast to ITRI, apart from the two companies that are direct and official spin-
offs of III, our research did not find a software company that regarded III as even somewhat helpful.
222
today, software is not included in the IDB's tax incentive scheme. For these reasons
many of the older software companies, facing virtual exclusion from big projects, have
branched out into other areas of operation, some of which have nothing to do with
software such as the distribution of gift packages. Thus, unlike their counterparts in the
IC design subsector, many of the Taiwanese software companies have suffered from a
lack of focus and an inability to concentrate enough resources, management and capital,
on R&D. The one subsector that proved to be nimble, innovative, and successful during
the 1980s and 1990s was video games.
Starting in the late 1990s, with the rapid growth and growing sophistication of the
IT hardware industry in Hsinchu Park, III activities dissuading new companies from
working on big business applications, and the growing skill base and sophistication in
computer science in Taiwan, a new cohort of companies that are much more
technologically oriented has appeared. Some of these companies have already managed
to become global competitors in their niches and a few more seem poised to do so. These
companies and the video games sector have had very little to do with III. In sum, the
software industry, unlike the IT hardware industry, has not been able to transform itself
into a successful exporter and a global competitor. What has been achieved has taken
place in spite of, rather than because of, the government's main agency, III.
Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the development of the Taiwanese IT industry. The analysis
showed that there have been major differences in both the development and state-industry
interactions between the hardware and the software sectors of the industry. The IT
hardware sector developed rapidly and successfully. In some specific subsectors and
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stages of production, the Taiwanese industry has either become the world's leader or
number two after the US. In contrast, the software industry growth was stagnant. There is
no subsector, production stage, or even product niche in which Taiwan's software
industry is considered to be a major global player.
The differences in state's policies and state-industry co-evolution occurred even
when, from the formal structural perspective, the Taiwanese state followed a very similar
pattern in its sectoral policy in both cases - the creation of a public research institution as
the focal R&D and policy coordination vehicle. Nevertheless, in the hardware sector in
both the case of the creation of a new industry, semiconductor, and in the case of
upgrading an existing industry, electronic OEM/ODMs, ITRI's behavior was an almost
ideal case of state-industry co-evolution. In software, however, III very quickly moved
into an adverse relationship with the private industry, a position it holds to this day.
In both cases, semiconductor, and electronics OEM/ODMs upgrading, ITRI at
first took a leading role and then slowly but surely divested itself from it and assumed the
role of a supporting actor giving the industry more decision making scope to manage its
own future. III, on the other hand, rapidly, by and large because of the conflicting
agendas given to it by the government, moved to secure itself as the biggest software
house and IT consultancy in Taiwan. From this position, III could not but view the
private industry as a competitor, rather than as the community it strives to serve. In
addition, due to its conflicting interests, III has never been able to play the important role
of research consortia coordinator and convener. These adverse relations with, and
inability to see, the private software industry as its real customer remains to this day,
when III itself realizes that it needs to change under mounting pressure from both
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government and private industry. The inability of III to envision its role as a supporting
actor for the private software industry is vividly demonstrated in the remark given by one
of III's top executives when asked about the future of III, "Our new goal is that we aim to
be the Accenture of IT of Taiwan, not to code the projects by ourselves." 160 Thus, III still
views itself as a for profit consultancy looking for projects on the national level, not as a
public research institution helping the private software industry to develop.
The role of the Taiwanese state in the development of the IT industry, in both
hardware and software, strengthens our hypothesis about the ways in which the state can
successfully promote RIB industries. It also strengthens our main contention about the
new developmental state theories. It is not the state that is either a neo-developmental or
not; the story of the Taiwanese IT industry shows that the same state can be both. The
answer lies in the politics that decides the particular ways in which the state tries to
implement its vision for the creation of a new innovation-based industry, and in the
politics of state-industry relations and co-evolution processes that evolve as the industry
grows.
If the state's responsible agencies, as in the case of ITRI and the hardware
industry, have as their main goal the development of the private industry, and are able to
manage the transformation of their own positions as part of the state-industry co-
evolution process, then the state can successfully play a key role in the development of
the industry. If, however, as in the case of III, the state's responsible agencies, even when
organized in a structurally similar way and managed from above by the same leadership,
do not see the development of the private industry as their primary goal, and are not
160 Interview with III executives 11/7/2003.
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willing to relinquish their leading position, then the same state that so successfully
developed one industry can be one of the main causes for the stagnation of another.
Looking on our second set of arguments on R&D capability creation, the decision
of the state to build public research institutions as its main policy vehicle crystallized a
specific division of labor in R&D between public agencies and private industry. In this
division of labor the public agencies focus on R&D and the private companies focus on
final development and integrated design. It is important to note how deeply this division
of labor runs and how much the R&D scope of Taiwanese companies is limited. From
the most basic levels of R&D-related decisions it is the state that took responsibility for
screening and capabilities development decisions. State officials compile detailed lists
defining products up to the level of feature specifications, and only companies willing to
develop them will be entitled to R&D incentives. State officials also make decisions
about future research fields. In case of national projects, such as SoC, once decisions
about research and specific products have been made, it will be the public research
institutions that will develop technologies and the first prototypes and only then transfer
the results to the private industry.
In such a system both the scope and the resources granted to private firms to
conduct R&D are limited. There are no incentives for private companies to develop their
own sophisticated R&D, technological screening, or product innovation skills and
capabilities. Companies in the Taiwanese IT industrial system are by and large motivated
to specialize in final product development and integrated design. The scope that the state
grants for private companies to participate and develop skills and capabilities in
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applicative, not to mention generic or basic, research is extremely restricted. 61 As a
result the private industry in Taiwan developed limited R&D and technological screening
skills, with almost no attempt to develop new-product innovation capabilities.
These effects have been reinforced by the behavior of private investors in Taiwan.
The conservative behavior of private investors and venture capitalists in Taiwan limit
resources available to firms that try to employ extensive product R&D business models
and channel large amounts of capital to firms that follow a second-generation innovation
or OEM/ODM business model. This is a direct result of two things. The first cause is the
way in which the VC industry was created and regulated in Taiwan. Of particular are: the
needs of VC funds to register as companies, and be regulated as such, and the fact that
almost all of the funds are raised in Taiwan. The second cause is the way in which both
public listing of companies and stock options are regulated. Taken together these supply
strong incentives to follow investment strategies that limit risk and uncertainty, and
consequently, the scope of R&D. Accordingly, the institutional settings of the financial
system in Taiwan do not support business strategies that necessitate high level of original
R&D to be taken by private firms.
In addition, the business structure of the Taiwanese industry, specifically the
relationship between MNCs and local companies, presents both established companies
and entrepreneurs with an extensive opportunities to supply the global IT production
network with components as well as manufacturing and integrated design services. On
the other hand, it does not present companies that wish to develop original innovative
161 It is important to remember, though, that overall industrial R&D resources, in contrast to the resources
channeled to original product innovation R&D activities of private firms, are relatively high in Taiwan
even if prioritized by governmental decisions. Hence, overall resources are much higher, for example, than
in Ireland.
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products with the same. Again it was the state that constructed these relationships with
the MNCs and employed a strategy of developing the local industry as a supplier of
components, manufacturing, and design services. This strategy was employed from the
early 1960s, and continues to be employed today. The state R&D efforts have all been
aimed at the creation of an industry with exactly these capabilities.
In sum, in analyzing development of the Taiwanese IT industry we found our
theoretical approach to assist us in giving a comprehensive explanation of the Taiwanese
IT industrial development experience. We can now understand the industry's position in
the global production networks, its successes and failures, and its unique strengths,
weaknesses, and limits.
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Chapter Four - A Misunderstood "Miracle" - The State and the Growth of
the IT Industry in Ireland
"Trying to induce private entrepreneurship in Ireland during the 1980s made me feel like I was part of the
old lobsterjoke: A young man goes to the beach, he sees an oldfisherman with two untied lobsters in a
very low bucket. He comes to the fisherman and tells him, "Sir, your lobsters are not tied and the bucket is
very low, you have to tie them or they will run away. " And the fisherman answers, "Dear lad, do not
worry, these are Irish Lobsters! As soon as one of them almost makes it to freedom the otherjumps and
drags him back down. "
A former executive of the IDA's Enterprise Development Plan.
Introduction
If there has been a great transformation in international perception of national
economic performance in the 1990s it has been the case of Ireland. As late as 1995, the
common perception of Ireland's economic performance was one of a continuous failure,
which dooms Ireland to always be the basket case of Europe (Guiomard 1995).162 Less
than four years later, sick Ireland seemed to have become the roaring Celtic Tiger
(Breathnach 1998; MacSharry and White 2001; O'Hearn 1998; Sweeny 1999). Irish
software companies such as Iona in middleware, Smartforce and Riverdeep in education,
or Trintech and Baltimore in data security not only achieved global success, but also
made their founders and many of their employees rich when they publicly listed on
NASDAQ. This success made software the first industry in Irish history to create such a
virtuous cycle of entrepreneurship, and helped to transform even the Irish perception of
themselves.
Indeed, Ireland has become the most invigorated economy of Western Europe, a
model for the EU's new entrants, and one of the world's most successful IT industries.
This achievement has been attributed largely to the Irish developmental agencies that
promoted this accelerated growth utilizing a series of industrial and S&T policy
162 As late as 1989, Ireland lost 1.1% of its population to emigration. Indeed, even today the Irish
population is still less than 50% of the eight million strong it was before the great famine of 1845-1850.
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initiatives. Moreover, this impressive feat has been achieved while both politicians and
bureaucrats have strongly adhere to a neo-liberal interventionalist ideology; a
development ideology significantly different from Israel's or the Taiwan's.
However, even a brief analysis of the Irish IT industry reveals dissonance
between the operations of the foreign multi-national corporations (MNC) and the
indigenous industry. On one hand, the MNCs, a cornerstone of Irish industrial policy
since the 1950s, are thriving and delivering great economic growth. Dell, an American
MNC, has just surpassed Microsoft, another American MNC, and became the biggest
Irish exporter, single-handedly responsible for 5.8% of Irish GDP in 2003.63 This is an
impressive statistic, and shows that even with rising costs, Ireland is still central to the
global strategy of leading IT MNCs. However, both Dell and Microsoft, together
equaling about ten percent of Irish GDP, have very few high added value activities, such
as R&D or product design, in Ireland. This leads many commentators to suspect that
behind the impressive Irish GDP and trade figures lies even more impressive
showmanship of transfer pricing accounting, utilizing Ireland's low corporate tax regime
and the availability of well-educated labor force.164
On the other hand, in the indigenous sector, it is the software industry that has
reached global prominence, not the hardware and electronic manufacturing sector favored
by the Irish FDI-based policy. Furthermore, while the state claims great credit in
sponsoring the growth of the software sector, it has started to sponsor it systematically
only after a few Irish-owned companies achieved global success. Lastly, these state
163 At around $8 billion, Dell's 2003 annual revenues alone equaled the combined value of the Irish tourism
and agriculture sectors.
164 Transfer pricing refers to the internal trade accounting techniques that MNCs use in order to record most
of their profits within units/subsidiaries situated in the most favorable corporate tax regimes.
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programs appeared to suffer from a slight misconception in regards to their goals and
methods, especially in the last four years.' 65 The result is that the industry's growth was
brought to almost a complete halt since 2001, with almost no new companies managing
to shore up annual revenues of more than $2 million.
Nonetheless, Ireland's state-led transformation from a country in which, in the
1950s had the least educated workforce in Western Europe, to one of the world's top IT
producers in the end of the 1990s, is nothing but miraculous. What are the causes behind
this transformation? What enabled Ireland, the laggard of Western Europe, to become the
EU's IT industry "shining light" in the time span of one generation? Lastly, what are the
weaknesses, strengths, and generalizability of the Irish experience?
This chapter analyzes and explains this transformation utilizing our theoretical
framework. Throughout this analysis I make the following arguments: first, both the IT
industry and the Irish S&T industrial policies evolved within a political system in which
the state has had one overarching goal -job creation - a significantly different
circumstance than in Israel and Taiwan. This led to a specific process of state-industry
co-evolution with markedly different outcomes, than these of Taiwan and Israel, in terms
of the IT industry's capabilities, structure, and position within the global production
networks.
The focus on job creation led the Irish state, following an ideology of "neo-liberal
interventionalism," to develop an FDI-based industrialization policy. The Irish neo-
liberal interventionalist ideology is based on two conflicting principles around which the
165 One significant result of such missteps is the fact that in 2001, with the Irish VC industry managing
record levels of capital, there were only three seed investments, which together equaled $750,000USD.
Hence, at the same time that state-led efforts increased the amounts of IT-designated funding to their
highest levels ever, the formation rate of new IT firms dropped to almost zero.
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Irish state has been formulating its economic and industrial policies since 1958. On one
side, the state, in both the government and the developmental agencies levels, possesses a
strong free-market ideology. On the other side, it also sees a large role for government in
enhancing the competitiveness of Ireland and strategically managing its growth. This
ideology is radically different than Israel's and Taiwan's where the state's ideology, until
very recently, was a variant of market-socialism.
The state, led, from the late 1950s until the early 1990s, by the specifically
created autonomous governmental agency - the Industrial Development Authority (IDA)
- was focusing its attention on bringing MNCs to open manufacturing plants in Ireland
and on upgrading the physical and educational infrastructure. Throughout this period the
Irish state paid relatively little attention to the development of industrial R&D activities
in general and indigenous IT industry in particular.' 66 Moreover, the state, true to its neo-
liberal ideology, did not apply pressure on the MNCs to embed with the local industry. 67
This lack of interest in the particular needs of rapid-innovation-based industry, coupled
with only minimal attempts of the IDA to nurture, embed itself, and network with Irish-
owned industry, hurt the early development of the Irish IT industry, in particular the
hardware sector.
166 The autonomous IDA, building on its ability to lure MNCs and its domain over what was widely
perceived as a key issue -job creation - grew to wield immense power of policy formulation and
implementation over all issues of industrial and economic development until the 1990s. Hence, between the
1950s and the early 1990s, the IDA was a true pilot agency with sway over the actions of many other
agencies Chibber 2002; Johnson 1982.
167 As will be discussed later, in the early 1990s the structure of the developmental agencies was changed
and after several reorganizations IDA, or IDA-Ireland, is now the acronym of Industrial Development
Agency Ireland and no longer of the Industrial Development Authority. IDA Ireland is an autonomous
government agency responsible solely for FDI industrial policy. Hence, it is a very different and much less
powerful agency than the original IDA in its heyday. Currently the structure of industrial developmental
agencies consists of Enterprise Ireland (EI), which is responsible for the indigenous industry, and IDA-
Ireland, which is responsible for the FDI-based industry. Both agencies are nominally under the auspices of
Forfas, which is responsible for strategic planning in regard to industrial development. The three are semi-
autonomous public agencies under the Ministerial Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment.
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Even in the 1980s and 1990s, after the IDA and its successors, Forfas, IDA-
Ireland, and Forbrait/Enterprise Ireland, started their active involvement in the creation of
the indigenous IT industry, they were neither technologically savvy or deeply embedded
within the IT industry, nor, for many years, did they view indigenous IT industry
development as a particular problem of creating rapid-innovation-based industry.
Industrial policy has been planned as a derivative of the goal to enhance employment
through the creation and growth of enterprises broadly defined. Only in 1991, when
industry pressure and the availability of EU funds led to the creation of a new specific
sub-unit within the IDA, the National Software Directorate, whose employees were
recruited directly from industry, did the state start to pay continuous attention to the
particular needs of R&D-based IT industry. Yet still the policy focused almost solely on
software.
Accordingly, my second argument is that the case of the indigenous IT hardware
industry in Ireland has been a clear case of stage one failure - the inability or
unwillingness of the state to facilitate and participate in the growth of the indigenous
hardware sector and its networks.'6 8
Interestingly, software was the recipient of focused state policy specifically
because it was defined as a tradable service and not as an industry. During the 1980s,
with Ireland once again in severe economic crisis, the IDA changed its policies in a few
critical domains. One of the changes was to step up the indigenous-industry-oriented
activity with the creation of the Enterprise Development Program (EDP). The second
change was to create a new focus on tradable services on both the indigenous and FDI-
168 The National Software Directorate was moved into Forbrait and then Enterprise Ireland after the two
agencies were created. It is now called the National Informatics Directorate. An ill-fated predecessor, called
the National Software Center, operated on a much smaller scale within the IDA from 1984-1988.
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based sides of its operations, with software quickly becoming the prominent sector of this
new policy. 16 9 However, seen as a service, these policies did not take into full account the
particular needs of the software sector as an R&D-intensive industry. S&T industrial
policies were enacted only after the industry achieved worldwide success.
In this chapter, I present the history of the co-evolution of Ireland's S&T
industrial policies, the particular growth pattern of the industry, and the state role in this
growth. I first give an overview of Ireland's early economic history as a background. It is
important to show how the development of the IT industry was profoundly influenced by
the nature of the Irish bureaucracy, the historic relationships with Britain, the continuous
economic crisis and large emigration, and the development of the neo-liberal-
interventionalist ideology. The next section analyzes the decisions that led in the 1950s to
the creation of the IDA, the IDA's early years, and its policy changes in the early 1980s.
Following this account, I examine the growth of indigenous IT industry, first hardware
and then software, by evaluating the intricate co-evolution process between state policies
and industry's development, the changing roles of the various developmental agencies, as
well as the particular division of labor that evolved between the local and the global
industry, and between public research institutions and private firms. The last section
investigates the industry's development in the 1990s, the influence of a new set of
policies and bureaucratic structure, the ways in which these policies, in turn, were
influenced by the industry's evolution, and the industry's current strengths and
weaknesses. The chapter ends by offering several conclusions about the current and
future state of the Irish IT industry.
169 Consequently, as will be described in detail, the indigenous hardware industry, never the focus of
targeted policies, continues to face severe disadvantages vis-a-vis both the indigenous software companies
and the hardware MNCs.
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Historical Background and the Beginning of the IT industry
After gaining independence, the Republic of Ireland passed through two almost
complete U-turns in its industrial policy, and a subtler, but arguably at least as important
transformation since the beginning of the 1990s. Starting with its independence in 1921
and for the first decade of its existence, after conceding to England most of the industrial
base, which was concentrated in the Northern counties around Belfast, the Irish republic
was almost solely an agriculture-based economy. Led by William T. Cosgrave of the
Cumann Na nGael party, the newly established republic followed an economic policy
focusing solely on the agriculture sector, and was fiercely free trade in its economic
ideology. Patrick Hogan, the then Minister for Agriculture, is famous for describing this
policy as "helping the farmer who helped himself and letting all the rest go to the devil"
(Haughton 2000). The main elements of this policy were: free trade, parity of the Irish
currency with the English Sterling, low taxes, and low and modest government spending
and intervention. This policy gave the Irish an almost unbeatable claim to the title of the
most conservative revolutionaries in history.' 70
In 1932, in the midst of the global depression, staging a major political
transformation in Ireland, Fianna-Fail - the republican or nationalist party - won the
elections. 171 Fianna Fail, led by Eamon de Valera with Sean Lemass serving by his side
as Minister for Industry and Commerce, made the first complete reconstruction of
Ireland's economic policy and devised a highly nationalistic policy based on the ideal of
170 For more on the Irish economic history see, Haughton 2000; Kennedy 1989; O'Gr'ada 1997.
171 Two center right parties have been dominating the Irish political system: Fianna-Gael and Fianna-Fail.
The main difference between the two has been that Fianna-Fail, the Republican Party, until very recently
did not officially accept the political separation of the Irish Island. Since 1932, Fianna-Fail has managed to
secure its position as the largest party and has been in power for most of the period. This makes Ireland a
one-party dominated political system for most of the period of its early industrialization, similarly to Israel
and Taiwan.
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an autarkic market. Free trade was abolished, high tariffs were put in place, and a proxy
economic war was waged for a very high economic price against England over land
annuities. While some debate still exists on whether these economic policies were truly
damaging to Ireland or only slightly so, one fact remains clear. The economic gap
between Ireland and the UK grew, and so did the gap between the North of Ireland and
the Irish Republic. Moreover, net emigration continued at an alarming pace and an
overall pessimism about the future of the republic as an independent state was deeply
felt. 172 At that time, at the request of Sean Lemass, who became Prime Minister -
Taoiseach - after de Valera, Ken Whitaker, Ireland's most prominent civil servant and
the general secretary of the Ministry of Finance, published in 1958 Ireland's first
comprehensive economic policy document - the celebrated Economic Policy (SO 1958a).
In this report, Whitaker devises the main points that continue to shape Irish
economic policy to this day: export-oriented industrial policy tied with free trade and
conceptualization of Ireland's main economic threat as severe unemployment leading to
alarming large net emigration.'73 The publication of Whitaker's Economic Policy also
marks the crystallization of the Irish neo-liberal interventionalist ideology. The main goal
of the first economic program and of all those that followed has been job creation. Since
1958, there have been three basic elements in Irish economic policy: provision of
economic incentives and low corporate tax rates to induce industrial development and
172 By 1961 the Republic population was only 2.8 million, compared with 3.1 million in 1921 and 8 million
before the great famine of 1845-50.
173 Emigration was so severe that it led the Irish government to organize special committees on the subject,
and some observers, most notably John O'Brien in the edited 1953 volume, The Vanishing Irish,
questioned at the time the viability of Ireland as an independent state (O'Brien 1953). In the 1958 economic
program which followed Whitaker's report the government described Ireland's main problem: "Production
has not been increasing fast enough to provide employment and acceptable living standards for growing
number of our people; large-scale emigration has been accompanied by a high level of unemployment.
Emigration will not be checked nor will unemployment be permanently reduced until the rate of increase in
national output is greatly accelerated" (SO 1958b. Italics added).
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investment, transition to free trade, and - the main cornerstone of Irish industrial policy
until the mid 1990s - attracting MNCs (mostly American) to locate export-oriented
manufacturing activities in Ireland. The most important vehicle for institutionalizing this
policy was the strengthening of the IDA, the Industrial Development Authority, as an
autonomous agency responsible for job creation through industrialization. The IDA
mandate was to create more jobs with the aim of decreasing the cost per job created
through time.
While not focusing on the MNCs sector in its inception, FDI-based
industrialization quickly became the main focus of the IDA and the Irish industrial
policy. Using the yardstick of job creation, one can understand the lure of bringing large
corporations that could promise the almost instantaneous creation of substantial and
quantifiable number of jobs, a situation in which employment creation-tied grants make
sense to both parties.174 The IDA rapidly grew in its importance and influence throughout
the years and transformed itself into a full "one-stop shop" for attracting and locating
MNCs.
In doing so the IDA utilized a double strategy. On one side targeting and
approaching MNCs, employing a wide array of techniques to befriend their senior
executives, the IDA operated as a marketing agency that sold "Ireland" to MNCs,
especially in the USA. The IDA quickly established a network of foreign offices whose
job was to create long-term relationships with companies (many times when these
174 The IDA, and Enterprise Ireland after it, have been using employment grant mechanisms as one of their
main vehicles for direct financial aid. The agency and its client corporation agree on the number of jobs to
be created and the agency awards the corporation a specific amount of capital per new job. The almost
obsessive attention with which job creation and destruction has been followed in Ireland is evident reading
Irish newspapers. The exact number of jobs created or discontinued still appears in the title of all articles
dealing with the fortune of foreign (and many local) companies, even if the main thrust of the article deals
with other issues.
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companies were still in their early growth phase) that would eventually result in these
companies opening their European facilities in Ireland. The IDA quickly moved to target
sectors and internally employed a set of targets based on the number of jobs created and
companies moved in each sector.
On the second side, the IDA was busily orchestrating the construction of the
infrastructural and financial benefits Ireland could offer to the incoming MNCs. Ireland,
like Taiwan, claims to be the first state to open a duty-free export processing zone, in
Shannon in 1958. Moreover, soon thereafter many of these tax incentives were applied to
the whole republic. In 1958, the Export Profit Tax Relief provided 100% tax relief on
export profit growth, i.e., 100% for new export-oriented facilities. In the beginning, these
policies were similar to Taiwan's. However, in 1964, the neo-liberal-interventionalist
ideology of Ireland sharply moved Ireland down a different path. All restrictions on
foreign ownership and reparation of profits were eliminated, no pressures were put on
MNCs to source locally, and the idea of demanding, or even asking, MNCs to transfer
knowledge to local component suppliers was not even floated.
As part of making itself into a one-stop shop for MNCs, the IDA became the
biggest industrial land developer and owner in Ireland, and took it upon itself to cater to
the needs of the MNCs even after they had already moved to Ireland, representing their
interests within the Irish state. Unlike local enterprises, MNCs coming to Ireland have
been offered land, complete factories, and one centralized agency that represents the
MNCs in all their dealings with other state and local agencies.
The IDA reached the zenith of its power in the 1980s. Not only was the IDA
formally semi-independent (defined as a public agency, it was not part of the civil
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service), which allowed it to act as a bridge between other governmental ministries and
departments, but its policy domain also included everything that related to industrial
development broadly defined. Its strong political connection to MNCs and responsibility
over local industry gave it an immense political clout. This was especially true in the
period until the early 1990s when the IDA was seen as effective in job creation - the
national mission at the time.
The fact that the IDA was: i) responsible for the recruitment of MNCs; as well as
ii) one of the largest landowners in Ireland was especially important. In the context of the
Irish electoral system, a single-transferable-vote system where Ireland is divided into
districts each electing three to five members of the Dail, the IDA was perceived to have
significant influence on MNCs' ultimate location decision within Ireland, and
accordingly, was seen as able to shape the economic future of specific districts. To
further enhance its political muscle, the IDA was actively organizing the local managers
of the MNCs into coherent lobbying group around its policy initiatives (O'Riain 1999).
The IDA also benefited by having internal cohesion and extremely high-skilled
personnel. The agency recruited the top high school graduates into a long career pattern
within it, in which they were also given opportunities to acquire higher education. Hence,
it was stuffed with highly-skilled, very motivated, and extremely loyal personnel who
were able to use the IDA's semi-independence to make the agency into a crucial policy-
entrepreneur, by utilizing the structural holes of the Irish bureaucracy to connect different
organizations with weak social ties, and through which, to attain the IDA's own goals
(Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973).
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This policy turnaround, coupled with the MNC-focused industrial policy,
followed by membership in the European Community since 1973, and entry into the
European Monetary System in 1979 led to relative economic growth until the 1980s.
However, while manufacturing output growth was quite stable throughout the years,
employment growth stayed slow and even took a dip in the 1980s. Moreover, the
aggregation of macro-level figures hides a negative facet of Irish economic performance
until the 1990s: the huge jobs' turnaround, i.e., number of job lost, especially in Irish-
owned firms.' 75
Building the Human Infrastructure - The Build-up of the Irish Education System
At the same time Ireland was passing through a much more subtle transformation,
a change arguably at least as important as any for the future growth of the IT industry.
Within two generations Ireland went from being the West European country possessing
the least educated workforce to a nation with one of the most highly educated workforces
in the world.
Until 1966, less than 50% of the Irish population enjoyed education above the 6 th
grade. However, that situation quickly changed after the Minister of Education, Donogh
O'Malley, following a heated debate started by a 1965 OECD sponsored survey,
Investment in Education, decided by decree that second level education was to be given
free to all Irish children. While publicly Lemass conveyed utter surprise at the
O'Malley's move, some argue that O'Malley had the blessing of Lemass who wanted
second level education to be granted to all Irish youth and knew that he better circumvent
175 For an assessment and historical description of Ireland's industrial policy, see O'Sullivan 2000a;
O'Sullivan 2000b. For a critique of Ireland's FDI-oriented industrial policy now and then, see (O'Hearn
1998).
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a public debate in which the Ministry of Finance might delay or prevent this change from
taking place. In an interview, Ken Whitaker strengthened this assumption stating how he,
representing the Ministry of Finance, felt a need to protest only to find that Lemass was
not only approving of O'Malley's "surprise" decree, but was quite prepared for it. 176
The OECD influence was also critical in the early 1960s in the establishment of
the regional technical colleges - which have been recently upgraded to Institutes of
Technologies (OECD 1965; OECD 1969). This was the first in a series of changes that
overhauled the Irish higher education system, first in the 1960s and continuing in more
vigorous fashion in the 1980s after the IDA included education policy in its overall view
of the supply side of Irish industrial policy. 17 7 In the 1950s only 33% of Irish school
leavers finished secondary education and only 10% had any experience of third level
education.'78 By the mid-1990s these levels grew to 80% and 50% respectively, and the
percentage of under 28-year-olds attending college in Ireland is one of the highest among
OECD countries (Breathnach 1998).
The role of the IDA in this transformation was immense. In the 1980s, when its
FDI-attracting focus changed from manufacturing activities to more technologically-
advanced activities in general and the IT industry in particular, the IDA realized that
Ireland needed a much more technologically-skilled workforce in order to attract the
MNCs it targeted. Using its influence, the IDA first managed to bridge the gap between
the universities and the government that delayed the improvement of the higher education
system, especially research, for more than a decade. This feud between UCD and Trinity,
176 Interview with Ken Whitaker 9/3/2003.
177 For a detailed account of the development of the Irish Higher Education system, see White 2001.
178 Higher education in Ireland was such a rare opportunity in the 1960s, that virtually none of the civil
servants in the Ministry of Education dealing with higher education policy was a university graduate
(White 2001. Pp. 41-42.)
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the two prominent Dublin-based universities, and the Irish government, began in the
1960s. The government tried to force the merger of the two institutions and to establish a
firmer control over the merged entity. The plan was quickly abandoned but animosity
between the political elite and the two leading Irish universities remained until the 1980s.
In retrospect, this bungled move by the government was one of the most important to the
creation of the Irish software industry. Immediately after the government announced the
plan, under which Trinity's engineering faculty was to disband and move to UCD, Trinity
moved to counter it by creating and rapidly expanding a new engineering department of
Computer Science in 1969. UCD followed suit by expanding its own Computer Science
program located in the sciences. These two departments became crucial to the
development of the Irish IT industry in later years.
Secondly, the IDA also managed to accelerate changes that upgraded the whole
education system. Within a decade and a half the regional technical colleges became full-
fledged academic establishments, the National University of Ireland system was
expanded, and a few more higher education institutions became full-fledged universities
(White 2001).179
There were major differences between the Irish education system and policies and
these of Israel and Taiwan. Education in Ireland was seen as an economic supply-side
issue, and consequently the system's main aim was to create high-skilled labor that could
work for the incoming MNCs. 80 Indeed, even today if a regional college wishes to open
a new degree course, it has to show that the industries around it not only want these
179 In addition to opening the new facilities and institutions, the state has also been using its control of
university slot allocation to steer students toward engineering and technology courses.
180 A spell as interns in various workplaces is still often an integral part of the education in the RTCs/RITs
and other, non-university, parts of the Irish higher education system.
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skills, but also approve the specific curricula offered. Many of the managers of the large
MNCs interviewed, such as Intel, Digital, or Ericsson, talked at length about the
involvement of their corporation in the development of the nearby colleges' course of
studies.' 8
In one important respect, academic research, Ireland is still far behind, Israel,
Taiwan, or most OECD countries only very recently does a small positive change appear
to have occurred.'82 In the 1970s the state supplied, at about £27 million, very minimal
resources for academic R&D, but during the financial crisis in the 1980s even that
amount went down sharply to almost nothing. EU grants became the main source of
capital. Only in the mid-1990s with the looming future expansion of the EU did policy
makers and politician realize that Ireland must upgrade its R&D capabilities if it were to
compete with the Eastern-European countries for MNCs.
These developments triggered the establishment of Science Foundation Ireland
(SFI) and the Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions (PRTLI) in 1988.183
SFI has been built on a similar basis to the American NSF. Indeed its director general,
William Harris, an American of Irish origin, was formerly a director of one of the NSF
divisions. SFI was envisioned as a five-year targeted effort to create high-quality research
in the areas of biotechnology and ICT, but this focus was somewhat expanded. The SFI
also continues another reoccurring theme of Irish economic policies: there is an
intentional bias to award grants for teams who are led by foreign-based internationally
renowned researchers. The argument behind this partiality has been that Ireland needs to
18' For a paper trying to measure the economic effect of the expanding education system, see Durkan et al.
1999.
182 See, NSB 2000. Figures 6-55 to 6-61.
183 Interview with Don Thornhill Chairman of the Higher Education Authority 2/4/2002.
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attract high-quality researchers if it wants to conduct top-level research. While Ireland
has the advantage over Israel and Taiwan of being a highly developed English speaking
country with high-quality of living that can attract foreign talent, others argue that this
move symbolizes the inability of the Irish state to trust its own citizens. As of 2004, SFI
budget for its first period of operation, 2000-2006, is £646 million (SFI 2004).
PRLTI is the twin effort of SFI and its main aim is to enable the building of the
necessary research infrastructure within the university system. PRLTI allocates its funds
on a competitive basis. As of 2004 the PRLTI had three multi-year funding cycles. It was
envisioned as a state-industry initiative. As of 2004, not including private contributions,
605 million were allocated (HEA 2004).
By establishing these two programs in 1998 the Irish state indicated its
seriousness about transforming the academic research infrastructure. However, there are
still many caveats as to the continuous state support for SFI and its medium and long-
term influence. Moreover, even when finally moving to upgrade the Irish research
apparatus, the Irish state still employs an FDI-orientation, for example in its insistence on
the participation of foreign-based scientists. Hence, questions remain as to whether the
goal of the SFI is a genuine attempt to change the Irish economy capabilities toward
rapid-innovation-based industrialization, or just the last stage of supply-side policies to
create MNC-attracting human capital.
Thus, although the development of the Irish education system is unprecedented in
Irish history and has greatly helped to propel Ireland along the track of high skilled IT
industrial development, it appears that the strategic view behind these developments
treated the education mainly as a way to produce high skilled labor, and not innovation
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and research. Only in the last five years policies with a vision of making the Irish higher
education system more research-oriented have been implemented.
Seeds of the IT Industry - From the 1960s to the Early 1980s
Throughout the same period the seeds of the future IT industry in Ireland were
planted. In both the public and the private sectors, computerization activities that would
eventually give birth to the Irish-owned IT industry were taking place. The official
beginning of computerization in Ireland was in 1958. In that year Suicra - the Irish Sugar
Company (a state owned enterprise) - decided to computerize its operations and brought
the first computer to Ireland.'8 4 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, big public and
private companies and organizations were the main loci of professional IT training and
knowledge diffusion, especially as formal third-level education was beyond the means of
most young high-school graduates at the time, and most universities didn't offer
computer-science degrees.' 85 Barry Murphy, the first director of the National Software
Directorate and before and after CEO of a few leading Irish-owned software companies,
such as Insight, Openet Telecom, and Netsure, echoed the claims made by many that
these institutions are the unsung heroes of the industry:
Those big companies were the only institutions that were actually training
people at the time; these companies were the likes of the banks and insurance
companies. They gave superb training to cohorts of young people, which they
all lost in five to seven years' time. These companies made an immense
contribution to the Irish software industry (Interview with Barry Murphy
11/6/2000).
184 For accounts of the development of the Irish software industry, see Arora et al. 2001; O'Riain 1997;
O'Riain 1999; Sands 2005; Sterne 2004. For an account based on cluster theory, see O'Gorman et al. 1997.
185 For some years, Cara, the computing subsidiary of the national airline, Aer Lingus, was the biggest
software company, data processing center, and exporter in Ireland. With its ticket ordering system and
remote terminals, Cara was the first to introduce distributed software systems into Ireland and later also
successfully sold hotel management systems in Europe.
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The early Irish IT companies were established in the 1960s and 1970s. Most, due
to the high cost of computers at the time and the capital constraints in Ireland,
concentrated either on consulting and services or out-sourcing of IT services' business
models. 186 The first Irish software company was System Dynamics, founded in 1968 by a
team of former IBM Ireland employees, and focused on software consultancy services.
System Dynamic was also important for three other reasons, first, the spawning of a few
of the biggest Irish software consultancies, such as Chaco or Delphi, which in turn
spawned others, such as Enovation. 187 Second, System Dynamic's founder Tom
McGovern was key in raising the profile of the Irish software industry and creating its
identity as a distinct socio-political group within the Irish industrial landscape. Lastly,
McGovern, in a way similar to other successful early IT entrepreneurs, such as Michael
Peirce of Mentec, played a crucial role as the early financier of other, more product-
oriented, companies. As other sources of finance did not exist, and as the Irish banks
were not even willing to extend overdraft facilities to many software companies until the
early 1990s, such a role cannot be underestimated.' 88
The Irish IT companies in that period, unlike the MNCs, had to surmount
extensive difficulties in order to commence and maintain operations. Not only was there
no source of funding nor entrepreneurial financiers such as the Israeli Tolkowsky and
186 Interestingly enough, some of the local managers of MNCs' subsidiaries claim that the existence of
these IT out-sourcing services companies in Ireland granted the Irish subsidiaries a comparative advantage
versus other foreign subsidiaries when competing for more activities in the corporate headquarters
(interview with former managers of the Irish subsidiaries of telecommunication MNCs 7/17/2001).
187 Michael Purser, an employee of System Dynamic who left to become one of the first Computer Science
faculty members at Trinity, founded Chaco. Chaco was created partly in an attempt by Purser to help his
own students find employment. The company was considered the more technologically oriented of the Irish
software companies in the 1970s before it merged with Baltimore, another company that Purser co-founded
together with Jim Mountjoy. A few more service-based companies that later transformed into product
companies appeared in that period. The most notable of these were GC McKeown and AMS.
188 McGovern's two most important investments were done in conjunction to his relationship with Jim
Mountjoy, the co-founder of Baltimore in 1984, and Euristix in 1990.
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Discount Investment, but also banks were not even willing to extend loans or simple
credit facilities to indigenous IT companies. The result has been that these few
individuals still daring to be entrepreneurs typically needed to mortgage their own houses
to secure working capital. As a result of these constraints, most of these early IT
companies stayed financially fragile and collapsed at the slightest change to their monthly
cash flow. Moreover, unlike the MNCs, local NTBFs were not offered land and offices in
the IDA's industrial estates, and many property owners turned out to be as conservative
as the banks, and were unwilling to rent space for software companies.'89
Slowly but surely, the first Irish companies moved on the backs of their customers
to product development. Timing and the movement of the MNCs into Ireland were
important catalysts in this development. In the 1970s, the MNCs led the progress in
Ireland away from the mainframe platform into minicomputers. As the opening of the
new and smaller Irish MNC subsidiaries coincided with the rise of minicomputer
technology, relative to its population Ireland became one of the worlds' heaviest users of
minicomputers.
Mini-computers were: i) a different platform, and hence, did not use the same
software employed at the MNCs' foreign headquarters; and ii) a new platform, and
hence, did not have an established base of software. As a result, many local companies
managed to get development projects that could easily be packaged (a new concept at the
time) into software products. The more successful of these packages quickly secured a
few more sales in Ireland and the UK. However, a second and much more important
189 As many of the commercial space problems relates directly to the Irish-British tradition of renting
commercial propriety only for long-term leases (5 to 25 years), even in the 2000-2003 period many
interviewees complained about the unwillingness of landowners to rent their offices to newly established
software companies.
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transformation of the local software industry happened when the computer
manufacturers, such as Digital, IBM, and ICL, invited some Irish companies to market
their products together as a bundled solution.
Kindle, one of the first Irish software companies to reach successful constant
overseas sales, is an example of this model of organizational development. Kindle,
founded in 1981 as Triple A Systems, first developed banking systems on the ICL
platform.' 90 ICL sold its computers around the world, especially in former British
colonies, and did not have many banking packages that ran on its platform. It added
Kindle to its official list of ICL software vendors as a banking package specialist. Soon
thereafter, Kindle got orders from all of the former British colonies. In the second part of
the 1980s, Kindle converted its products to other platforms. Kindle is now owned by a
British company, and is a 500-person software house with a global sales and support
network. However, its main locus of activity and R&D is no longer in Ireland.
The early 1980s saw an overall maturation of the Irish software industry. This
process concurred with the beginning of the changes in the IDA view of the indigenous
IT industry and the tradable services industries. With the establishment of the Enterprise
Development Program by the IDA the agency started to become more proactive in
assisting local IT NTBFs, however, on a very low scale and with relatively small amounts
compared to the aid given to MNCs. Furthermore, the IDA and many leading politicians
developed a relationship of mutual distrust with the indigenous IT industry, a state of
affairs that continued to the mid- 1 990s.
Apart from Kindle, two other software companies whose rise and fall changed the
way the IDA and subsequently Enterprise Ireland manage their R&D grant schemes were
190 ICL was a leading British computer company that merged into Fujitsu.
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Insight Software and Real-Time Software (RTS). The two companies, in particular RTS,
were different from earlier Irish-owned companies in being product-based companies
from their inception. They were also representative of the particular profile of the Irish
software industry at the time: the products of both were based around Maapics. Maapics
was the main software suite for manufacturing facilities offered by IBM as part of its own
foray into the minicomputer arena. 1 9 Both companies grew out of the relative strengths
of the Irish industrial base in the early 1980s - manufacturing facilities that were world
leaders in utilizing the new minicomputer technologies.
Insight was originally the name of a package for financial reporting and analysis
built to work on top of the Maapics package by a product-oriented venture of AMS
named Vector Software. Insight was sold by AMS, which also financed all the
development efforts from its IT consulting revenues. AMS started to directly sell the
Insight packages around the world in 1980, and changed its own name to Insight
Software in 1983. The company reached record product sales for an Irish company in the
early 1980s, and by 1988 was poised to sell its more advance software package for the
IBM AS/400. However, the company started to suffer form severe cash flow problems.
These were caused by a series of factors: i) the need to financially rely solely on its own
revenues; ii) its use of a business model that necessitate a costly international direct sales
operations; iii) the fact that Insight, with Vector acting as its R&D center, still maintained
both the product line and the consultancy business; iv) the added difficulties in moving
into the higher priced software package on a newly launched platform brought. In the end
191 The Maapics package was introduced to Ireland together with IBM's System/34. IBM launched
System/34 in April 1977 as its own approach to minicomputers. System/34 was a low cost distributive data
processing system modeled on the IBM 5340 system.
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the founders were glad to sell Insight to the Hoskyns Group, a publicly listed British
software house in 1988.192
Real-Time Software (RTS) was given more attention by the IDA, mainly as it was
perceived to be the first technology-based spinout to form from a subsidiary of foreign
MNCs and as such was celebrated as a political success story. The company was founded
to develop software packages and tools around the Maapics software. Its seed finance
came from it co-founders, one of whom then proceeded to sell his services as a consultant
to finance the initial product R&D. Starting by offering multicurrency modules, RTS
developed a whole suite of financial packages. By 1985, the company had revenues of a
few million dollars and a chain of foreign offices. However, it still did not manage to
secure investment anywhere in Ireland and even with the relatively small amount of
capital RTS raised in the US and the UK by the end of 1985, it was clear that its better
funded American rivals were winning market share. In 1986, the company suffered heavy
losses that brought its founders to sell it to the American company MSA. Soon thereafter
MSA itself faced difficulties and closed down its Dublin operations in 1988.
192 In 1988, Hoskyns also bought CBT systems' - Computer Based Training - first incarnation. With the
sale of Hoskyns to Cap Gemini in 1990 the remaining product-based activities of the former Insight were
discontinued. Barry Murphy, the then CEO of Insight left to become the first Director of the NSD. CBT
was established by Patrick (Pat) McDonagh in 1983. Its first product was a training kit for money market
dealers. The domain knowledge, as well as some of the financial backing, came from Dermot Desmond.
Dermot was the first private financier to invest significant amounts of capital in the software industry
(Dermot's most known software investment was the backing of Fran Rooney's transformation of Baltimore
into a data security company in the late 1990s). In 1987, McDonagh sold the company to Hoskyns only to
buy it back in September 1991 after Cap Gemini bought Hoskyns. Under the management of Bill McCabe
the new CBT concentrated its effort on the American, and not the European, market. Within three years
CBT, selling software user training products, mainly for Lotus Notes, reached revenues of $18 million
before becoming the first Irish software company to list on NASDAQ in 1995. CBT later changed its name
to Smartforce before merging with Skilsoft in 2002, and is now trading under the Skilsoft name. Using the
money he earned from CBT's public listing Patrick McDongah financed Riverdeep, in 1995, another
educational company selling multimedia school courses. Riverdeep also publicly listed on NASDAQ in
2000, making McDonagh, a school teacher by training, the most successful software entrepreneur in
Ireland.
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In the same period many politicians as well as other parts of the IDA aired
concerns that the EDP was investing too heavily in risky indigenous software businesses
without generating enough employment. In the three years between 1986 and 1989 these
concerns were strengthened when many of the leading software companies went
bankrupt. In addition, as the result of the foreign M&A of RTS, Insight, and CBT, some
of their founders made what was considered in Ireland at the time a small fortune. The
fact that these entrepreneurs made this fortune by selling their companies, which was
perceived to entail the destruction of jobs instead of the creation of jobs, triggered severe
resentment. Both the public and the politicians, only too willing to spend millions on
MNCs, saw the newfound riches of the software entrepreneurs who benefited from IDA
grants not as a sign of success but as socially unfair gains. Moreover, with the growing
number of bankruptcies there was a wariness of the chances that a local industry would
ever be able to achieve continuous and sustained growth.' 93 In the end a decision was
made that state aid should be constructed to share the upturn of businesses it invested in
and not just their risks. Direct pressure from the then new Minister of Finance, Albert
Reynolds, brought the IDA to introduce a small, later to be proved significant, change to
the conditions of its grants: starting in 1988 the Irish state started to take equity stakes in
return for financial aid.
The tales of these three companies also show the most significant difference
between the Irish and the Israeli software industry. The Israeli software industry grew
within an innovation system already focused on R&D. As a result, many of the products
of its software companies were software development tools. The Irish software industry
193 As one interviewee from the former IDA remarked: "in that period <1986-9> we joked that in Ireland
the best way to create a small Irish software company was to establish a big one and wait" (interview
3/10/2001).
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followed a different track, developing software applications for particular business
domains such as finance, insurance, or manufacturing control. Only with the rise of
university research in the early 1990s would Ireland manage to grow successful software
companies with a focus on developing software technology itself. However, when one
such company, Iona, was listed on NASDAQ, it epitomized the new international success
of the industry and completely changed its perception in Ireland.
An almost forgotten fact about these early years of the Irish IT industry is that the
first IT companies that truly reached sustained global success were hardware, not
software, firms. In the mid-to-late 1980s the Irish IT hardware industry briefly enjoyed
unprecedented success. The two prominent companies of that period, whose development
stories also explain why there were only a few Irish hardware companies until the mid-
1990s, were Lake Electronics and Mentec.
Harry Lynam set up Lake Electronics in the end of 1976. Lynam, a physicist,
worked for many years in the engineering part of the Post and Telecommunication
Ministry where Jim Mountjoy, another important entrepreneur, also gained his first
experience. In 1976, Lynam become fascinated by microprocessors, and decided to sell
his house and move with his family to his in-laws to secure the seed finance for Lake
Electronics. Luckily for Lake in the same period the IDA established the EDP and Lake
became one of its first clients. A few of the early employees of Lake described the effect
of this state help as critical:
"More than anything else at that period in Ireland it <the IDA backing the
company> was the psychological affect. We were frowned on, seven adults
with families leaving good secure jobs to start some adventure in a
technological area nobody understood. The fact that the esteemed and all
powerful IDA thought that we were making something useful gave as the
mental strength to continue" (interview 7/9/2001).
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That injection of capital from the IDA also transformed the way in which the
banks treated the company and together with a first project with Lynam's former
employer, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Lake managed to develop its
first product: an MP controlled PBX.' 94 Lake secured a critical alliance with British
Telecom (then a state-owned enterprise) in 1979. Building on its first major international
sale Lake soon expanded worldwide and by 1983 grew to become a 200-person strong
company with revenues of 10IEP million. However, the company suffered from lack of
management skills and encountered reoccurring cash flow problems. The result of these
unstable times was the sale of the company in 1988 to Landis & Gyr, a Swiss engineering
MNC. 195
Thus 1988, the year in which the remains of RTS' Dublin operation closed down
and Insight Software and CBT's first incarnation were bought by Hoskyns, became the
year in which the first generation of international successful Irish IT companies suffered
heavy setbacks and the image of the indigenous sector was tarnished.' 96
Mentec's creation story has many similarities to Lake's. Mike Peirce, who was a
lecturer in Trinity's engineering faculty at the time, founded Mentec in 1978. Peirce's
expertise was the use of computers in manufacturing. In 1978 together with one of his
graduate students he went on a study trip in Japan to see the use of robots in
manufacturing. The trip proved to be the needed trigger and Peirce and his student-
194 PBX stands for Private Branch exchange, a private telephone network used within a specific
organization. Users of the PBX share a number of outside lines for making telephone calls outside the PBX.
195 Lynam also become seriously ill in 1988 and retired from the industry. In 1990 he came back and
established Klas, a telecommunication hardware company, together with his wife and son Henry.
196 Landis & Gyr ran into difficulties in 1991 and closed down its Irish subsidiary. Out of its Irish
operations two new Irish-owned IT companies were created by MBOs. The first was Lake Communication,
which is still managed by several of the old management team of Lake Electronics who stayed on with
Landis & Gyr. The second was Peregrine Software, a financial data security company that flourished for a
few years before being bought in 2000 by Trintech, one of the three Irish software companies that are still
listed on NASDAQ in 2005.
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turned-partner mortgaged their assets to secure seed financing in the form of a bank loan.
Fortunately for them the IDA's EDP not only agreed to match their funds but also to
guarantee 50% of a £100,00IEP bank loan. The fact that the IDA agreed to assist the
company at the time was critical and an interviewee working for Mentec at the time
described it:
"We could absolutely not get started without the IDA, the banks were
unwilling to talk with us before the IDA chipped in. As a matter of fact we
probably would not have even tried. When we floated the idea of opening a
company, almost all the people we knew told us that we are crazy and that to
leave secure respectable careers at Trinity is madness. Many reminded us that
we have families and children to think of' (interview 6/10/2003).
With the IDA's backup, Mentec approached the banks. However, the banks
insisted that Mentec buy "real assets" worth £50,00IEP to secure the 50% of the loan not
covered by the IDA. Hence, Mentec's first activity was the building of its own offices.
The banks were pleased, but Mentec was left with no working capital and no way to
finance R&D activities.
At the time the biggest IT MNC in Ireland was Digital Equipment of
Massachusetts, which had large facilities around Galway. Mentec first focused on
projects to develop custom hardware solutions around Data General's computers, but
switched allegiance to Digital in 1979. Digital, unlike the other MNCs at the time, had an
active and developed OEM partnership program and was looking for suppliers to develop
bundled solutions for its PDP computer line. In order to help its smaller suppliers it
granted them complete and open documentation of its systems. Mentec soon became
Digital's most important OEM supplier in Ireland. Focusing on product development,
Mentec created its core product in 1982, a single board computer/controller based around
Digital's J-11 CPU to be used in manufacturing control systems. This basis led to many
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other developments around Digital's and Mentec's own chips that were fabricated by
Texas Instruments. In its prime, Mentec had revenues of ten of millions IEP and
employed more than 200 people in Dublin and a few score more in the US and England.
At one point sixty-five of Mentec's employees worked on R&D, a unique feature in the
Irish IT industry of those days. Mentec also enjoyed the fact that it became an official
partner of Ireland's foremost MNC and the IDA gave it more than a few R&D grants
throughout the years.'97
The stories of Mentec and Lake Electronic exemplify the difficulties that Irish
hardware companies had over and above the significant obstacles that software
companies were facing. Not only is hardware product development a much costlier
endeavor than software, but also the opportunities for consulting projects, especially
these that can ultimately lead to product development were scarce. In addition, at that
time both software and hardware companies had to face a hostile social environment that
either saw technological entrepreneurs as risk takers when they failed, or resented them
when they succeeded. Thus, where in Israel and Taiwan, the pioneers of the IT industry
were seen to advance the national dream - soldiers in the war for national growth and
glory - in Ireland, under the political context ofjob creation the same pioneers were seen
as unstable and untrustworthy gamblers. 198 Banks and other financial institutions not
only were unwilling to invest in the industry, but also refused to extend even the minimal
197 Mentec and its founders, especially Mike Peirce, became crucial to the continued development of the
Irish IT industry. Peirce invested in and was the chairman of Parthus, an Irish IC design house established
after the demise of Digital's facilities in Galway that became the only Irish hardware company ever to be
listed on NASDAQ. Peirce and Mentec not only encouraged a few spinouts, such as, Eurologic and AEP,
but also became their key early investors. In addition, in 2001 Peirce, together with the former director
given to Mentec by the IDA, opened Mentor Capital, a small VC fund.
198 John Sterne, a historian of the Irish software industry, remarked that even as late as 1995, a Minister of
the State, Pat Rabbitte, decided that it would be politically expedient to use a joint conference of the Irish
and Massachusetts software associations to chide the Irish software industry for "paying too much for their
employees" (Sterne 2004. Pp. 86-87).
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necessary financial services to IT companies. Only those founders willing to risk
everything they had by mortgaging their own property managed to secure enough capital
to open their businesses. Accordingly, the financial backing of the IDA, even if limited,
was absolutely critical.
Even in the relatively simple issue of finding office space, indigenous Irish IT
companies have been facing severe difficulties and discrimination compared with the
MNCs and traditional businesses. Regulation and tradition in regards to commercial
space in Ireland have led to a system in which private property owners prefer to lease
almost solely for long multi-year terms. Furthermore, almost none of them were willing
to lease their offices to NTBFs, which they perceived as too risky. Thus, if on the one
side the IDA was busily developing purposely built industrial estates for its MNC clients
(hence, probably lowering the profitability of developing industrial commercial spaces
for private property developers), on the other side the indigenous companies faced
immense difficulties in securing even a small office space. Many of my interviewees as
late at 2002 still argued that finding office space was one of their most difficult obstacles,
even for well-funded companies.
The experiences from the creation of the IT industry in Galway after the closure
of Digital's facilities in the early 1990s are exemplary. The founders of both Storm and
Toucan, two of the most successful companies to be created by former employees of
Digital after its closure, quickly found out that even with state and regional agencies
backing their efforts, and even at a time in which their success was deemed crucial for the
economic future of their communities, no one was willing to rent them office space. In
the end the only way in which they managed to secure space was by the IDA allowing
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both companies to build their own premises in one of its industrial estates. A solution that
forced both firms to spend a large percentage of their limited resources. Last but not least,
while throughout this period MNCs were offered a wide array of tax incentives, the
indigenous IT companies, like all Irish businesses, had to pay the full, and high, corporate
taxes rates.
State Policies and the Discovery of IT and Tradable Services - the Evolution of State
Policies in the 1980s and Early 1990s
On the IDA's side, the late 1970s were the years in which the agency started to
appreciate the potential of the IT industry. If in the 1950-60s the IDA was broadly
recruiting MNCs, it became much more focused in the late 1970s, especially with the
'growth-without-jobs' socio-economic crisis of the 1980s. The IDA's biggest coup in the
1970s was attracting Digital Equipment. Digital, then and throughout the 1980s one of
the world's top IT companies, opened its facilities in Galway in 1971 and soon became
the biggest MNC in Ireland. Together with Erickson, which has large facilities in
Athlone, Digital has also been one of the first MNCs to move more advanced R&D
operations to Ireland.
By the late 1970s, the IDA started to focus on the tradable-services industries and
on high-technology electronics. This process was soon accelerated when it became clear
in the 1980s that manufacturing MNC subsidiaries preferred to increase their investment
in capital equipment, not in expanding their headcount. Thus, while overall production
grew, the number of jobs did not.
In 1975, the IDA established the International Services Program (ISP) that
through political lobbying extended the incentives formerly given only to the
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manufacturing sectors to the service sectors. In the beginning software was not
considered to be the main target, but by 1981 it became one of the ten designated sectors
of internationally traded services to which tax incentives were fully extended. The IDA
pushed for and succeeded in getting incentives, approval, and recognition for a rainbow
of tradable-services industries, from English-language-schools, to software, finance, and
film. These incentives and the actions of the IDA to both bring MNCs and create local
enterprises in these areas developed the institutional framework in which the perception
of service industry firms gained in reputation and legitimization.
At the same time the IDA institutionalized its support to indigenous companies in
1978 when it created the Enterprise Development Program (EDP). The main goals behind
the creation of the EDP were to: a) increase employment; b) lower Ireland's reliance on
FDI by growing indigenous companies; c) create of a set of suppliers to attract more
MNCs; and, d) change the attitude against entrepreneurship and local enterprises in
Ireland. The focus was on all sectors, both traditional and technological.
Interestingly the officials running the MNC-focused International Services
Program were also given the responsibility over the EDP. Thus, unlike the case of the
indigenous hardware industry, which was continuously treated as an extension of the
already established MNC-oriented policies, the birth of indigenous software industry
concurred with changes within the developmental agencies that institutionalized their
interest and focus around the industry.19 9
The two programs, ISP and EDP, were not focused on the IT sector in particular
or on NTBF promotion in general, but on promoting any kind of entrepreneurial activity
199 During the interviews, executives of the EDP all remarked that electronics was always considered
manufacturing. As a result it was not firmly on the new agenda of indigenous enterprise building and new
tradable-services industries.
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in Ireland.200 However, processes related both to state activities and to the activities of
private entrepreneurs, coupled with changes in global demand for IT, propelled the
software sector as the first sector in which indigenous companies achieved worldwide
success. This success, in turn, refocused most of the attention of the newly created state
agencies on the IT sector, specifically enhancing the software industry and aiding its
continuous growth since the mid 1990s. Indeed two different executive of the EDP
program strongly insisted that:
"There was no aim to create science-based industry at the time, the program
<EDP> evolved in a case by case process. Slowly it became clear that services
are the main beneficiary, and that in reality we were mainly dealing with
software. This is why we quickly added software to the list of sectors to get the
full tax benefits and why later policy was constructed around software. But we
had no ideal of creating a technological industry in Ireland at the time. We just
aimed to create more enterprises and jobs" (interview 3/14/2001).
The EDP became crucial not only in the funding of companies but also in actively
convincing potential entrepreneurs to start their business. At least as importantly, the
EDP's actions granted some legitimacy to technological entrepreneurship and risk taking.
The latter might have been the most important accomplishment of the EDP considering
Ireland's ultra-conservative business and financial landscape at the time. In addition, on
the FDI-oriented policy side, the new policies and the actions taken by the ISP
culminated in major software companies opening subsidiaries in Ireland. A consensus
evolved that the future of Irish industry did not rely solely on the manufacturing sector.
The first major software MNC that arrived in Ireland and transformed it into the
world capital for software localization was Lotus in 1985.2 °I Unlike the indifferent
200 Interviews with former executives of EDP and ISP (3/10/2001; 7/16/2001), and the first CEO of El, Dan
Flinters (2/5/2002).
201 There were many smaller foreign software companies that arrived to Ireland prior. However, Lotus'
move, in the time it was considered one of the premier software MNCs, had the effect of legitimizing
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reaction given by the political establishment to the activities of local companies, the
political and social elite attended the opening ceremony of Lotus' Irish operation and the
company gained the goodwill of both the Irish developmental agencies as well as leading
politicians. John Sterne argues that the main reason why Lotus was greeted with such
esteem is specifically because it did not conduct any R&D activities in Ireland but
concentrated on localization, packaging, and logistics. Therefore, Lotus was seen as a real
manufacturing company with sensible well-understood operations (Sterne 2004. Pp. 101-
108).202 Following Lotus almost all of the top software MNCs, such as Oracle, Symantec,
Coral, Novell, and Microsoft opened localization, packaging, and logistics operations in
Ireland during the 1990s. Microsoft soon became Ireland's top exporter and the sales
attributed to its Irish subsidiary are single-handedly responsible for making Ireland into
the world's biggest software exporter.
In the 1980s the commitment of the state expressly to the software industry was
further strengthened with the establishment of the National Software Center (NSC). The
NSC was the first failed attempt to create within the IDA a subunit stuffed with industry
experts to promote the growth of the software industry. In 1983, two competing proposals
for a National Software Center were put forward. One, proposed by a coalition of the
Science and Technology Board, the Higher Education Authority, and representatives of
the indigenous industry, envisioned a non-profit center providing the industry with wide
range of services. The second proposal, of the IDA, was focused on the MNCs sector and
envisioned the NSC as a self-financed operation giving services to the industry for a fee.
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Ireland as the "place to be" for American software MNCs. A very similar effect that DEC's move to
Galway had in the 1970s, and Intel's in the 1990s.
202 Localization is the programming activity of taking a software working in a specific culture/language and
translating it into different cultures/languages.
Unlike the Science and Technology Board and the Higher Education Authority, the IDA
did not bother to consult with the indigenous industry (O'Riain 1999; O'Riain 2004;
Sterne 2004).
In another example of the IDA's power at the time, although the local industry
supported the competing plan, the NSC was created on the basis of the IDA's proposal.203
Brian Dugan was recruited from a position of VP in Standard and Poor's in New York to
become the NSC's first director. The NSC's first board of directors also consisted solely
of MNC representatives. However, the NSC very quickly focused more on the indigenous
industry. By 1987-88 the NSC became one of the main institutions in which the state and
the indigenous software industry were collaborating. On the other hand, the NSC's need
to become self-financed ultimately led to conflicts as well as perceived and real
competition with industry. In addition, its focus on the indigenous sector cost it its IDA
support. By June 1988 the NSC was closed down.
Before it closed down the NSC managed to complete the first survey of the
industry. The result of this survey shows how different from the Israeli, and how similar
to the Taiwanese, the Irish software industry was in the 1980s. If in Israel the leading
companies at the time were focusing on solutions to R&D and software programming
processes, in Ireland most of the companies either imitated already established packages
of foreign companies on new platforms, or focused on industry specific applications with
very little in terms of R&D or innovation. For example, in 1984 there were twenty four
203 O'Riain, reporting on the view of the indigenous industry on that period, cites their position as reflected
in its main publication of the time - Irish computer: "If the interests of the indigenous computer services
industry companies are safe-guarded and promoted, and if there is a proper structure within which they can
influence the new body in the interest of their members, then it <NSC> will have the association's <ISA
then called ICSA> support. If they are not met, in the word of a member of the ICSA executive committee,
it will be 'total opposition '" (O'Riain 1999. P. 214, Italics added).
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companies selling packages for insurance agents, eighteen with software for lawyers'
offices, and twelve selling applications for TV rental stores (Sterne 2004. P. 17).
By 1988, the political landscape in Ireland was changed, and the further
development of the indigenous software industry was very much on the agenda. As soon
as the NSC was closed down two proposals for centers to replace it were immediately put
forward. The first, focusing on skill development, resulted in the ultimately ill-fated PAT
university-industry linkages centers established with EU funds. The second, developed
together by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the indigenous industry resulted
in the creation of the National Software Directorate within the IDA in 1991.
In a symbolic move, very different than the IDA's choice of an American to be
the NSC's first director in 1984, an Irishman, Barry Murphy, was the choosen to become
the NSD's first director. Murphy, Insight Software's CEO and a member of the board of
ICSA, has been one of the most vocal and prominent leaders of the indigenous industry.
The NSD became crucial on three fronts. It was the first organization to chart the
size and scope of the software industry on Ireland in a comprehensive and regular basis,
finding it in the words of Murphy, "to have more companies than anyone thought at the
time" (interview with Barry Murphy, 11/6/2000). Following that initiative, the NSD
became the main center devoted to collecting, processing, and publishing data on the
software industry. Secondly, the NSD became the main promoter of the movement
toward the product-development business model and away from the consulting business
model. Last but not least, using EU financing, the NSD became one of the main initiators
of the high-tech-oriented venture capital industry in Ireland.
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At least as important, however, was the effect of the NSD within the Irish
developmental agencies. Unlike any other sector, software companies now had a direct
line and a voice within the Irish developmental agencies, first the IDA and then Forbriat
and El. With the NSD pushing for more resources to be channeled toward the indigenous
software sector and with its people sitting in the grant-giving committees of the El,
software soon became the pilot sector around which Ireland's S&T industrial policies,
focusing on the indigenous-industry, were planned and implanted.
The Restructuring of the Developmental Agencies
Even with the IDA's new programs and focus in the 1980s, the "growth without
jobs" crisis coupled with the failure of fiscal expansion policies left Ireland in a dire
situation. Emigration reached new heights with 44,000 or 1.1% of population leaving
Ireland in 1989 alone, many of those from the young and highly educated segment of the
population. This turn of events together with a growing public resentment of the IDA's
focus on MNCs, started subtle but important changes in Ireland's industrial policy,
which, in the end, refocused it around the high technology sectors in the 1980s and
1990s.
The last restructuring of Irish industrial policies around the high-technology
industries started during the latest Irish economic crisis. In the early 1980s, major policy
and social upheavals started the realignment process of Ireland's institutional system
along the path of NTBFs-oriented industrial development. In the socio-political arena
resentment toward what was seen as the excessive focus of IDA on MNCs with much
smaller amounts of resources channeled into the indigenous industry, coupled with the
severe crisis of Irish industry, culminated in the Telesis report.
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The report, commissioned by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC),
hence with substantial political support behind it, argued for an almost complete
renovation of Irish industrial policy. The report concluded that Ireland's economic
growth should have a "double engine" of FDI and Irish-owned companies. The report
also argued for the building of national champions, and contended that the level of
organizational and management capabilities of Irish firms was too low for them to
succeed without a hands-on industrial policy. Thus, the report called for a break with the
traditional neo-liberal-interventionalist industrial policy. Nevertheless, the report itself
did not give any conditions whatsoever as to how national champions and winners should
be selected nor to how the state should employ direct intervention to strengthen the
management and organizational capabilities of Irish-owned firms.
The Telesis report was published in February 1982 and a heated debate about
industrial policy followed. However, in the 1984 White Paper on Industrial Policy, the
Telesis report recommendations were mostly ignored (O'Sullivan 2000b). Nevertheless,
the report's long-term impact was larger than it seemed at the time. It both started and
lent legitimacy to a long process of refocusing industrial policy around the indigenous
industry. This process culminated in another committee report, the 1992 Culliton Report.
The Culliton report's most important recommendation was that the state should
direct its assistance into fixing general financial market failures, i.e., helping companies
in every sector that were deemed too risky by the existing conservative financial
institutions to be granted finance.2 4 Moreover, the Culliton Report envisioned a
restructuring of the development agencies' organization.
204 Again the contrast with Israel is apparent, where in Israel the state focused its energies around market
failures associated with R&D activities and not with general financial market failures.
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As a result of the Culliton report, two waves of bureaucratic reshuffling occurred.
In the first, under the Industrial Development Act of 1993, the IDA was restructured into
two main agencies: Forbairt took charge of the indigenous industry development and the
Irish Science and Technology Board (Eolas). The IDA, still influential but with reduced
power, was renamed as the Industrial Development Agency-Ireland, and given the
mandate over the MNCs and FDI-related activities. In addition, on top of these two
agencies a strategic, coordination, and advisory agency - Forfas - was created. In 1998,
the reshuffling was completed with Forbairt merging with the Irish Trade Board and parts
of FAS (the training agency) into one agency with capabilities and responsibilities for
promoting Irish-owned industry in both Ireland and abroad. The merged agency was
renamed Enterprise Ireland.
This period also strengthened Ireland's particular neo-liberal-interventionist
ideology. These bureaucratic reconstruction efforts progressed side by side with the
establishment of a neo-corporatist regime by the new right-center government. In a stark
difference to both the US and the UK, in Ireland when a new center-right government
gained power from a center-left one in 1987 it opted not only not to crush the labor
unions, but also to enhance their power by structuring an encompassing neo-corporatist
framework - the social partnership agreements. This framework led to a series of ever
more comprehensive three years agreements, which are part of the backbone of Irish
industrial and economic policy to this day (Hardiman 2000; Hardiman 2002).
Thus, Ireland, led by an ideologically center-right government, possessing an
industrial base consisting mainly of American MNCs, and under strong pressure from the
IMF and the World Bank, decided and successfully implemented a neo-corporatist
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framework. Moreover, the Irish Fainna-Fail government accomplished this feat at exactly
the same time that their ideological contemporaries and partners, Thatcher in the UK and
Reagan in the US, were busily dismantling union power. Thus, the end of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s brought major policy changes to Ireland. These policy
changes, taken together as part of a major restructuring of the Irish industrial policies,
have been very different than those taken in Taiwan and Israel in the same period.
The Rise of the Software and the Continues Stagnation of Hardware - Development and
State-Industry Co-Evolution in the 1990s
By the latter half of the 1980s, the success of the Irish product-oriented software
houses together with the PC revolution started to change the Irish IT industry's
landscape, and a growing number of software companies were founded around specific
product ideas. Nevertheless, as the stories of the first few years of even the most
successful Irish companies like Iona, Aldiscon (now Logica-Aldiscon), and Smartforce
(formerly CBT and now part of Skillsoft) attested to, the industry's main problem
remained the acute lack of capital.
An example for the difficulties of the indigenous companies in these years is the
story of Glockenspiel. Glockenspiel is also important for the development of the Irish
software industry for three reasons: first, it was the first globally successful Irish
company that utilized the path common to the Israeli software industry - development
and sales of software tools to developers. Moreover, Glockenspiel pioneered in Ireland a
particular strategy for doing so: the quick implantation of the latest international
standards of a particular software development technology, with the company becoming
the first to the market offering a workable product based on these standards. This is the
exact strategy executed later by Iona, Ireland software industry's flagship company, and
266
since then by many of Iona's spinouts. Second, Glockenspiel became famed for operating
a high-technology firm in one of the roughest neighborhoods in Dublin's inner city. This,
while irritating some, also gave the indigenous software industry in general and
Glockenspiel in particular, some political goodwill. It later became an integral goal of the
Irish state IT development schemes.205 Third, the story of the rise and fall of Glockenspiel
portray the very ambivalent way in which the IDA was treating the indigenous industry.
The IDA's treatment of the company when it faced crisis became a focal point for the
growing resentment of the agency by the software industry.
John Carolan, an Irish software programmer with extensive knowledge and
networks with research institutions and developers outside Ireland, founded Glockenspiel
in 1984. At that time, Carolan became involved with the new technologies of object-
oriented programming and the new C++ language standard. Glockenspiel utilized his
knowledge of the C++ standard and became the first software company worldwide to
develop a C++ compiler for the PC platform. In its first years Glockenspiel financed its
product development mainly from C++ consulting.206
In 1988, the same year in which many major Irish IT companies succumbed to
financial difficulties, Glockenspiel reached a point in which most of its revenues came
from export sales of its products. Very quickly Glockenspiel taught the Irish software
industry the lesson already well learned by the Israeli one: software development tools
which are sold directly to engineers and developers need no localization and can be sold
all over the world without costly modifications. Moreover, the customers for these
205 The latest of which is the project to create an R&D-based multi-media/digital hub/cluster in the Liberties
(around the old Guinness Brewery) that brought MIT's Media-lab as its anchor tenant.
206 A complier is a program that decodes instructions written in a specific programming language, such as
C, Pascal, or Basic (also called higher order languages) and produces an assembly or machine language
program that can then be executed by the computer.
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products, being engineers and programmers, are more sophisticated than the average
consumer; hence products that are too complex and crude in their user interface to be sold
to the consumer market can still be sold to these highly skilled customers. Building on its
C++ expertise, Glockenspiel started to offer a wider range of RAD tools for C++
development. The company's deep technical knowledge enabled it to develop award
winning products and both IBM and Microsoft promoted their sales.
However, in Ireland, this technology-development-oriented business model was
so different from any other Irish company ever to exist that it led both the IDA and the
financial institutions to treat the company with suspicion and mistrust. In 1991,
Glockenspiel achieved record sales and was the second top indigenous software exporter
after CBT. In 1992, however, its American distributor went bankrupt. Almost
immediately its bank in Ireland informed the company that it had to pay its overdraft
facility in full and the IDA did not agree to extend any aid. Shortly thereafter Computer
Associated bought Glockenspiel out of receivership and the IDA, in a move that further
installed distrust within the indigenous industry, demanded that every grant the company
ever received should be paid back in full (O'Riain 1999; Sterne 2004).
By the early 1990s, the software industry had notably grown and apart from being
well organized, a growing number of product-oriented companies attained global success.
For the first time, Irish software companies managed to successfully cross the Atlantic
and thrive in the American market. Furthermore, the Irish software industry became
much more technologically savvy. One of the most important factors in enabling this
development had nothing to do with the Irish state, but a lot to do with the Irish university
sector and the EU.
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Starting in the end of the 1980s, and with growing importance in the 1990s, the
Irish universities, in particular Trinity, started to participate in the EU research
framework schemes. In a short period of time, Trinity's Computer Science Department
became one of the largest recipients of ESPRIT grants for computer science in Europe.
These grants enabled Trinity not only to expand its computer science research activities,
but allowed several research group to form and then spinout as already established
companies with working products and strong IP.20 7
The most important software company to rise out of these particular institutional
settings was Iona. Iona had its origins in Trinity getting an approval to offer the first
undergraduate computer science degree course in 1979. Trinity needed to expand its
faculty very quickly and enrolled as lecturers many of its graduate students, among them
both Chris Horn and Sean Baker. At the time there was very little money for research in
Ireland. However, in 1980, one of the senior lecturers in the department, Neville Harris,
came back from a sabbatical at Stanford bringing with him in his baggage four Sun
Microsystems' processors and a 3mb per second Ethernet to establish the Distributed
System Group (DSG). In 1983, the coming of the ESPIRT program suddenly changed the
research landscape in the department. ESPRIT allowed for applicative research groups to
apply for funding on a multiple year basis. In 1984 the DSG group, then consisting of
four lecturers, managed to get their first multi-year project. This allowed the group to
expand, and joined by Chris Horn, who came back from Brussels after being part of the
EU team forming the ESPRIT program, the group quickly managed to get enough
207 The continuous important of ESPRIT and other EU framework programs to the research activities in
Ireland is evident when one realize that as late as 1998 more than third of the research budget of Trinity's,
at the time Ireland's university with the biggest research budget at £20.3, came from these programs
(Grimes and Collins 2003).
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funding to make it the biggest and richest computer science research group in Ireland. By
1985, the DSG group grew to encompass six lecturers and about 40 graduate students. At
that time the group was already run almost as an independent financial entity, a unique
and novel experience in the Irish higher education system.
In 1991, a group within the DSG led by Chris Horn, Sean Baker, and Annari
O'Toole decided to open Iona, a campus company based around their knowledge of
distributed systems.208 By that time, Horn and Baker were already active in a new
international standard group, the Object Management Group (OMG). The founders saw a
window of opportunity utilizing a strategy similar to Glockenspiel: being the first
company to offer products that implant OMG's new middleware standard.209 However, in
1991, no one in Ireland was willing to invest in a company with such extensive R&D-
based business plan. From 1991 to 1993, the company was financed from consulting
revenues including the fees the founders earn for teaching C++ and system analysis, two
ESPRIT projects, and some savings. This financial situation allowed Iona to start product
development only in June 1992. By that time Iona also managed to get an IDA
employment grant of £1 50,00IEP for which the IDA took a 7% stake of the company.2 '0
By June 1993, Iona became one of the first companies to offer a product
implanting the new CORBA standard with C++ compatibility. This raised the interest of
Sun Microsystems. In December Sun offered to invest $600,000USD for 25% of the
208 Colin Newman was Iona's fourth founder.
209 The specific standard was ORB, which stands for Object Request Broker. ORB is the component in the
heart of the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) middleware standard. Middleware is
the general name for software whose main task is to allow programs written and operated on different
platforms to exchange information and work together.
210 A former executive in Iona argued when interviewed that at that period in order for an indigenous
company to be approved for the lower tax regime (automatically given to MNCs) the IDA needed to give
its consent. The only way to get the IDA approval was to agree for a grant scheme in which the IDA took
7% stake in the company.
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company. This offer from a leading MNC transformed the reputation of Iona in Ireland,
transforming it from an untrustworthy R&D-based IT operation into a legitimate and
promising company. It was here that the development agencies' misconception of the
software industry proved to be a hurdle. The inward looking development agency, by
then restructured as Forbrait, and Trinity, refused to be diluted by Sun's investment. Only
when the founders threatened to close down the company did the two institutions back
down and the IDA agreed to give a matching funding to Sun's to keep its stake from
being diluted.2 '
Very quickly the new relationship with Sun, in a very similar way to Sun's
alliance with the Israeli Checkpoint or to Amdoc's alliance with SBC, opened the doors
of the US industry for Iona. By 1995, both Boeing and Motorola were using Iona's
products and in February 1997 Iona became the second Irish company after CBT to go
through an IPO on NASDAQ. Since by that time Sun had decided to sell its entire 25%
stake in Iona, the IPO became the fifth largest software IPO on NASDAQ up to that
point.2 2 The sums involved and the large publicity helped to transform the perception of
the indigenous software industry both within and outside Ireland.2 3 Software had become
the jewel in the crown of S&T industrial policies in Ireland. This was especially true as
EI's growing portfolio of Irish IT companies' stocks soon made it the most profitable
211 Financial resources for R&D in Ireland were so constrained even after the IDA approval, in 1994, for its
second grant, Iona decided to hire a former graduate student of Horn and Baker's to a fulltime position of
applying for ESPRIT funding.
212 Sun had two reasons for selling its stake: i) by that time Sun decided abandon the CORBA middleware
standard and concentrated its efforts on its own self-developed Java technology; ii) Sun Microsystems
preferred as a corporation not to hold large stakes and board directorship positions in other public
companies in order to prevent the legal risks involved.
213 Iona also had one other key influence. Led by former lecturers at Trinity the company was the first Irish
company to hire entire cohorts of Irish computer science students to conduct R&D work in Ireland. In this
Iona helped to transform the perception of Irish computer science students about what should, and can, be
done in Ireland.
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Irish venture capital organization. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the growing
fixation of El on profitable investments has by now become an obstacle to the industry's
continuous growth.
The DSG group and Iona, also offered a development paradigm for the evolution
of other research groups, many of them turned into commercial spin-offs in Trinity's
computer science department. Some examples of these have been Wilde Technologies,
another a spinout of the DSG group focusing on software design; Prediction Dynamics,
which develops financial modeling software and was founded by Professor Padraig
Cunningham and Dr John Carney, based on Carney's Ph.D.; and, Havok, which is the
commercial reincarnation of the Graphic Users Group. In addition, EU programs and the
incentives they supplied to organize the research into semi-independent applicative
technology research groups gave rise to some of the relatively few successful Irish
hardware companies in the late 1990s, such as Haptica and MV Technologies. As Trinity,
even under the constraints of miniscule research budgets, has spun-off many other
companies both before and after, including another two of the only six Irish software
firms ever to go public on NASDAQ, Baltimore and Trintech, one wonders why in
Ireland the universities' research effort are seen to have failed to positively effect the
growth of the industry. This is especially remarkable as other universities, including
UCD, DCU, and UCC, were also the breeding ground for many software companies
throughout the years, if not to the same degree as Trinity.
Iona itself was also critical for the development of the industry, in its role being
the educator as managers for a whole cohort of computer science students. These students
joined the company before its IPO and passed through its rapid growth phase. Many of
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them left the company after 1999 to establish their own companies. There are now over a
dozen direct Iona spin-offs. In one of which, Cape Clear, not only did Iona invest, but
also two of Iona's founders, Colin Newman and Annari O'Tolle, left Iona to join and
manage it.214
Accordingly by 1994-95, the time of the restructuring of the development
agencies and the NSD initiative to develop a high-tech oriented VC industry, the
landscape of the indigenous software industry was already transformed. Smartforce/CBT
had become the first Irish software company to become public on NASDAQ, Iona
secured major partnerships with Sun, Motorola, and Boeing, and by 1995 Aldiscon was
the market leader in the new mobile phone technology of Short Text Messaging
(SMS).215 In short, by the time the industrial policy restructuring process had begun in
1994, the indigenous software industry was already established as the leading and most
successful export-oriented sector in Ireland.21 6
Many product-oriented firms had to support their R&D efforts by offering
services and consulting, a fact that not only slowed their R&D efforts but limited their
ability to develop large-scale, complex, R&D-based products. This situation started to
change only after the reconstruction of Irish industrial policy and the refocusing of a
more significant portion of that policy on the indigenous industry. The formal creation of
Forbrait, the forerunner of Enterprise-Ireland, in 1994, increased state support for Irish-
owned software companies.
214 However, later the relationship between Cape Clear and Iona turned sour and ona took Cape Clear to
court in 2002 over hiring issues (Daly 2002).
215 In 1996, Aldiscon was also the first company to secure major investment from the El sponsored ICC
software fund. In 1997, in the middle of an IPO process, Aldiscon was sold to Logica for £90 million in
cash and is now the division that generates most of the revenues and profits for Logica-Aldiscon.
216 At the time the software industry was the only successful indigenous sector in Irish history apart from
agriculture and tourism.
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In the hardware sector, however, there was no significant improvement. The two
prominent hardware companies that became major exporters in the 1990s were Silicon
and Software Systems (S3) and Parthus, both IC design houses. The circumstances
involving their establishment were so unique that they made them the exception rather
than the rule. In 1986, S3 was founded and has been managed since as an independent
company by professor Maurice Whelan of Trinity. However, S3 was established as part
of efforts to convince Philips to open a subsidiary in Ireland by Whelan, a former
researcher of Philips electronics, and the IDA's. These efforts culminated in Philips
agreeing to open S3 as a joint venture with Whelan where Philips owns 90% of its shares.
Parthus was established as Silicon Systems in 1993 when Brian Long, then the
chief design engineer of Digital in Ireland, decided not to move with Digital to Scotland
after the closure of Digital's operation in Galway. Instead, Long, with the help of the
IDA, which also matched him with Peter McManamon, Parthus financial co-founder,
established Parthus as part of the efforts to reconstruct the IT industry in Galway with the
closure of Digital. However, what allowed the company to start operations and grow was
a combination of financial backing and aid from Michael Pierce of Mentec, seed
financing and stream of orders from STMicroelectronics, obtained through Long's
industry contacts, and Long's and McManamon's savings. Only after securing these
financial resources did Parthus obtained a matching grant from the then newly established
El. Parthus was started as a service IC design house, mainly for STMicroelectronics,
which supplied Parthus with over 65% of revenues in its first three years. However,
luckily for Parthus, the contract with STMicroelectronics stated that the IP developed was
to be owned by Parthus.
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In 1998, building on the already established reputation of the Irish software
industry, Parthus changed its business model to an IP licensing, utilizing what has been
one of the biggest investments by Goldman Sachs in an Irish IT company, $16 million. In
2000, Parthus became the first and only Irish hardware company to be publicly listed on
NASDAQ when it double listed on the London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. In 2002
Parthus was bought by an Israeli company, DSP group, and was merged with DSP's own
IP licensing division to be re-floated as Parthus-Ceva; in 2003 the name was changed to
Ceva.
Thus, the stories of S3 and Philips, Parthus and STMicroelectronics, as well as the
earlier relationship of Mentec and Digital, show that in the context of the Irish innovation
system with its dearth of both capital and a semiconductors industrial eco-system, such as
Taiwan's, only with a rare combination of long-term support of an MNC and the
development agencies could a successful hardware NTBF grow. With the development
agencies focused as they were on the indigenous software sector, treating the indigenous
hardware sector only as a derivative of the MNC-focused policy, it is not surprising that
stories of successful Irish hardware companies are few and far in between.
The venture-financing situation improved significantly after 1995. NSD, by then a
part of EI, led an initiative to distribute EU-backed finance in an attempt to spur the
establishment of high technology oriented venture capital funds. This effort, coupled with
the proof for profits by the publicly listed companies and some high-profile M&As after
1995, culminated in a small but vibrant local VC industry. For the first time in the history
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of the industry starting in 1999, local software entrepreneurs could reasonably expect to
find enough investment capital to startup a product-oriented-only company.2 7
The first government initiative to create a VC industry in Ireland was not at all
aimed at the high-tech sector. In 1994, realizing that financial institutions in Ireland were
overly conservative, unwilling to grant working and growing capital to new enterprises in
any industry, the government, using a policy of veiled threats, persuaded the big pension
funds to make available up to £100IEP million, to venture capital very broadly defined.218
Using this finance, three VC funds were established: Delta, Act, and ICC. The three
invested most of the funds in later-stage development of businesses, mostly in traditional
companies, and not in IT.
In 1995, the NSD initiated the first attempt to spur a high-technology oriented VC
industry. The NSD VC initiative, using EU money from the Operational Program for
Industrial Development 1994-1999, distributed E43.9 million to establish 16 funds under
a scheme in which half of each fund's finance was granted by the state and the other half
was raised in the private market.219 The state position in all these funds was that of a
regular general partner. This created the ironic situation in which in Ireland, where,
unlike Taiwan and Israel, the state specifically chose policy vehicles with the aim of
limiting its direct intervention in the market, representatives of EI, often the same people,
sit on the boards of the VC funds, the boards of companies in which El invest, and El
investment committees that decide in which companies to invest.
217 Good statistics are lacking but using multiple resources we can ascertain that starting in 1999 a major
upgrade of the Irish VC funds occurred. About C700 million were raised by Irish IT oriented VCs in 2000-
2001, with actual investment in IT of C62 million in 1999 and E162 million in 2000. Sources: M.O.P 2000;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2000, and the Irish Venture Capital funds' websites.
218 Unlike the US, in Europe almost any capital involved in the growing or the restructuring of a business
falls under the rubric of venture capital. In effect the European use of term VC is very similar to the
American definition of private-equity firms.
219 In the end only 15 funds actually started operations.
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The Irish state, much like the Taiwanese, saw VC as a missing pool of finance,
and not as a separate industry with specific capabilities to be developed. Hence, while
one of the declared aims of the policy, similarly to Israel's, was to enlarge not only the
pool of finance but also the pool of financiers, the state opted to cooperate with local
investors, who lacked specialized high-technology VC knowledge and background, and
not with foreign VC-skilled institutions.220 The first fund to be established was the ICC
software fund I. ICC fund I started operation in 1996, and Maurice McHenry, an old NSD
and EDP hand, relocated from the NSD to become the fund's manager. Aside from one
large and recent VC fund (Cross Atlantic) and a few semi-institutionalized funds of
successful entrepreneurs (Mentor, Oyster, and Island are the prominent ones), all the VC
funds operating in Ireland were created as part of the NSD initiative.
In 2002, Enterprise-Ireland announced another VC initiative, this time more
regionally and sectorally-oriented and fully funded by the Irish government. Under this
new initiative the Irish government distributes E95 million to ten funds, most of which
are the new funds of the same management companies of the first initiative, with the hope
of stimulating the commitment of a total of f500 million to these funds' management.2 2
It is the ironic result of the inherent conflicts of Ireland's neo-liberal interventionalist
ideology, that the state's attempts not to interfere with the market's price-setting
mechanisms ended with Ireland, the only nation out our three cases to fully subscribe to
free-market principles, becoming the one case where the state is not only the biggest VC
in itself, owning shares in all of Ireland's promising IT companies, but also the biggest
220 On the distinction between the two VC industry creation policy types, see Avnimelech and Teubal
2003a.
221 Interview with Denis Marnane 3/7/2002. For more information on the distribution of the first El VC
initiative, see El 2000.
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investor in the VC industry. Accordingly the state also has a claim to a large stake of the
VC industry's investments and a significant role in shaping its decision-making.
The VC initiatives of the Irish government through Enterprise-Ireland and the
NSD bore some fruit. Starting in 1999, Irish entrepreneurs could reasonably expect to be
able to raise enough capital to enable them to start NTBFs focusing solely on new
product development. However, as of 2004, especially in comparison to Israel, the Irish
VC industry is smaller, less professional, and still intimately linked to established Irish
financial institutions. If in Israel, many of the VCs are former technological
entrepreneurs, in Ireland most of the VCs are former accountants and management
consultants. Moreover, the Irish VC industry is less internationally connected than the
Israeli one, with the sources of its financing and its connections concentrated in Ireland
and Europe. Thus, especially in the software industry where the US is the main market,
the VC industry in Ireland is still lacking.
On the other hand, it might be that some of these features, principally the close
connection with local institutional investors, and the fact that Ireland possesses very
developed institutional pension funds, made it very attractive to Irish firms to double-list
on both the NASDAQ and the Dublin (or another European) Stock Exchanges. This
double-listing option is one that all the Irish IT companies listed on NASDAQ followed,
and it probably diminishes the need to transfer more and more activities to the US.222 The
greatest concerns regarding the Irish VC industry today are: i) its ultra-conservatism and
lack of will to invest in seed stage companies; and ii) its continuous reliance on the state
for both its investment decision making and financing.
222 In 2001, Israel had acknowledged that problem and changed some of its regulations to make it easier
and more attractive to Israeli firms to double-list. However, it remains to be seen how widespread will be
the effects of those measures.
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In the late 1990s the Irish software industry enjoyed its greatest success so far. Six
software companies, CBT/Smartforce, Iona, Trintech, Baltimore, Datalex, and Riverdeep
listed on NASDAQ. Together with a few large-scale M&As, these high-profiled success
stories helped to change the perception of the industry both within and outside Ireland. In
1998-2001, the new generation of NTBFs also enjoyed, the advent of the VC industry
and could rise enough financing to utilize product-R&D focused business models. In
addition, many established companies, such as SoftCo or Fineos, transformed their
business model into a product-based one, often using VC financing to accomplish it.
However, as can be seen from Graph I, the average sales per employee in the Irish
indigenous sector, while vastly improving from a low of $45,000 in 1991, is still only
40% of the average of the Israeli IT industry. This seems to imply two points: first, from
an optimistic perspective, there is still a lot of room for improvement; second a larger
percentage of the Irish industry is still focused on the less profitable activities of service,
consulting, and bespoke development.
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Enterprise-Ireland has also been intensifying its own grant giving mechanism.
Since 1994, Enterprise-Ireland has directly given companies an annual average of £16
million Irish.
Table I - EI Support and Profits all sectors 1998-2004
Year Capability Building Equity and VC Funds Funds Gained by El from Equity
1998 | 58 m** e 14 m** E 14.3 m**
1999 | 68 m** 33 m** E 12 m**
2000 E 65 m** E 38 m** E 49.56 m**
2001 E 51 m** E 72 m** E 101.58 m**
2002 E 31 m** E 38 m** _ 34.3 m**
2003 E 26 m** E 38 m** E 14.6 m**
Source: EI annual reports.
Notes: Capability Building is defined as an investment in R&D, training and new market development, thus
it includes, but not solely consist off, R&D grants. Equity and VC Funds are financing channeled to the
private VC industry. Unlike Israel, funds gained by EI are delivered to the exchequer and are not channeled
back into the industry.
However, the grant-giving mechanisms of Enterprise-Ireland highlight the
different underlying objectives of the Israeli and Irish industrial policies, and intensify the
main obstacle that still exists for many Irish entrepreneurs - the acute lack of very early
and early stage financing for NTBFs. EI financial aid packages for new companies
consist of both a hodgepodge of grants, some of which are the remnants of older grant
schemes mixed with some new ones, and equity-based investment. In order for
companies to get special tax benefits and qualify for R&D grants, EI needs to approve
them as "fast-growing start-ups," an idea devised by the NSD in the early 1990s. Fast
growing start-ups are companies that are seen as capable of reaching sales of E2 million
within a few years. There are, however, only a limited number of companies that can be
approved, and only very limited resources given to the NSD and EI to conduct the
necessary analyses. Hence, a bottleneck develops specifically in this critical development
stage where the firms are in their most dire need for state-aid.
This situation is further complicated by the equity-base of the El grant giving
mechanisms. EI, in one of the most paradoxical twists of the Irish neo-liberal-
interventionist ideology, claims on the one hand that the state can and should take large
stakes in private companies. However, adhering to neo-liberal principles on the other
hand, EI wishes to avoid a situation in which a government agency determines the market
capitalization evaluation of a private company. This creates a situation in which the firms
seeking EI aid must find private market investors that would resolve the evaluation
process. Only then would EI join the investment round on the same valuation basis. Many
investors, though, agree to invest only in companies that have already received El's seal
of approval. This seeming "Catch 22" situation is even more complex when we realize
that El is also the single largest financier of the Irish VC industry itself. Hence, in many
cases, El actions make the Irish VC industry even more conservative in its investment
decisions than what it is already.
This process, in effect, makes it impossible for most early stage IT start-ups to get
sufficient financial aid from the state. As early stage investment is riskiest with the
uncertainty being the highest, EI investments do almost nothing to solve the most intense
market failure inherent in new technology development. In addition, it can be argued that
EI financial aid packages, as they are organized now, help more in lowering the risk for
the VCs than they help NTBFs to secure larger amounts of capital than they could
without this venue.223 These shortcomings are readily admitted by EI. Accordingly, EI's
then CEO Dan Flinters mused: "I agree with some of what you say, especially with the
fact that we are still lacking a good mechanism to finance seed and early stage
223 As EI finance is conditional on VC funds' agreement to invest, and as Irish VC funds usually make their
investment conditional on the NTBF securing El financing, EI packages are in a sense complementary
finance, which otherwise the VC fund would need to supplement.
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companies, on which we are working, but considering our goals and resources I think we
have the best working scheme" (Interview with Dan Flinter, 2/5/2002).
Indeed, considering that the goal of EI is not to generate the maximum amount of
R&D but to maximize the number of successful indigenous businesses that supply the
highest number of jobs for the lowest cost to the taxpayer, EI mechanisms are sufficiently
well suited. Nevertheless, the continuous crisis of the industry since 2001, and the fact
that there have been almost no seed investments by Irish VC companies since then, raise
the question of whether EI policies and grants answer the needs of the indigenous
industry, or whether they have in fact become an obstacle to its growth. This sentiment
was voiced not only by many companies but also by former El executives. One can
indeed defend the Irish record by arguing that since 2001 there has been a global crisis of
the IT industry in general and VC financing in particular. Nevertheless, this does not
explain why does Ireland fare so much worse than either Israel or Taiwan, especially as
Ireland has just culminated a major policy effort, including VC creation, whose main aim
was specifically to set in motion more NTBFs formation, not less.
For example, a founder of a very successful company in the 1980s reflects on EIl's
changing policies:
"When we opened our first company, EI, then the IDA, was crucial. They also
proved very very helpful throughout the years and early 1990s. Now they just
become too conservative. They are no longer that helpful, especially to new
young firms" (4/18/2001).
A few founders of younger start-ups concurred:
"In the past EI were very helpful to young companies. Now, after they
suddenly made money, the only thing they do is to play 'king of the lake'
games. Meaning that if you are already very successful EI will come and grant
you both money and help. When you actually need them, though, they just
ignore you."
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"The part of EI that deals with helping you to set offices and meetings abroad
is superb, not so within Ireland. In the beginning we were desperately looking
to get grants from them and they turned us down. Now after our success and
after getting some VC money they <El> are running after us trying to convince
us to take their money. They think they missed our boat and that they could
have made money on us... I really wonder if EI is at all capable of making
decision to invest in truly innovative, hence, risky, new IT companies."
"For two months I was trying to get money from EI, and then I finally
understand that this is a waste of money and time to go to El. To get good
money <large grants> from EI you must already have a good VC deal in your
packet."
"The funny thing is that I found out that EI is much more aggressive than the
VCs themselves asking for big chunk out of companies. This, and they are so
utterly slow and bureaucratic. I truly do not understand why they do it, because
on the other hand they are the nicest and friendliest people I ever met. I think
that the real problem is that they become omnipotent, you now must have EI
approval in order to get anything in Ireland and they are talking with you under
so many hats that sometimes I wonder if the person in front of me knew which
role he is supposed to be playing now" (interviews with company founders
1/7/2001; 3/13/2001; 3/20/2001; 4/20/2001).
Lastly one of the IDA's former executive who took part in planning the equity-based
grant giving mechanisms argued for a radical change of EU grant-giving mechanisms:
"At the time it is was a good idea, we had two problems we needed to deal
with. First, there was political pressure after politicians became concerned
when, on one hand, many software companies who got grants went bankrupt,
and, on the other hand, a few were sold to MNCs with the founders making a
large profit. The second was the need of technology companies that do R&D to
get a large quantity of capital upfront, which we could not do with employment
grants, especially as new software start-ups just do not create that many jobs.
Thus, equity-based grants seemed like an ideal solution for both and could be
worked within existing regulations. I also must say that in the beginning, when
we did not make any profit, it worked like a charm. The problems started when
EI holdings in a few companies were suddenly worth millions. The more EI
turned into the most successful VC organization in Ireland, the more profits
become a yardstick, with the result that investment decisions are becoming
more and more conservative and profit-oriented. El is now so obsessed about
making money and does not care enough about the overarching goal that the
state should have - the development and growth of the industry" (interview
3/10/2001).
However, the most telling example of the acute lack of true seed capital might be
the political battle the ISA led to prevent the cancellation of the Business Expansion
Scheme (BES) and the Seed Capital Scheme (SCS). BES and SCS are tax schemes under
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which a group of private investors pool capital of up to the amount of £250,000 to invest
in exchange for stocks in a specific enterprise under special tax discount procedures. The
two, in particular the older BES, have been a crucial source of capital for all newly
established enterprises, especially IT NTBFs. Almost all of the Irish IT companies have
used the BES as their main, and sometime sole, source of seed financing.
The two schemes were supposed to phase out in the end of 2003. The Ministry of
Finance argued that the with Irish technology-oriented VC industry having the largest
ever amount of capital under management, and with El help, the two schemes, which
need a special approval from the EU competition commission, should be scraped.
However, with the Irish VC industry and El in effect reaching a deadlock over seed
investment, the importance of the two schemes to the industry rose even more after 2000.
In the end after extensive lobbying by the ISA the two schemes were prolonged until
2006 and their maximum amount was raised to El million. It is symbolic of the current
missteps and misunderstandings of the Irish state-industry co-evolution processes that the
chairman of the ISA, Cathal Friel, who has also been a top manager the Irish VC and
corporate finance industry, described the schemes as the only source of funding available
for start-ups in the software sector, apart from EI aid (O'Halloran 2003; Smyth 2004a;
Taylor 2003).
Hence, it seems that even with all the new initiatives and the greater amount of
finance designated for investment in the IT sector, the actual situation of the Irish IT
industry in 2004 is not that much different than that of the Irish IT industry in the
beginning of the 1990s. This, again, hurts the IT hardware industry more than it hurt the
software industry. The main reason for this disadvantage is that hardware product R&D
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phase is both longer and more expensive; therefore the risk associated with hardware
R&D is higher. The reaction of two leading VCs and hardware entrepreneurs to questions
about the lack of investment in the hardware sector are revealing:
"It is obvious why there are almost no new hardware companies. The risks are
a lot higher than in the software sector, so we prefer not to invest in them."
"There are no hardware followers to us because there is no money, you need a
lot more money in hardware than in software and when there is almost no
money period, then software companies, which can also generate revenues
through consultancy and bespoke development, will be the only ones that
survive."
"Hardware investment is just too risky for Irish VCs, the development phase is
long with no revenues, the costs are an order of magnitude higher than
software, this is just too risky. Even in software we dislike investing in
companies with no source of revenues. You want to know what was the best
VC investment of the year in my opinion? It was this lovely company, three
ex-Iona founders, they already generated E3 million in consultancy fees, and
now they talk about a product. They do not really know what the product is
going to be, just that it is going to be in middleware in the mobile domain. You
see? Three trusted veterans, a constant stream of revenue, and low risk that
they will go belly-up. These are the kind of investments we like to take part in,
not some haphazard idea for some hardware product development" (interviews
6/10/2003, 2/5/2004, 2/4/2002).
This crisis in new company formation coincides directly with the culmination of
the most extensive initiative to expand the Irish technology VC industry. Moreover, it
also coincides with the most extensive efforts ever to create significant academic R&D
activities, with the aim of fostering the continuous growth of the IT industry in Ireland. In
sum, it seems as if the co-evolutionary process of state-industry relation in Ireland is now
out of step. With EI's centrality in each and every point of the system and with its new
zeal for profit-generating investment, one must wonder if the future development of the
indigenous software industry in Ireland is now in danger of suffering from a stage II
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failure - the inability of the state to relinquish its own power over the sectoral industrial
system.2 2 4
The crisis in the formation of new firms is not the only crisis the Irish indigenous
software industry is facing. Internal reports done by the ISA strategic vision group in late
2003 showed that only 24 of the total of 700 Irish software companies reached the very
low barrier of £2 million in annual sales. These findings suggest that even established
software firms find it very difficult to expand their activities under the current conditions.
Moreover, less than 30% of surveyed companies in 2004 were even willing to look for
VC funding; this is a sharp decrease and another indicator of the growing mistrust
between industry, investors, and the state agencies (ISA 2003; ISA 2004; McManus
2002).
The one sector of the Irish IT industry to which this crisis is irrelevant is the MNC
sector. MNCs not only extended their R&D activities in Ireland by buying Irish IT firms
for their technologies, but also, in the last five years, moved to open their own in-house
R&D operations. Both Intel and IBM announced the opening of new R&D facilities, and
the MNCs' participation in the new Science Foundation Ireland schemes is growing,
compared to the almost insignificant participation of the local software industry.
Accordingly, it seems as if without some changes in policy the end result of the
new S&T industrial policy initiatives, aimed at least partly to diminish Ireland's over-
224 One measure of the new passion for profits and EI self-congratulatory mode, which is in part created by
the adherence to the neo-liberal interventionalist ideology, is the farewell interview, Dan Flinter, EI's first
CEO gave the Irish times before his departure in September 2003. Flinter was quick to point out that
Enterprise Ireland realized about E250 million in the 1999-2003 while investing "a sinfully small amount!"
Flinter also forcefully defended the status-qua, arguing that EI activities are getting the balance exactly
right (O'Keeffe 2003).
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reliance on the MNC sector might end up by increasing it (ISA 2004; IT 2003a; IT
2003b; Lillington 2003a; Lillington 2003b; Smyth 2004b).
Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the development of the IT industry and the co-evolution of
state-industry relations in Ireland. In particular, it inquired into the different ways in
which the state acquired its technological and scientific skills, the industry's evolution,
and the interdependencies between state policies and the industrial development. The
chapter evaluated policy vehicles as well as the amount of control the state attempted to
have over the IT industry's technological development path. Furthermore, it analyzed the
role of the state in fashioning the indigenous industry's relationships with the global
markets.
Since the 1950s, the Irish state developed its economic and industrial policies
adhering to the inherently conflicting ideology of neo-liberal interventionalism. This
ideology let Irish policy makers to devise and implement economic policy on the basis of
two opposing ideals, a neo-liberal free market principle and the opposing strong
interventionist ideal granting the state massive scope to construct, structure, and
restructure the Irish society for the common good. The main goal around which this
ideology, and consequently all Irish industrial policy, crystallized was job creation. With
the severe economic crisis and vast immigration bringing the leaders of Ireland to fear for
its survival as an independent state, job creation became the highest national objective
and the people and organizations that were designated to achieve it were granted
immense power and influence.
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The strong focus on job creation led the IDA, the industrial development agency
responsible, to develop an MNC policy orientation, a successful application of which
brought an almost constant stream of MNCs to open manufacturing facilities in Ireland.
Each such opening, created, as if by magic, a specific and usually large number of jobs.
The focus on MNCs and manufacturing also allowed for the utilization and growth of
employment-tied grants to become the main legitimate mechanism with which direct
financial aid was channeled to private companies.
Hence, the Irish IT industry developed within a very different system than that of
either Israel or Taiwan. Unlike both, the development of an indigenous IT industry was
not for many years the goal of the state. Moreover, the Irish bureaucracy, structured as it
is in the English flavor of Weberian ideals, was not deeply infused with scientific and
technological skills as the Israeli and Taiwanese. Moreover, none of Ireland's leading
politicians were engineers or scientists, nor did any of them attach any value to science
and technology as such. In fact, in the political context of job creation the local IT
industry was actually viewed with suspicion for many years.
The skills and policies that were developed were designed mainly around the core
goal of MNC-bringing industrial policies, and the realization that in order to continuously
bring and retain them Ireland needs to develop a highly skilled and technologically savvy
labor force. It is in the context of this industrial and innovation system that we can now
understand the specific development path of the Irish IT industry. The Irish software
industry's orientation toward the development of products of mid-sophistication,
developed in environment were not only were these the solutions that its main customers
needed, but also what the severe financial constraints allowed Irish software firms to
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develop. This is no more apparent than in the rise of the first globally successful Irish
software companies around the new mini-computer technology. This was a technology in
which Ireland, with its concentration of MNCs manufacturing subsidiaries, became a
global center of using.
However, it is precisely because of those particular circumstances that the effect
of the IDA's and later El's initiatives were so immense. Not only were the EDP's grants
many times the sole source of financing, but also the fact that the powerful IDA was
willing to invest in these companies granted them a much needed legitimacy, both
commercially and financially, and at least as importantly socially. Nevertheless, while the
indigenous software sector became the main recipient of the new policy initiatives, the
hardware sector was left behind and still remains mostly unattended. The changes in
policies together with the economic crisis of the 1980s and the growing success of the
software industry focused Ireland's industrial policies toward two new pillars:
internationally tradable-services and Irish-owned enterprises. The S&T industrial policies
developed in this context again made software the main beneficiary of these changes.
This was especially so with the NSD, staffed with veterans of the software industry,
becoming the main IT policy unit within the IDA and EI throughout the 1990s.
Toward the end of the 1990s, with the efforts of EI and the establishment of SFI
and PRLTI, coupled with the successful state actions to create and grow a local, and
locally financed and managed, technologically-oriented VC industry, it seems as if the
Irish IT industrial innovation system has been finally transformed. However, the
particular way in which this system evolved and the devotion of the Irish developmental
agencies to the two contradictory ideals of the neo-liberal interventionalist ideology still
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prevent the indigenous industry from enjoying most, if not all, of these newfound riches.
With their resources and knowledge and their new interest in moving more R&D
activities to Ireland, the MNCs are much better poised to utilize the growing academic
R&D infrastructure in Ireland. Already American MNCs are by far the largest patent
issuers in Ireland, and with the inability of the indigenous industry to successfully grow
firms, it is extremely vulnerable vis-A-vis the MNCs in two fronts. Hence, without
extensive changes in the indigenous-focused science and technology industrial policy, the
new move of Ireland into high level R&D, hailed as a way for Ireland to become less
dependent on FDI, would end up making the Irish economy even more dominated by
MNCs than before.
EI central position in all nodes of the IT industrial development networks is now
doing more to inhibit the continuous growth of the Irish IT industry than to aid it. With EL
representatives involved in each and every major decision of an NTBF life: its seed and
feasibility venturing, its designation as a "high-growth potential," the VC financing
rounds, the composition of its board of directors, and many of the times the establishment
of its first international offices, El is significantly more important to the industry than it
ever was before. Moreover, since El is the largest single investor and shareholder in the
Irish IT industry, both directly and as the chief investor in the Irish VC industry, the
agency now wields immense power over the future and present development of both the
Irish IT and VC industries. This situation rises two questions: i) is it advisable for the
state to wield these powers in such an advanced growth stage of a RIB industry? And, ii)
does El specifically uses these powers wisely and in accordance with the proper
yardsticks. Our analysis suggest that the answer to these two question is no.
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In short, the growth story of the Irish indigenous IT industry and the particular
mode of its development, side by side with Ireland's growth as a site for IT MNCs
manufacturing and logistics center, shows the utility of our theoretical framework.
Helping us to analyze the development of rapid-innovation-based industry in Ireland, our
framework pointed us to key areas of inquiry, and assisted us in understanding them. Our
analysis enabled us to inquire into both the considerable strengths and the weaknesses of
the Irish IT industry. Ireland is now well into becoming not only an MNC-led
powerhouse, but also an innovative indigenous IT industry powerhouse. However, it is
still an open question whether the Irish state can amend its neo-liberal interventionalist
ideology, a doctrinal anchor that served it so well, to accommodate for the building of the
risk-taking, privately managed, financial and services infrastructure this industry is
yearning for.
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Conclusion - Comparing Choices and Consequences in Rapid Innovation-
Based Industrialization
Choice: The act or opportunity of choosing; suggests the opportunity or privilege of choosingfreely
Consequence: Something produced by a cause; as a result
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary 11t" edition
Introduction
This dissertation has been motivated by two puzzles. First, what is the role of the
state in the development of RIB industries in less developed economies, under the
conditions of intensified globalization and fragmented production? Second, does the fact
that the IT industry's very different development paths, in particular in Israel, Ireland,
and Taiwan, suggest that multiple developmental choices are available to emerging
economies?
The dissertation shows that emerging economies do have the ability to craft and
select different paths in nurturing the growth of successful RIB industries. In my case
studies I elaborated on how diverse S&T industrial policies distinctly shaped the
development of each IT industry. In so doing, this dissertation dispels theories that solely
attribute the explanatory power to either the timing of industrialization or to specific
states' structures. The stories of Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan suggest that four factors are
crucial in order for a state to spur RIB industrial development.
First, the state needs to actively engage with industry to solve the fundamental
market failure in industrial R&D. Otherwise, the inherent characteristics of industrial
R&D, its indivisibility, inappropriability, and high uncertainties, all of which are
accentuated in the case of emerging economies with their lack of technological
capabilities and finance, would lead private investors to allocate sub-optimal amounts of
resources to research.
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Second, state action is also of crucial importance because the innovation process
itself is an inherently collective endeavor. As such, innovation is iterative and cooperative
in nature; therefore, there is a significant role for public actors in facilitating, enhancing,
and maintaining innovative activities.
Third, the state must actively link the local industry with global markets, both
production networks and financial markets.
Lastly, in each specific industrial sector, the state and industry need to be able to
manage constant change. State actions and policies that prove successful in early stages
of the industry's development might prove harmful in later stages. Specifically, the
development agencies need to be able to manage the political reality of their own
diminishing importance as the industry grows.
The theoretical framework presented in the first chapter offers a specific
understanding of the different consequences and final outcomes of the diverse choices
taken by Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan. First, our theory argues that specific industrial
R&D, dynamic economic capabilities, and business models are more suitable for certain
stages of the production process. Secondly, the analysis of the dynamics of production
stage specialization and economies of scale and scope indicates that industrial systems
specializing in specific stages of production tend, if successful, with time and effort, to
become ever more competitive and innovative in these specific stages. Consequently, to
understand the different evolutionary processes of RIB industrial growth we must: (a)
comprehend how industrial R&D and dynamic economic capabilities are created,
improved, and maintained in each of our cases; (b) follow the growing utilization of
certain business models in each of our cases; and (c) understand the development of
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specific relationships that the local industry has with the global industrial and financial
markets.
In short, our framework motivated us to a specific analysis of how different
behavior and structure of the state influences the development of the IT industry's R&D
capabilities in each of our cases, by looking at a few critical domains. The first domain is
state decisions on necessary R&D skill acquirement. The second domain is state
decisions on the degree of control it attempts to have on the technological development
path of the industry, including decisions of how, and whom, to finance. These decisions
affect both the R&D resources available to the industry and the scope of R&D activities.
The third domain is, state efforts to build the early local leading companies, and state
decisions concerning the involvement of foreign firms and investors within its national
borders, as well as decisions concerning whether to enhance specific relationships
between local and foreign companies outside the state's national borders. These
decisions, shape the resources, the particular feedback and information the industry gets
from its main customers, as well as the diffusion and development of specific innovative
capabilities.
We anticipated that private firms in the high technology industry of emerging
economies would have more limited R&D capabilities if the state tried to control the
industrial R&D development path, encompassed the R&D conducting agents within its
structure, supplied only limited resources, refrained from urging foreign companies to
conduct R&D activities within its borders, and limited the involvement of foreigners as
financiers. Throughout the three empirical chapters, this framework proved to be
effective in enabling us to comprehend how the particular choices of the three states led
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to the specific industrial outcomes in each case. Moreover, unlike other theoretical
frameworks, our framework proved helpful in understanding not only successes and
failures, but also the specific strengths and weaknesses of each industry. In short, the
theory helps not only in explaining results in the aggregate level but also in
comprehending the true nuances and consequences of the choices made and the actions
taken. Accordingly, by showing the plurality of actions and choices that emerging
economies have in order to develop their RIB industries, and by analyzing their particular
consequences, both positive and negative, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of
politics - the process of crafting, debating, deciding, and acting on different alternatives.
This concluding chapter takes a more comparative approach to this last point and
shows how political debates, on both the national and sectoral levels, influenced key
decisions about the critical variables of our framework. This chapter presents detailed
comparisons on three issues: R&D market failures, MNCs, and venture financing.
Together, these examples not only strengthen our arguments on how we should
reformulate our thinking on RIB industrial development, but also strengthen our
arguments on the role of politics at both the national and sectoral levels in defining the
very diverse economic growth paths emerging economies can, and should, follow.
Dealing with the "King Kongs" - The Politics of MNC-focused Policies
One of the critical factors in understanding the diverse development paths of the
IT industries in Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan is the different ways in which the state has
linked the local industry with the global industry. Nowhere are these differences more
apparent than in the diverse policies that the three countries employed with regard to
MNCs. This is also a crucial political choice as decisions with regard to MNCs are: i)
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decisions about the nationality of the ownership of local production, and hence, decisions
about the level of dependency on the international system and markets that the local
economy is willing to sustain; and ii) decisions that intimately attest to the national
perception of the local industry's current and potential capabilities as well as status.
Therefore, various policies followed by the three countries reflect the diversity of their
national identities as well as their perception of the world system.
Looking at the political context in which these policies developed, we find that, in
1950, Ireland was a country brought to the brink of poverty by two decades of extreme
nationalistic-autarkic industrial and economic policy, aimed at severing its dependence
on the UK. In this political situation, job creation became the national mission and a
significant social backlash spread against the ideals of national economic independence
and industrial isolation. Consequently, local industry was thoroughly discredited and its
capabilities and motives were suspect. The fact that the IDA's MNC-focused policies
were quickly perceived as effective in large-scale job creation, while the local industry
continued its downward spiral, strengthened this political atmosphere. Only by
understanding the socio-political context in which Ireland's first industrial policies
evolved, can we understand why, until very recently, the main aim of Irish S&T and
industrial policies was to maximize inward FDI and bring more MNCs to open labor-
intensive manufacturing facilities in Ireland, and why the local industry, specifically the
IT industry, was treated indifferently and its leaders regarded with doubt.
On the other hand, we have Taiwan, a state that, while much more willing to
create dependencies on international markets than its neighbors in North Asia, Japan and
South Korea, was much keener to see the nationality of the ownership of a significant
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percentage of the Taiwanese industry stay Taiwanese (Fuller 2002). Taiwan, in the
context of its growing political isolation, was actively trying to link its local industry as a
strategic supplier and partner to the world's leading MNCs. However, to accomplish this
vision, Taiwan still needed to create a critical mass of local industry, specifically locally
owned, in the context of a political system distrusting the concentration of power in big
multidivisional conglomerates, and within a financial system designed to prevent the use
of large-scale long-term debt. Only by taking account of these political constraints and
wishes, can we understand why the Taiwanese state at the same time tried to lure MNCs
into Taiwan, employing tactics similar to Ireland's, and pressure these MNCs to source a
significant percentage of their components locally as well as to transfer to Taiwanese
companies the necessary know-how to manufacture them.
Lastly, Israel conceptualized its economic future not in terms of job creation, but
in terms of the creation of a "science-based" industry. Hence, the policy goal was to
maximize a certain set of activities and to build an industry whose main activities in
Israel would be the creation and development of new products and technologies.
Moreover, in the political context in which Israel has operated since 1967, with the Arab
embargo, cooperation with MNCs was perceived as a significant international
achievement, especially convincing these MNCs to locate activities of strategic
importance in Israel. This is especially true since the vision of a "science-based" industry,
unlike the Taiwanese industrial vision, does not inherently necessitate national ownership
of the organization conducting these activities.
Looking at the behavior of American IT MNCs in the three preceding chapters,
we saw that these diverse national policies translated into marked differences in the ways
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in which MNCs linked with the Israeli, Irish, and Taiwanese industries, as well as in the
activities the MNCs located in the three countries. In contrast to the way American IT
MNCs have been operating in Ireland and Taiwan, In Israel many, if not all, of the MNCs
first activity was to open R&D centers, or to buy Israeli NTBFs and transform them into
R&D centers, moving only later, if at all, to manufacturing activities. These diverse MNC
behaviors translated into the different outputs MNCs supplied to the local industrial
system, and the different inputs they sourced from it. Accordingly, these differences
translated to different incentives for capabilities development as well as different
resources and opportunities available in pursuing them for the local IT industry.
Two examples of the different paths pursued by two leading MNCs, Intel and
3Com, in Israel and Ireland serve as a way to highlight these differences and their impact.
In 1974, Dov Frohman, a senior Israeli researcher in Intel's California headquarters,
decided to return to Israel and accept a professorship in the School for Applied Physics at
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.22 5 As Intel wanted to retain the services of Frohman,
the company agreed to open its first design and development center outside the US in
Israel, with five employees.226 In doing so, Intel pioneered a mode by which many MNCs
started operations in Israel.227 Over the years, the Intel center was highly successful and
continuously enlarged its R&D activities. By 2002, it encompassed seven centers. In
1985, Intel Israel also pioneered the first movement of Intel toward silicon chip
225 In 1971, shortly after joining Intel in 1969 and after the first kbit DRAM was released, Dov Frohman
invented the UVEPROM, an electrically programmable memory that holds the programmed values until
erased by intense ultraviolet light. Frohman invented, developed, designed, and fabricated the first
UVEPROM.
226 One must note, though, that opening a small SC design center is not as capital-intensive a high-risk
decision as is opening a fabrication facility; total investment in the Israeli center was $300,000 (1974
terms).
227 Over the years, Israeli senior R&D managers in other American MNCs have followed this pattern and
returned to Israel to open R&D operations for their MNCs. National Semi-Conductors and KLA are two
prominent examples.
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fabrication activities outside the US when the first Intel fab in Israel started operations in
Jerusalem. In 1999, Intel started the operation of its second fab in Israel. In 2000,
following the acquisition by Intel of two companies with major R&D centers in Israel,
DSPC and Dialogic Israel, Intel's R&D activities evolved into two more product
platforms. Beyond these, the activities in Israel of Intel Capital, Intel's venture capital
arm, are the most comprehensive in terms of investment outside the US. During 2002-03,
Intel Capital was the most active foreign investor in Israel.
Throughout the years, Intel Israel R&D has been responsible for some critical
components in Intel's global strategy, including the 8088 (IBM's famous pick as a CPU
for its first PC) and the Pentium MMX technology. In 2000, Intel Israel had revenues of
$2USD billion and employed 4,000 people; as of 2002, Intel Israel was responsible for
the development of the next generation's laptop-oriented CPUs, 3G mobile network
products, and a few other critical components of Intel's global R&D strategy, such as the
development of the latest technologies for optoelectronic chips' manufacturing.
In 1989, Intel decided to start manufacturing operations in Ireland. The main
reason behind Intel's decision to locate in Ireland was the company's fear of an imminent
creation of "Fortress Europe" by the EC (now EU) in 1992. A year after the first box
assembly operation began, Intel decided to open a full-scale fab, making Ireland the only
other place apart from Israel with an Intel fab at the time. Within a few years, Intel
realized that "Fortress Europe" was not an imminent danger and the box assembly line
was closed. However, fabrication activities continued. Moreover, local management,
spurred by the shock of the closure and helped by an Israeli who became the fab
developer and manager, and using his experience in Israel started low-profile R&D
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activities aimed at the creation of a center of excellence in specific technologies in
Ireland. Intel Ireland also managed to lobby Intel HQ to create a special position for Intel
Capital in Ireland, which started operations in 2001 and has already invested in a few
local start-ups.2 2 8
3Com's involvement in Israel enlightens the second and newer route used by
MNCs' starting operation in Israel. In 1994, 3Com bought NiceCom, an Israeli company
that developed local area network ATM switches.229 NiceCom was then transformed into
the NiceCom division inside 3Com, responsible for the development of all ATM
technology in 3Com, which enlarged its Israeli NiceCom R&D center through a few
more M&As, and ended with a critical mass of 300 people in Herzelia. At the end of the
1990s, 3Com became a large complex company and suffered from growing financial
difficulties. As a result, 3Com started a process in which it spun off, among others, Palm,
its handheld division; its modem division under the old US Robotics brand (which it
bought with the acquisition of US Robotics, another company with an R&D center in
Israel); and, in February 2000, Atrica, a new Israeli start-up developing urban optical
networks and headed by none other than the old NiceCom executive team. As of 2004,
Atrica inherited all of 3Com's R&D activities in Israel and has been considered one of
Israel's most promising start-ups, managing by the beginning of 2005 to secure more than
228 The history of Intel in Ireland and Israel is based on interviews with five executives of Intel and Intel
Capital in Israel and Ireland, and email communication with Dov Frohman. See, also Dror 2/6/2002,Wired
Magazine "Tech New Promised Land," 1/17/2000, also available on line,
http://www.wired.com/news/infstructure/0, 1377,33537,00.html, and Intel Israel and Intel Ireland
websites: http ://www.intel.com/il/ and http ://www.intel.comn/ireland/.
229 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is an international standard for cell relay in which multiple service
types (such as voice, video, or data) are conveyed in fixed-length (53-byte) cells. This makes ATM a fast
data transmission protocol as fixed-length cells allow cell processing to occur in hardware, thereby
reducing transit delays.
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$160USD million in investment. Moreover, the former CEO and now chairman of 3Com
and CEO and Chairman of Palm, Eric Benhamou, serves as Atrica's Chairman.
For reasons similar to Intel's "Fortress Europe" strategy, 3Com started its Irish
operation in 1992 by opening a plant in Dublin. Over the years, the Dublin operation
became the best in quality and yields, and 3Com opened a small R&D center in Dublin. It
is an interesting fact that even as 3Com was reeling from 18 months of downsizing in
2002, the Irish R&D center was still operative when all others were closed or spun off,
and that, although 3Com has outsourced all of its manufacturing activities, mainly to
Flextronics, and closed down all of its other plants worldwide, the Irish plant was the last
to close. According to 3Com, the reasons behind this decision have been a mix of the
high quality and yields for the Dublin plant; the Irish tax regime; the fact that Ireland is
part of the EU; the excellent infrastructure for European deliveries around Dublin; and
last, but not least, the excellent relationship with the Irish government.230
Thus, the story of Intel and 3Com exemplify the very different ways in which
their national IT industries are embedded in the MNCs' global production network. Israel
has always been first and foremost a location for high-level R&D activities, while Ireland
was mainly deemed a strategic location for manufacturing. These different relationships
brought leading American MNCs to locate very different activities in each location,
creating very different relationships with, demands from, economic incentives for, as well
as opportunity structures and resource availability for, the local IT industry.
230 Sources: interview with Eric Benhamu, former CEO and Chairman of 3Com 1990-2000, and current
Chairman of 3Com, Chairman and CEO of Palm 2/13/2002, Asis 2/20/2002; Harmony 2/14/2002, and the
company's website www.3 com.com.
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Facilitating Industrial R&D - The Politics of the State as a Researcher
A second critical component in understanding the different development paths of
the Israeli, Irish, and Taiwanese IT industries is the ways in which the three states
devised different solutions to the problem of industrial R&D market failure. Of particular
importance is the question of the location of the R&D generating agents within the
industrial system, public versus private. In all three countries this debate was intimately
connected to the national perception of capabilities, status, and identity, as well as to the
politics and the bureaucratic structure of knowledge. Taiwan and Israel are the two cases
between which a deeper comparison is most revealing.
Looking at Israel in 1968, with a total of 886 R&D workers with academic
degrees in the whole civilian industrial sector, one might wonder how the Katchalski
Committee came to the conclusion that the growth of science-based industry should be
the core of Israel's S&T industrial policy goals. However, even more interesting, and
easily forgotten, is the fact that the committee's recommendations, which were
transformed to specific policies, viewed state-run public research institutions as the main
vehicle for this socio-economic transformation. Hence, between 1968 and 1973, Israel
undertook major steps toward following a development path very similar to Taiwan's.
Nonetheless, by 1974 the reliance on public research institutions was quickly curtailed,
and the system refocused around a policy regime viewing private companies as the main
agents for industrial R&D and technological development. Thus two questions arise: why
did Israel, unlike Taiwan, choose to change course? And what enabled Israel to do so
with such speed and without any significant political backlash?
The answers to these two questions are intimately related to these two countries'
different politics of technological knowledge, perception of national identity, state-
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industry relations, and the political-bureaucratic structure of power. First, let us look at
the question of each country's political context of state-industry relations and the politics
of technological knowledge. In Taiwan, the ruling party, the KMT, while viewing the
growth of private industry as the ultimate end, at the same time mistrusted private
entrepreneurs and their motives and was actively pursuing policies to prevent the growth
of competing centers of power (Cheng 1993; Fields 1995; Gold 1986; Hong 1997; Wade
1990; Wu 2001). In Israel, on the other hand, the ruling labor party actively tried to grow
a strong private industry and was pursuing policies to limit the power of the public and
semi-public sectors (Levi-Faur 1998; Levi-Faur 2001). Accordingly, if at the starting
point in both societies, the existing infrastructure of industrial R&D consisted mainly of
public research institutions, in the political context of Taiwan such a system would have
offered an optimal solution to competing political goals. In Israel, on the other hand, a
system focusing on public research institutions not only clashed with the ultimate goal of
building private science-based industry, and hence, an industry with significant R&D
capabilities, but it also clashed with the political-economic goal of the ruling Labor party
to strengthen the private sector at the expense of the public sector.
However, at least as important in facilitating the Israeli course change were the
different politics of knowledge in the two states. Here the bureaucratic structure of
knowledge and power as well as the perception and structure of the academic system,
were of key importance. In Taiwan, the decision to create ITRI and later III was the
personal undertaking of two prominent KMT leaders, Dr. Y.S. Sun and Dr. K.T. Li. As a
consequence, the two public research institutions were under the direct patronage of two
leading politician-bureaucrats, who had direct interest in their continuous development.
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From the mid-1 970s onward, K.T. Li devoted his career and considerable power to the
development of the Taiwanese IT industry through ITRI and III.
In addition, the high echelons of the Taiwanese bureaucracy consisted of
engineers. Therefore, the view of a state deeply involved in charting the technological
development of its industry and locating the R&D agents within the state structure, was
accepted not only as natural, but also as politically prudent, and helped to directly
enhance the power and status of the two patrons of ITRI and III. Lastly, during that
period, the university system in Taiwan was thoroughly controlled by the KMT, with
virtually all the professors and administrators nominated by the KMT and members of
stature in the party. Academic freedom was not a widely held value, and the goals of
academic research were intimately tied to the national aims of improving Taiwan's
economic and political power.
In Israel, the situation was almost directly opposite. No leading politician had any
direct interest in Israel's public-research institutions. The political leaders who decided
the fate of Israel's S&T industrial policies did not possess Ph.D. degrees, nor did they
personally undertake the development of the IT industry. S&T industrial policy in Israel
was always deemed to be a professional domain. Values of academic freedom and "pure"
basic research were strong. Until the late 1970s, developing the research capability of
strictly academic institutions was a high national priority, sometimes even higher then
national security and the growth of the defense industry. A case in point is the story of the
transfer of a whole department to the Weizmann Institute of Science from RAFAEL, the
public research institution for the development of armaments. This was done in order to
enhance the national academic research infrastructure, and against the wishes of
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RAFAEL that invested significant resources into the development of this department and
viewed it as critical to its future R&D plans (Mardor 1981. Pp. 113-117. ).231
Consequently, after the 1973 war, when the government of Israel decided to give
higher priority to the development of industrial R&D and science-based industry by
recruiting a prominent and strong-willed professional, Itzhak Yaakov, to head the OCS,
he was given the power to transform it into an active agency, and had authority to
formulate and implement policies. Coming from within the military, and possessing
strong international connections and education, Yaakov was ideologically opposed to
public research institutions. In an interview he concluded:
"My second guiding principle was that a state cannot guide the industry. The
state cannot come and say from now on we will develop engines for
helicopters, this is a complete dead-end. Successful industrial R&D comes
from the people themselves. Therefore, the problem of the state is to give the
entrepreneurs who think they know what they are doing the ability to do so.
The key to understand is that we cannot control the consumers; accordingly
good ideas have to come from the market, not from the state. These are the
reasons why in my second year I decided to cut the budget of the public
research institutes by 70% and transfer the finance directly to industry"
(interview 9/28/2000).
The combination of the different national political contexts, ideologies of
development and science, political patronage for the public research institutes, and the
bureaucratic structure of power, were the main reasons why in Israel, once Yaakov
decided to dismantle the public research institution-based S&T industrial policy, he could
do so in matters of days, while in Taiwan, this option was not even considered.
These decisions have had decisive long-term consequences on the development
path of the IT industries in Israel and Taiwan. In Israel, the focus on the enhancement of
231 Indeed the social status of academia in Israel was so high in these early years that RAFAEL viewed it as
critical to win a political battle to grant its R&D employees recognition as academic personnel, giving them
the same wage agreements and similar career pattern as those of university professors and not of engineers
(Mardor 1981. Pp. 88-92.)
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technological cutting-edge R&D activities of private firms has propelled IT companies to
develop capabilities that facilitated novel products innovation based on the latest
technologies, the newest technologies themselves, or new applications of these
technologies, and has led Israel's IT industry into its position as a supplier of new
technologies to the global IT industry's production networks. Nonetheless, the source of
the industry's gravest Achilles' heel is also the state's almost exclusive focus on
promoting private firms to conduct R&D activities and follow business models based on
new innovations. Because the development of management and business skills have
laggard, many Israeli companies have difficulties in maintaining enduring success.
In Taiwan, the decision to utilize public research institutions-based S&T
industrial policy led to the development of an industrial innovation system with strong
division of labor between industry and public research institutions. This pattern limits the
development of R&D capabilities of private firms by motivating these firms to
concentrate more on the development part of the R&D. In this system, it is the public
research institutions that decide which R&D projects should be pursued, conduct nearly
all R&D, and only then diffuse the results to private industry; accordingly, core R&D
capabilities' development is concentrated within the public sector. Thus, in Taiwan,
specifically because its institutional system, the industry successfully developed
advanced capabilities in second-generation, process, and manufacturing innovation, but
not in new product development. While it has been this system that propelled Taiwan to
unprecedented success in the IT hardware sector, it is an open question as to whether
Taiwan can change this system to allow it to move to original, new product R&D
activities in the future.
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Financing and Resources - Going Local or Going Global?
A third critical variable in the diverse development paths of the IT industries in
Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan has been the connections of industry with the global financial
markets. In all three countries, key decisions by the state were taken as part of policy
initiatives to create local VC industries. These were again decisions that are closely
linked to questions about the ownership and the long-term embeddedness of the industry
within the national context. On the one hand, a tight relationship with the global investing
community and financial markets gives the industry an opening to an immensely rich
supply of skills, resources, and capital. On the other hand, this same linking transfers a
large portion of the ownership of local industry into foreign hands, and this same
dependency on foreign financial markets weakens the industry's national linkages.
Moreover, the more connected the industry is to the global financial markets, the more
the fruits of the local IT industry's success are redistributed to foreign investors who are
not as inclined as local investors, to reinvest their gains in the national economy. Lastly,
national governments have more power to influence the behavior of local financiers.
Hence, while from the point of view of overall industrial development, linking the IT
industry with experienced foreign VCs might be preferred, governments might favor
working with local institutions and individuals.
In each of our cases, the developmental agencies followed very different VC
creation policies. A large percentage of these differences can indeed be explained by the
different conceptualizations by policy makers of the VC industry itself. Chapters 2-4
showed the distinction between two VC creation policy styles: one that sees VC creation
as a problem of a missing pool of capital, and a second that sees VC as a distinct industry
with specific skills and capabilities (Avnimelech and Teubal 2003a). This explains much
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of the outcome in terms of VC behavior. Nevertheless, this distinction obscures the
intense political nature of these policies, specifically since, in the case of emerging
economies, a decision to treat VC as a distinct industry, strongly suggests a need to
tightly connect the local with the global VC industry and financial markets.
In Taiwan, the VC industry was, like many other initiatives, the brainchild of the
leading technocrat-politician Dr. K.T. Li. Impressed by the US VC industry in the early
1980s, Dr. Li viewed the VC industry mainly as a supplier of a dedicated pool of capital.
In the Taiwanese political context, Dr. Li considered it essential that the main investors in
the industry would be Taiwanese. In 1983, under his influence, VCs were allowed to
register as companies, and not as limited partnerships. The main vehicle to channel
capital to these newly formed companies was tax credits of 20% to shareholders in VC
firms. This tax incentive remained in place until 2000, and was the main reason behind
the extensive amount of finance channeled specifically to VCs. It is not surprising that in
this political context many of the early VCs were financial subsidiaries of different KMT
investment vehicles. For the most part, the VC industry in Taiwan remains captive to
various investors, both financial and industrial. The VCs themselves lack extensive
industry experience and are mainly recruited from those with financial background.
Taiwan's VC industry, operating under the regulations that force VCs to be registered as
companies, also continued to be extremely local. As of the end of 2003, according to the
Taiwanese VC association, foreign capital still amounted to less than seven percent.23 2
In Israel, the political and industrial contexts were almost the opposite. By the
beginning of the 1990s, not only was the IT industry already relatively well embedded in
the American financial markets, with a cumulative number of about a dozen companies
232 Interview with Taiwan's VC Association secretary general, 11/3/2003.
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already listed on NASDAQ, but also the first private VCs appeared and foreign financiers
were their main investors. The OCS took the lead after a first failed attempt, Inbal,
headed by the Ministry of Finance to spur a local VC industry with an organizational
form very similar to Taiwan's - VCs as publicly listed holding companies on the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange. Unlike Taiwan or Ireland, the OCS linked VC policy and made it
an integral part of its overall reconfiguration program for the high-technology industrial
environment in the early 1990s. In this political context, we can understand why Yozma,
as the VC creation initiative was known, was conceptualized in the way it was.
In the early 1990s, the OCS used the political window of opportunity created by
the massive waves of immigration from the former Soviet Union to launch a series of
policy initiatives. Each of these three initiatives was part of an overall program to fix
what the OCS analyzed as areas of persistent weakness with Israel's RIB industries:
extreme early seed investment, skills and finance in the more mature market penetration
stage of firms' development, and advanced generic R&D capabilities. Thus, the creation
of the VC industry was not conceptualized solely as a problem of financing, but as part of
a systemic weakness of missing capabilities. It is in this context with the already deep
embeddedness of the Israeli industry within the American financial markets, and only
after the failure of the Inbal program to create a locally financed VC industry, that we can
understand the advancement of the Yozma program. In particular, its conceptualization of
VC as an industry with skills that were lacking in Israel, and as a deliberate political
attempt to increase both the field of investors and their clients as well as to tie the Israel
IT industry more fully with the global financial markets.
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In Ireland, the one rarely talked about but quite striking political constraint, in the
period when the IT-focused VC initiative materialized in the second half of the 1990s,
was the recent reorganization of the developmental agencies and the sharp division of
labor between their two domains and clientele. On one side of the divide was IDA-
Ireland with MNCs and all FDI inflows into Ireland being its domain. On the other side
was the newly structured, and out to prove itself, Enterprise Ireland with local industry
and all local enterprise and investment being its domain. VC policy, under other political
circumstances, a bridge with which to connect FDI inflows with local enterprise
development, fell within the domain of El and was led by the NSD.
Hence, even with the declared aim of the NSD VC initiative to embed the Irish IT
industry more intimately with the global markets and to aid Irish companies in their
pursuit of foreign success, and even with the acknowledged political goal of increasing
the circle of financiers in Ireland, which was deemed too narrow, the political
institutional constraints limited the NSD to seek established local financial institutions as
partners for its VC program. Accordingly, the NSD, utilizing EU funds, opted on the one
side to enforce the organizational form of limited partnerships, similar to Israel and in
imitation of the US, but on the other side specifically chose only Irish institutions as its
partners.233 The institutional division between the IDA and El is also becoming an
artificial obstacle with the growing interest of the MNCs in the Irish IT industry.
Consequently, many managers of MNCs and their VC arms find that their "natural"
political interlocutors are located within the IDA. However, the proper interlocutors for
issues of Irish IT industrial development are all situated in El.
233 Interview with El VC program official 3/7/2002.
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All the three very different VC creation policy initiatives of Ireland, Israel, and
Taiwan have been exceptionally successful. However, all three had very different
outcomes in terms of the VC industries created, and in terms of the tremendously
different relationships between the local IT industry and foreign markets they nurtured.
In Taiwan, the creation and rapid growth of this VC industry has helped the
Taiwanese IT industry, in particular the hardware industry, to evolve in the way that it
did. Taiwanese VCs are both much more conservative than their US counterparts and also
much less capable of giving added value in running a true R&D-based young venture.
The VC industry in Taiwan prefers to invest in companies with the more established
business models of second-generation innovation or OEM/ODM. Moreover, as virtually
all of its financings are Taiwanese, and as the VCs are registered Taiwanese companies,
the Taiwanese VCs are under no pressure to seek financial exits in foreign financial
markets. Hence, not only does the Taiwanese VC industry strengthen the linkage of the
Taiwanese IT industry within Taiwan, but it also diffuses some of the need it otherwise
might have had to embed itself more tightly into the global financial markets. Thus, it
seems as if the political goal of keeping the Taiwanese industry Taiwanese has been
achieved; however, only at the price of a less sophisticated and much more conservative
VC industry.
In Israel, on the other hand, the VC industry that rapidly grew in the late 1990s is
better seen as an extension of the American financial markets and VC community than as
a purely Israeli industry. Almost all of the financing of the industry is foreign, with the
share of local investors actually diminishing after the dotcom crash on NASDAQ. Most
of the biggest funds not only have offices in the US and Europe, but also have general
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partners (i.e., VCs) who are experienced American and European VCs. Most of the VCs
have industry experience and operate very similarly to Silicon Valley VCs. Even more
importantly, with the finance and the organizational modes coming from the US, Israeli
VCs are seeking foreign financial exits. Thus, the linkage of the IT industry with the rest
of the Israeli economy is severely weakened, while its embeddedness in the global
financial markets is growing. In addition, the need to seek foreign exits and the diffusion
of the Silicon Valley VC model limit the Israeli IT industry to employ, almost
exclusively, novel R&D-based models. Lastly, with the investors of the VC industry
mostly being foreign institutions, most of their profits are transferred back to the
investors, and hence, out of the Israeli economy, with, relative to Taiwan, only a small
fraction of the capital staying within Israel. The existence of such a VC industry is thus
both positive and negative. For example only with such intimate connections to foreign
capital markets could Atrica, the spin-off of 3Com's Israeli R&D center, raise more than
$160USD million to support novel R&D activities, a sum that is alone larger than the
combined capital managed by the biggest Irish VC companies. However, Atrica's CEO is
no longer Israeli, the HQ is no longer in Israel, and the financial gains of Atrica's
success, if and when they arrive, will be mostly enjoyed by foreigners.
In Ireland the VC industry seems to be stuck in the middle. On the one hand the
industry tries to imitate the American model and employ a hands-on value-added
investment and management policy. On the other hand, most of its finance, and hence, its
connections are with Irish financial institutions and the VCs' background is mainly in the
financial and management-consulting industry. Therefore, the Irish VCs' ability to add
value and to link their companies to foreign financial markets is limited. Indeed, with the
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Irish government being the single biggest source of funds, the VC industry is keener to be
seen as helping the growth of the Irish IT industry. However, apart from a short period in
the end of the 1990s, the VCs' apparent influence vis-A-vis the sums under the industry's
management has actually declined. Nonetheless, the creation of a growing VC industry in
Ireland has changed the rules of the game. Unlike in the past, a pure R&D business model
is no longer seen as a taboo. Moreover, the strong connection of the VC industry to
Ireland, in a very similar way to Taiwan, aids in diffusing some of the pressure of Irish IT
firms to embed themselves more strongly in foreign markets at the expense of their
"Irishness." With a VC industry flush with capital it is also plausible to expect that once
the global IT industry shows signs of substantial improvement, Irish IT NTBFs can hope
to raise significant amounts of finance for R&D. Nonetheless, as of 2005, not only did the
rapid growth of the Irish VC industry not transform the shape and size of the Irish IT
industry, but also the existence of the VC industry and the attention it gained from the
state might actually have hurt the ability of NTBFs to commence operations in the short
run.
In Conclusion: The Politics of RIB Industrial Growth in a World of Fragmented
Production
The premise of this dissertation is that - with the extensive and rapid changes of
industries, the international system, and the nature of industrial production itself - there is
a need to establish a framework to analyze the role of the state in RIB industrial
development. Since the early days of the late development theory, research on industrial
production, innovation, and economic growth has diverged. Hence, we no longer have a
coherent body of literature capable of answering the questions that motivate this
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dissertation. Accordingly, the first chapter was devoted to analyzing, synthesizing, and
building on three schools of thought - late development, systems of innovation, and
globalization, particularly the globalization of production networks - to develop a
theoretical framework. The rest of this dissertation used this framework to analyze the
role of the state in the development of the IT industry in Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan. This
inquiry was conducted in order to answer three questions: first, what are the roles of the
state in RIB industrial development in emerging economies? Second, do states and
societies have choices in their economic development strategies? And third how does
globalization, especially the radical transformation of production, influence the
development opportunities of peripheral economies?
Our analysis of the development of the IT industries in Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan
yielded the following answers. First, there is a significant role for the state in creating and
sustaining RIB industrial development. This role, however, is not fixed. Emerging
economies have many different choices in their efforts to develop RIB industries. Each of
these choices has major consequences on the developmental path of each industry. This is
particularly true with regard to industrial and innovational capabilities, and the ways in
which each of these national industries is embedded into the global product networks and
financial markets. For this reason, while globalization might limit the scope of state
capabilities to develop their national industries in the strong development state method
used by South Korea or Japan, globalization, especially the growing fragmentation of
production, opens numerous new entry points for RIB industries in emerging economies.
As a consequence, the role of the state in RIB industrial development has
significantly changed. First, the state needs to actively engage in the fostering of
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industrial R&D and innovation. In so doing, the state is devising different solutions to: i)
the inherent industrial R&D market failure, which is heightened in the case of emerging
economies; and, ii) the need to start a collective, i.e., a community, effort to foster
innovation, which stems from the fact that innovation by its very nature is an iterative and
social endeavor. However, precisely because of this, and the fact that long term strategic
planning is less feasible in RIB industries where technology itself or its latest application
are the products, the state cannot assume a position of central planning and command.
Rather, the state role is more limited to that of creating capabilities, spurring specific
activities, and motivating private enterprises for sustained efforts in RIB industries.
Another argument of our theory, that was found to be true in our analysis, is that
the proper level of analysis of states' RIB industrial development efforts should be in the
specific industrial sector level and at the level of particular state agencies, not solely in
the national level. State can both fail and succeed in their RIB industrialization efforts in
different sectors. Furthermore, many times sectoral, and not national, policies have more
direct influence on industrial development. This is especially true as, in contrast with the
traditional Weberian ideals, our view of the state bureaucracy is of a fragmented and
flexible civil service deeply embedded in various industrial sectors. For this reason, we
should no longer view the state as a monolithic whole. Thus, a crucial factor in
understanding industrial success is to comprehend the political processes of state-industry
co-evolution at both the national and sectoral level.
Another crucial role of the state is to link its local burgeoning RIB industry with
global markets, both production networks and financial markets, both inside and outside
its national borders. Our theory allowed us to develop hypotheses as to the specific
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development paths of successful IT industrial sectors and apply them to analyses of
Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan. As predicted, we found that in the case of Taiwan a hardware
industry developed that excels in second generation innovation and high level design and
manufacturing services, as well as in the supplying of components, where the state: i)
located the R&D conducting agents mostly within its own structure; ii) is intimately
involved in decisions about the technological development path of the industry; iii) has
been aiming specifically at developing companies that excel as ODM/OEMs, as well as
actively trying to foster OEM/ODMs relationships between local companies and MNCs;
and, iv) has been striving to limit the relationship of Taiwanese NTBFs to Taiwanese
financial institutions.
In the case of Israel an IT industry developed that excels in novel product
innovation and new technology creation, where the state: i) focused on motivating private
firms to innovate and refrained from targeting specific technological development paths,
instead focusing on fostering a specific set of activities, R&D; ii) has been actively
helping in the creation of particular relationship between local companies and MNCs
where Israeli firms focus on new product R&D, iii) has had an FDI-focused industrial
policy whose sole goal was to motivate MNCs to open R&D subsidiaries in Israel; and,
iv) has been vigorously trying to tie the local companies as closely as it can with foreign
financial institutions. Nevertheless, the Israeli IT industry lacks several managerial skills,
and is not highly tied to Israel and the rest of the Israeli economy.
In Ireland an IT industry developed that excels in developing software products of
mid-sophistication, usually offering applications of novel technologies in new markets
and industries, rarely developing the new technologies itself, where the state: i) focused
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on job creation for many years, attempting to bring MNCs to open large-scale
manufacturing facilities in Ireland and paying much less attention to the creation of the
local IT industry; ii) was not actively trying to embed these MNCs with the local
industry; iii) was for a long period of time not channeling many resources for industrial
R&D activities, and since then has concentrating on the software industry, taking less
notice of the hardware industry; and iv) while not specifically dissuading local industry
from deeply interacting with the global financial institutional, was, nevertheless, growing
an Irish-owned vastly state-dependent VC industry.
The most important conclusion of this dissertation is that states and societies still
have real choices with regard to developing their own RIB industries. Moreover, each set
of choices has particular consequences that can be foreseen, at least partly.
Therefore the final message of this dissertation is a positive one: less developed
states and societies still have extensive opportunities to improve their economic well-
being and spur RIB industrial development. Moreover, there is more than one model to
follow in order to achieve success. Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan have demonstrated that
there are at least three, and probably more, development paths that other countries can
follow. Moreover, our theoretical framework has shown the feasibility of developing
models that would help us to predict the industrial outcomes in both capabilities
development and the social distribution of success of different choice sets. For that reason
this dissertation constitutes one step in a research continuum that will grant us greater
understanding of the politics and outcomes of RIB industrial development.
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